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ABSTRACT
This project develops an interpretive account of the single reasonableness
standard as it has evolved in the Canadian Supreme Court case law since its introduction
in New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir. My analyses show, contrary to
the bulk of the academic commentary, that reasonableness is a clear and coherent
standard of review. Specifically I show that in the eyes of the Court, interference owing
to unreasonableness is required only when decisions are not justified in the context of the
legal framework. Unjustified decisions demand interference because they are arbitrary in
the sense that the powers of the state are exerted without regard for the accepted system
of rules, meaning they undermine the rule of law. Once a justification has been confirmed
to exist, however, all grounds for interference owing to unreasonableness have been
extinguished because interference with a justified decision undermines the foundational
democratic principle.

Keywords: Canadian administrative law, judicial review, the rule of law, reasonableness,
the single reasonableness standard, the standard of review analysis, New Brunswick
(Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, judicial interference, the broad and purposive
approach to correctness, municipal law, justifications, arbitrary decision making.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Judicial review seeks to address an underlying tension between the rule of law
and the foundational democratic principle, which finds an expression in the
initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies
and endow them with broad powers. Courts, while exercising their constitutional
functions of judicial review, must be sensitive not only to the need to uphold the
rule of law, but also to the necessity of avoiding undue interference with the
discharge of administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated to
administrative bodies.1
1. Seeking Equilibrium
According to the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in New Brunswick
(Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, judicial review strives to preserve the rule of law in
a manner that does not unduly undermine the will of the democratic majority as
expressed by elected representatives, manifest in the decisions of administrative
appointees. So understood, the process of judicial review partially balances the powers of
the two fundamental institutions of Canada’s constitutional order, i.e., Parliament and the
provincial legislatures, and the courts. The substance of that balance is found in the
standards that define judicial review; they determine when judicial interference is
necessary to ensure the rule of law persists, and when judicial interference is prohibited
out of respect for the ‘foundational democratic principle’ as expressed by administrative
decision-makers.
This project consists in an extended analysis of the most significant explicit
reform to the process of judicial review introduced in Dunsmuir, i.e., the single
reasonableness standard. I argue that that standard has evolved into “a principled
framework that is… coherent and workable.”2 One of the primary ways in which the
framework implied by reasonableness is, on my account, coherent and workable is the
1
2

New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] at para 27.
Ibid at para 32.
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single, general principle it satisfies: judicial interference with administrative bodies
owing to unreasonableness will occur only when interference is necessary to preserve the
rule of law. And when judicial interference is not necessary to preserve the rule of law, it
is prohibited out of respect for the foundational democratic principle.
Showing that the evolution of reasonableness has been guided by an attempt to
establish an equilibrium between judicial interference and a respect for the delegated
authority of administrative decision makers requires I elaborate its substance. I show the
post-Dunsmuir Supreme Court case law holds that reasonableness:
(i) Consists in a cluster of five interrelated concepts that are semantically clear
and imply a coherent conceptual order according to which each must be satisfied.
(ii) Sets a specific threshold which, when met by an administrative decision,
prohibits the possibility of judicial interference.
(iii) Is applied in an identical manner every time the reasonableness of a decision
is assessed.
(iv) Is concerned exclusively with confirming that legally relevant reasons
supporting the impugned decision exist, and so is not directly concerned with
assessing the substance of the decision itself. Any decision supported by legally
relevant reasons is, by definition, reasonable.
To bolster my case for the clarity of reasonableness, I rely on this framework to
resolve two potential confusions about the impact of that standard on the process of
judicial review. First, I rely on this account to precisely characterize the change it has
yielded to the circumstances in which judicial interference is deemed necessary to
preserve the rule of law:
(v) The single reasonableness standard prohibits the possibility of judicial
interference owing to inadequacy, and in that sense requires interference to
preserve the rule of law in fewer circumstances than when compared to the preDunsmuir understanding of reasonableness.3
As defined by the ‘reasonableness simpliciter’ standard introduced in Canada (Director of
Investigation & Research) v. Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748 [Southam] and elaborated in Ryan v.
Law Society (New Brunswick), 2003 SCC 20 at para 20, [Ryan]. That the circumstances in which
judicial interference is necessary to preserve the rule of law were reduced with the introduction of
the single reasonableness standard notably contradicts the stated goals of Bastarache and Lebel JJ
3
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I also use the framework to identify and resolve a significant misstatement on the part of
the Court in its elaboration of the single reasonableness standard:
(vi) Owing to the pronouncement that municipal bodies are free from the
obligation to present reasons in support of their policy decisions in Catalyst Paper
Corp. v. North Cowichan (District),4 the standard applied in that case was,
notwithstanding McLachlin CJ’s assertions to the contrary, not reasonableness. It
was, instead, the broad and purposive approach to correctness.
An argument in defence of the clarity of reasonableness since Dunsmuir faces
considerable critical opposition.5 In his concurring minority reasons, for example, Binnie
J criticizes the Dunsmuir majority for failing to clarify reasonableness precisely because
reviewing courts still need to continue to 'contextualize' each case to determine whether
interference is warranted.6 This critique was elaborated by both David Mullan7 and Ron
Goltz8 in some of the first scholarly commentary on the ruling. In the words of Goltz: “In
Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court of Canada attempted to clean up the clutter, confusion, and
disarray that it, along with the practising bar, had created. However, the practical

in Dunsmuir. By reducing the number of standards of reasonableness, they sought to simplify the
process of judicial review and did not, by contrast, intend to substantively alter the way in which
the judiciary “supervise those who exercise statutory powers, to ensure that they do not overstep
their legal authority” (Dunsmuir at para 28). See also The Honourable Michel Bastarache
“Modernizing Judicial Review” (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 227 at 235. Responding to the
concern that the single reasonableness standard is ‘variable’, Bastarache J maintains that the goal
of introducing that standard was merely to “eliminate the tautology that was patent
unreasonableness” and was not, therefore, to make any substantive change to an assessment for
reasonableness; the single reasonableness standard “will be applied in the same way; the context
will just determine the parameters within which the test is to be applied.”
4
Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 [Catalyst].
5
Though I am not, however, alone in maintaining the impact of the single reasonableness
standard has generally been to improve the clarity of judicial review. See, for example, the Hon.
Justice John M. Evans “Standards of Review in Administrative Law” (2013) 26 Can J Admin L
& Prac 67 at 79: “in my view the Supreme Court has succeeded for the most part in tidying up
many of the loose ends left by Dunsmuir, which itself usefully simplified the law.”
6
Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 139.
7
David Mullan “Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, Standard of Review and Procedural Fairness for
Public Servants: Let’s Try Again!” (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 117 at 150.
8
Ron Goltz “Patent Unreasonableness is Dead. And We Have Killed It. A Critique of the
Supreme Court of Canada Decision in Dunsmuir” (2008) 46 Alta L Rev 253.
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consequences do not match the aims.”9 The view that clarity was not achieved in
Dunsmuir persists in the more recent literature. Paul Daly, for example, argues that the
majority “got it badly wrong... Clarification and simplicity have not been achieved.”10
Similarly Matthew Lewans maintains that clarity is lacking in part because in their
subsequent rulings “the Supreme Court has generally failed to apply the reasonableness
standard in a consistent or principled fashion.”11

2. Structure
Chapter 2 consists in an overview of the process of judicial review as it existed
prior to Dunsmuir, along with an introduction to the single reasonableness standard. The
two ‘concerns’ of that standard structure my analyses in Chapters 3, 4, and 5:
“reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law."12 I argue in Chapter 3 that the three listed criteria imply five
requirements which, when fulfilled, establish that ‘a justification exists’. Chapter 4 uses
this account of reasonableness to characterize the reduction to interference it implies
when compared with the pre-Dunsmuir case law. Chapter 5 articulates the relationship
between the criteria and the ‘range of possible, acceptable outcomes,’ using that account
to understand the mistake made by the Court in Catalyst.

9

Ibid at 265.
Paul Daly “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” (2012) 58:2
McGill LJ 483 at 485.
11
Matthew Lewans “Deference and Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir” (2012) 38:1 Queen's LJ 59
at 63.
12
Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 47 [emphasis added].
10
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The particular goal of Chapter 3 is to elaborate the sense in which the three
criteria restrict reviewing courts to confirming that a justification exists. I show
reasonableness requires administrative decision makers to present reasons that they
genuinely used in their deliberations, that are meaningful and consistent, and are relevant
to their decision given the legal context. Courts engaged in reasonableness review ensure
these requirements are met by first summarizing the reasons accompanying the decision,
thereby establishing that reasons exist. Then they identify the elements of the legal
framework applicable to the case, as a means of determining whether the reasons as
summarized are relevant to the decision. When the reasons supporting an administrative
decision are not relevant, the decision is unreasonable because no justification exists. In
those circumstances alone, judicial interference owing to unreasonableness is necessary
to ensure the rule of law obtains.
Chapter 4 relies on the analyses of Chapter 3 to resolve one persistent source of
confusion in the academic literature, viz., accurately characterizing the impact of the
single reasonableness standard on the circumstances in which interference is necessary.
On my account, when compared to the limited permission to interfere with a decision on
the grounds that ‘better’ justifications exist, a permission granted to reviewing courts
under the pre-Dunsmuir reasonableness simpliciter standard, merely confirming the
existence of a justification according to the three criteria requires interference in fewer
circumstances. I cast this change in terms of the difference between adequacy and
relevance; prior to Dunsmuir, reviewing courts were in limited circumstances required to
interfere owing to the inadequacy of a set of reasons. Since Dunsmuir, interference is
necessary to preserve the rule of law only if the reasons offered are not relevant to the

6

decision made; there are no longer any circumstances in which the existence of alternate,
and potentially more adequate reasons justify interference.
In Chapter 5 I complete my account of the framework that defines reasonableness
by characterizing the relationship between the three criteria and the range of reasonable
outcomes. Relying on the majority opinions in Dunsmuir, Khosa v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration,13 and N.L.N.U. v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury
Board),14 I show the three criteria entirely determine the possible scope of the reasonable
range. In other words, any decision supported by reasons that satisfy the criteria is
reasonable, by definition. This analysis allows me to critically engage the one postDunsmuir ruling in which the two concerns of the single reasonableness standard are
treated as separate and redefined, i.e., Catalyst Corp v. North Cowichan.15 To defend my
characterization of the three criteria as the only bases for interference owing to
unreasonableness, I argue that the standard applied in Catalyst was not reasonableness
but was, instead, the broad and purposive approach to correctness.

3. Method – Interpretive Legal Theory
This project is an argument; I am trying to convince readers to accept my
conclusions based on my engagement with the case law, the academic literature, and the

13

Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [2009] 1 SCR 339, at para 59.
N.L.N.U. v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board) 2011 SCC 62, [NLNU].
15
Catalyst is notably not the only post-Dunsmuir ruling which treats the criteria and the range of
reasonable outcomes as two separate components of reasonableness review. See for example
Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2013 SCC 36. At paras 89 and
90 Lebel J, writing for the Court, concludes first that the Minister’s decision is reasonable by
reference to the three criteria, then separately draws the same conclusion by reference to the
‘reasonable range’. Catalyst is nonetheless unique since it is the only decision in which the Court
asserts that the three criteria are not universal components of reasonableness review, conducting
its assessment by reference to ‘the reasonable range’ only.
14
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strength of my interpretive inferences. In this section I roughly characterize the nature of
this argument as an exercise in what Stephen Smith calls ‘Interpretive Legal Theory’.16
According to Allan Beever and Charles Rickett, a scholar producing an interpretive
account of the law
begins with what appear to be salient features of the case law. She then attempts
to produce a theory that explains these features. In doing so, she may discover that
some of what appeared at the outset to be salient features of the law conflict with
her theory. When this occurs, the theorist has a choice. She could revise her
theory, or she could decide that the relevant feature of the positive law that
conflicts with her theory is erroneous and should therefore be rejected... the task is
primarily to reconcile case law with a general account of the law.17
Consistent with Beever and Rickett’s description, this project explains the single
reasonableness standard by arguing it contributes to a single goal, i.e., that judicial
interference with administrative bodies occurs only when necessary to preserve the rule
of law. My position is ‘theoretical’ inasmuch as it is based on the plausibility of a set of
general inferences drawn from a wide set of independent judicial voices. Following
Smith, I strive to articulate “the intelligible order in the law, so far as such an order
exists.”18 In this case, that order is the combination of a coherent set of concepts that are
consistently applied in a manner that implies a singular tipping-point marking the need
for, or prohibition upon, judicial interference. My goal is therefore not to simply describe
the state of reasonableness review as it has evolved since Dunsmuir, but to do so in a
manner that reveals the single explanatory principle guiding that evolution.
There are two abstract limits that apply to every exercise in interpretive legal
theory. The first is evident in Smith’s concession that any attempt to articulate an

16

S.A. Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Allan Beever and Charles Rickett “Interpretive Legal Theory and the Academic Lawyer”
(2005) 68:2 Mod L Rev 320 at 325.
18
Supra note 16 at 5 [original emphasis].
17
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‘intelligible order in the law’ could be futile. It is at least possible that there is no unifying
principle by which we can glean insight into the law generally, or the process of judicial
review in Canada in particular. Versions of this type of skepticism are most often
defended by proponents of ‘Legal Realism’ and their intellectual progeny in ‘Critical
Legal Studies’. They are skeptical of the possibility of consistency in the law, convinced
that as people, judges are simply not able to separate their legal expertise from their
subjective biases. It follows that there can be no unified order in the law, just an ad hoc
collection of individual decisions made by individual judges according to their individual
whims.19 This form of skepticism limits interpretive legal theory inasmuch as it is not a
position one engaged in such a project could address; an interpretive account, by
definition, must (at least initially) assume there is an ‘intelligible order’ to identify.
The second limit to which any interpretive account of law will be subject is an
inability to specify ‘success conditions’. I have compiled, organized, and articulated what
I take to be the most compelling set of judicial pronouncements and scholarly
commentary I can offer in support of my several conclusions. But there will be no point
at which I will be able to declare my argument is in some conclusive sense ‘right,’ while
all views to the contrary are ‘wrong’. This follows from the fact that the ‘success’ of an
interpretive argument is not exclusively dependent on its rational strength; it also depends
In his work Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Brentano’s, 1930), Jerome Frank defends
one variant of this skepticism when he argues that judges decide cases like every other human,
i.e., by first deciding according to their intuitions and then articulating the legal rules in a manner
that satisfies those intuitions. The result of this observation on his account is that ‘the law’ will
always be unsettled, determined only according to the whims of the presiding judge in the case at
bar, meaning outcomes are rarely (if ever) predictable. More recently Duncan Kennedy’s A
Critique of Adjudication (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998) defends the position
that American judges intentionally preserve and propagate an unnecessarily mystical terminology
that secures their social importance and masks their ‘true’ roles as political operatives. Unlike
Frank, there is for Kennedy a consistent way to understand the law, but it does not involve relying
on official pronouncements set out in the case law.
19
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on the degree to which it is accepted by the relevant audience. A successful interpretive
argument is one that is taken up by members of the legal community. The greater the
number of judges, scholars, and practitioners using my arguments as a basis to inform
their own legal analyses, either in whole or in part, the more successful my argument.
Unfortunately, that is a measure of success the achievement of which will not be
determinable until long after I have finished writing.

4. The Rule of Law, Justifications, and Reasonableness
In Canada, the single reasonableness standard is one of two legal mechanisms
courts rely upon to fulfill their constitutional obligations to uphold the rule of law under
sections 96 to 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867in respect of administrative actions.20 As
outlined, reasonableness requires courts to confirm that administrative decisions are
justified by reference to their enabling legislation, the common law, and the constitutional
framework. My final introductory task is to explain how ensuring that an administrative
decision is justified preserves the rule of law. I focus on one dominant theme in the
scholarly literature: A state governed by the rule of law is one in which an exercise of
state authority is never arbitrary. I then explain how the requirement that administrative
decisions be reasonable is, in Canada, plausibly construed as one means by which to
ensure political authority is not exercised arbitrarily.
See Crevier v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1981] 2 SCR 220, at para 22: “It is true that this is
the first time that this Court has declared unequivocally that a provincially-constituted statutory
tribunal cannot constitutionally be immunized from review of decisions on questions of
jurisdiction.” See also David J. Mullan, Administrative Law: cases, texts, and materials 5th ed.
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd, 2003). Mullan characterizes the effect of the
ruling in Crevier at 49: “the judicature sections of the Constitution Act, 1867… are now
understood primarily as entrenching individuals’ access to an independent judiciary to protect
their legal rights, or otherwise to ensure that the administration observes the limits of its legal
authority.”
20
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As a starting point for articulating the rule of law as that which prohibits arbitrary
state action, I begin with A.V. Dicey. On his account, if ‘the rule of law’ is a meaningful
phrase
[i]t means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular
law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of
arbitrariness, of prerogative... Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by the law
alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can be punished
for nothing else.21
Note the contrast: State actions consistent with the law are not arbitrary, while actions
that are not consistent with the law are ‘prerogative,’ i.e., a function of the arbitrary
whims of the individuals exercising authority. In an effort to elaborate the importance of
Dicey’s idea that the rule of law limits the possibility of the arbitrary exercise of state
power, F.A. Hayek argues it marks the difference between free and totalitarian societies:
Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a
country under arbitrary government than the observance in the former of the great
principles known as the Rule of Law… While every law restricts individual
freedom to some extent by altering the means which people may use in the pursuit
of their aims, under the Rule of Law the government is prevented from stultifying
individual efforts by ad hoc action. Within the known rules of the game the

21

A.V. Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1982) at 153. Invoking Dicey’s account of the rule of law is controversial in the
Canadian context. His account has, for example, been singled out and explicitly rejected by two
sitting members of the Supreme Court. See the Honourable Thomas A. Cromwell “From the New
Despotism to Dunsmuir: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Apocalypse” (2011) 24
Can J Admin L & Prac 285 at 286-7. Cromwell J objects in particular to Dicey’s position that the
rule of law demands reviewing courts carefully restrict the discretionary powers of delegated
decision makers. See also Doré v. Quebec (Tribunal des professions) 2012 SCC 12 at para 29
wherein Abella J also rejects the claim that the rule of law requires courts to narrowly construe
the discretionary powers of administrative bodies. While I do not think Dicey’s position entails
denying administrative bodies a permission to interpret legislation (so long as their interpretations
remain subject to judicial oversight), exploring that claim is unnecessary. What makes Dicey’s
account of the rule of law important for my purposes is the significance he places on the
importance of avoiding arbitrary state action, a significance not rejected by either Justice. For an
attempt to show Dicey’s aversion to arbitrary state action can inform an understanding of
Canadian administrative law in particular, see Geneviève Cartier, “Administrative Law and the
Spirit of Legality: From Theory to Practice” (2009) CJLS 313 at 327.
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individual is free to pursue his personal ends and desires, certain that the powers
of government will not be used deliberately to frustrate his efforts.22
Dicey’s account of the rule of law as an assurance that state action will always be
consistent with ‘regular law’ and in that sense non-arbitrary is specifically intended to
describe the British constitutional order. Hayek extracts from that narrow definition what
he takes to be the fundamental feature of any liberal democratic society.
Hayek’s emphasis on the rule of law as a condition in which the actions of the
state must conform to the pre-established ‘rules of the game’ offers one noteworthy
refinement to Dicey’s idea that state action is non-arbitrary when it accords with the rule
of law. That refinement appears when he distinguishes between a society that operates by
laws and one that conforms to the ‘Rule of Law’:
To say that in a planned society the Rule of Law cannot hold is, therefore, not to
say that the actions of the government will not be legal or that such a society will
necessarily be lawless. It means only that the use of the government's coercive
powers will no longer be limited and determined by pre-established rules. The law
can, and to make a central direction of economic activity possibly must, legalise
what to all intents and purposes remains arbitrary action. If the law says that such
a Board or Authority may do what it pleases, anything that Board or Authority
does is legal-but its actions are certainly not subject to the Rule of Law. By giving
the government unlimited powers the most arbitrary rule can be made legal: and
in this way a democracy may set up the most complete despotism imaginable.23
So the mere existence of and conformity to ‘regular law’ is not sufficient to establish that
‘the Rule of Law’ obtains, because it is possible for laws to grant individuals unlimited
discretion. It follows that the rule of law, understood as a limit on arbitrary state action,

F.A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom (New York: Routledge Classics, 2006) at 75 – 76
Ibid at 85 – 86. Of course, it is possible that Hayek is not refining Dicey’s position as much as
identifying an implication of Dicey’s claim that equality before the law, and in particular the
‘equal subjection of all classes to the law’, prohibits the possibility of administrative bodies
operating “beyond the sphere of the civil Courts…” Dicey, supra note 21 at 153. In other words,
Hayek could be taken to be recognizing the in principle possibility of an administrative body
being legislatively empowered with unrestricted discretion (contra-Dicey), but merely denying
the decisions of such a body could be consistent with the ‘Rule of Law’ (in accord with Dicey).
22
23
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imposes substantive restrictions. At a minimum, laws must be ‘pre-established,’ and they
cannot grant officials unlimited, hence arbitrary, prerogative to respond to changing
circumstances.
Lon Fuller’s discussion of the ‘internal morality of the law’ as a set of eight
‘principles of legality’ that must be satisfied in order to successfully create law24 are
easily interpreted as an attempt to elaborate the substantive conditions Hayek implied
lawmakers need to satisfy to prevent arbitrary state action.25 That the rule of law can be
taken primarily to prohibit a state from arbitrarily exercising its power against citizens is
most clearly stated when Fuller articulates the consistent flaw he believes to be evident in
the works of his four most prominent critics: “One searches in vain in their writings for
any recognition of the basic principle of the Rule of Law – that the acts of a legal
authority toward the citizen must be legitimated by being brought within the terms of a
previous declaration of general rules.”26 For Fuller, the possibility of bringing state action
‘within the terms of a previous declaration’ presupposes the rules are general, public,
prospective, clear, consistent, able to be satisfied, stable, and meaningfully applied in
particular cases. When satisfied, the exercise of state authority will be ‘legitimated’ by
reference to the pre-established rules and in that sense non-arbitrary.
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See Lon Fuller The Morality of Law (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, 1969) at page
39 for a concise statement of the eight conditions every legal system must satisfy. On his account,
laws must be (i) general, (ii) publicized, (iii) prospective, (iv) clearly formulated, (v) not
internally contradictory, (vi) not impossible to satisfy, (vii) consistent over time, and (viii)
administered as written. Fuller elaborates each of these principles over the course of Chapters 2
and 5.
25
See, for example, Colleen Murphy “Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law,”
(2005) 24 Law and Phil 239 at 240: “It is generally agreed that Lon Fuller’s eight principles of
legality capture the essence of the rule of law.”
26
Fuller, supra note 24 at 214. Fuller explicitly identifies the critics he accuses of making this
omission at 190 – 191. They were the self-proclaimed ‘new Analytical Jurists’, specifically
H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Marshall Cohen, and R.C. Summers.
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Of course, the primacy attributed to the rule of law as that which provides for the
possibility of a legal system and/or imposes substantive restrictions on the character of
possible laws is not universally accepted. Joseph Raz, for example, has argued that the
significance of the rule of law has been overstated; it is not “a complete social
philosophy… [but is instead merely]… one important virtue which legal systems should
possess.”27 It follows for Raz that “[s]ince the rule of law is just one of the virtues the law
should possess, it is to be expected that it possesses no more than prima facie force. It has
always to be balanced against competing claims of other values.”28 Though Raz
minimizes the significance of the rule of law as compared to Dicey, Hayek, and Fuller, he
nonetheless does accept that one of the primary values served by the rule of law is
limiting the possibility of arbitrary uses of power, i.e., “using public powers for private
ends.”29 A narrow construal of the rule of law as the legal norm that opposes arbitrary
state action is also reflected in some of the dominant Canadian academic literature. David
Dyzenhaus, for example, characterizes the rule of law as “a rule of fundamental
constitutional principles which protect individuals from arbitrary action by the state.”30
To draw the connection between the rule of law and justifications, I need to first
explain why the possibility of the rule of law demands citizens be assured state authority
is not being exercised arbitrarily. Consider Fuller’s requirement that state power must be
‘legitimated’. Two conditions are implied: (i) The actions of the state must be ‘justifiable’
by reference to the stated and pre-established rules, i.e., it must be possible to explain the

Joseph Raz “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979) 210 at 211.
28
Ibid at 228.
29
Ibid at 220.
30
David Dyzenhaus The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 2.
27
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sense in which any given action conforms, and (ii) The state must actively formulate that
justification, i.e., conformity between the rules and actions must be demonstrated or
explained. For Fuller, a functioning legal system presupposes government and citizens
generally share a “tacit expectation that parliament will act toward the citizen in
accordance with its own laws so long as those laws remain unrepealed.”31 Such a
commitment cannot obtain in the absence of explicit attempts to demonstrate to citizens
that the actions of the state are indeed justified by reference to those laws.
The final step in my attempt to connect the rule of law and the need for state
action to be shown to be justifiable by being actively justified is to articulate the role of
the judiciary in the process. On Raz’s account, three of eight principles he presents as
constituent elements of the rule of law are focused exclusively on the courts: A state
pursuing the ideal of the rule of law must (i) have an independent judiciary, that is (ii)
easily accessible to citizens, and most importantly, (iii) has the power to review the
implementation and exercise of the authority of the state “to ensure conformity to the
law.”32 Courts therefore serve a unique role in assuring citizens state actions are not
arbitrary; they are the primary means by which citizens will be able to seek, or find
evidence of, those assurances.33 The judiciary must therefore be independent of the
executive and legislative branches just so citizens can be assured they are able to question
state power in front of an impartial arbiter. Similarly, the possibility of carrying such a
challenge forward presupposes citizens can access the courts for a hearing when they are
31

Fuller, supra note 24 at 218.
Raz, supra note 27 at 216-17.
33
Note that Raz and Fuller both agree that the courts are not, and cannot be, the only branch of
government concerned to uphold the rule of law. But their role is nonetheless unique in the sense
that they are the branch that remains responsible to authoritatively determine what the rule of law
requires in particular cases, which entails they must be empowered to limit the actions of the
other branches in some cases.
32
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subject to state action, and be able to consult the publically available accounts of those
proceedings prior to doing so. Most importantly, the possibility of citizens actually
receiving a meaningful hearing presupposes the judiciary has the power to require those
exercising the powers of the state to comply with the stated rules.
That the Supreme Court of Canada understands its obligation to uphold the rule of
law in the context of judicial review as an attempt to ensure exercises of state authority
are non-arbitrary is easy to establish. Consider, for example, Rand J’s concurring opinion
in Roncarelli v. Duplessis. If the Premier of Quebec could direct the liquor authority to
revoke Roncarelli’s liquor licence for reasons that all parties conceded were unrelated to
his practice of selling alcohol, the rule of law would be undermined by arbitrary action.
That in the presence of expanding administrative regulation of economic
activities, such a step and its consequences are to be suffered by the victim
without recourse or remedy, that an administration according to law is to be
superseded by action dictated by and according to the arbitrary likes, dislikes and
irrelevant purposes of public officers acting beyond their duty, would signalize
the beginning of [the] disintegration of the rule of law as a fundamental postulate
of our constitutional structure.34
The rule of law therefore imposes an implicit requirement on government actors in
Canada to ensure administrative decisions be justifiable by reference to pre-existing laws
and procedures. This understanding of the rule of law was entrenched into the process of
judicial review by the Court in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration).35

34

Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959) SCR 121 [Roncarelli] at para 44. For a compelling account of
the importance of Rand J’s opinion in Roncarelli to the understanding of the rule of law as a
substantive limit on the possibility of arbitrary state action, see David Dyzenhaus, “The Deep
Structure of Roncarelli v. Duplessis” (2004) 53 UNBLJ 111 [Dyzenhaus DSR].
35
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker] It is hard
to overstate the impact of the ruling in Baker on the structure of judicial review in Canada. See,
for example, G. Van Harten, G. Heckman, and D. J. Mullan, Administrative Law: cases, texts,
and materials 6th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd, 2010), who use the
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Ms. Baker was an illegal immigrant ordered deported in 1992. She sought an
exemption from the Minister of Immigration on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds; her appeal was denied, and she sought judicial review of the rejection. Baker is
the first decision in which the Court recognizes the existence of a common law duty
requiring administrative bodies to present a justification in support of their decisions.36
This obligation is significant because it means administrative bodies cannot merely
assume their decisions are justifiable, but must actively justify their decisions by showing
how they fit the existing legal framework: “though discretionary decisions will generally
be given considerable respect, that discretion must be exercised in accordance with the
boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of
administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the
Charter.”37 Had the decision of the Minister been allowed to stand for the reasons given

majority opinion as the basis upon which to organize the definitive text on Canadian
Administrative law. For examples of Canadian legal scholars and practitioners who understand
the rule of law as primarily concerned with avoiding arbitrary exercises of state power in the
administrative context see Cartier, supra note 21 or Hoi Kong “Something to Talk About:
Regulation and Justification in Canadian Municipal Law” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ, or Basile
Chiasson, “Planning, Discretion, and the Rule of Law” (2011) 79 MPLR-ART 10 at 4: “Under
the Rule of Law, an exercise of public power is only appropriate where it can be justified to
citizens in terms of rationality and fairness. It follows that arbitrary decisions and rules are seen
as illegitimate. Rule by decree is unaccepted.”
36
Baker at para 43: “In my opinion, it is now appropriate to recognize that, in certain
circumstances, the duty of procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation
for a decision.” See Dyzenhaus DSR, supra note 34 at 133 – 135 for an account of the
significance of requiring administrative bodies to present reasons.
37
Baker at para 56. See Dyzenhaus DSR, supra note 34 at 135 and Cartier, supra note 21 at 319
for similar discussions of the importance of this statement as the first time the Court maintains
that administrative discretion, not just administrative interpretations of the law, is subject to
judicial review. See also Mullan 2003, supra note 20 at 85.
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in this case,38 it would be arbitrary in the sense that it would be based on the individual
biases of that officer, contrary to the values implicit within the legislative framework.39
The rule of law is, in both the scholarly literature and in the administrative law
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, primarily a reference to the need for all
actions of the state to be both justifiable and justified by reference to ‘regular law’, and in
that sense not arbitrary. What follows is an attempt to specify the substantive
requirements imposed by the single reasonableness standard on those exercising
delegated discretionary authority. I argue that since Dunsmuir, when a justification exists
the impugned decision is not arbitrary and is therefore ‘reasonable’ by definition. Since it
is ultimately the responsibility of the courts to ensure administrative decisions are
justifiable, it follows that when a justification has been confirmed to exist there is no
threat to the rule of law, meaning judicial interference is prohibited. This approach to
reasonableness review, I argue, reduces the conditions under which the reasons of an
administrative body could be thought to be ‘arbitrary’ and therefore unreasonable by
eliminating the possibility of judicial interference owing to the inadequacy of a set of
reasons.

38

Though the Minister did not offer explicit reasons for refusing to grant Ms. Baker an
exemption, the Court nonetheless determined at para 44 that “the notes of the subordinate
reviewing officer should be taken, by inference, to be the reasons for the decision.”
39
Baker at para 65. The decision to withhold an exemption was, according to the Court,
unreasonable and so arbitrary in the sense that the notes of the subordinate officer were
completely dismissive of the interests of Ms. Baker’s children, contrary to the requirements of the
legal context. For a similarly explicit and post-Dunsmuir statement of the sense in which
reasonableness review in particular limits the exercise of discretion to prevent the arbitrary
exercise of state power, see Montreal (City) v. Montreal Port Authority 2010 SCC 14 at para 33:
“in a country found on the rule of law and in a society governed by principles of legality,
discretion cannot be equated with arbitrariness.”
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Chapter 2: Judicial Review Before and in Dunsmuir; Judicial Deference, the Standards
of Review, and the Scholarly Response
1. Introduction
This chapter sets the context for my analyses in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. I begin with
an account of the process of judicial review as it existed immediately preceding
Dunsmuir.1 I introduce the three standards that were available to courts reviewing an
administrative decision, and summarize the ‘pragmatic and functional’ approach used to
determine which of those three standards were to be applied in any given case. My
primary goal is to explain the way in which ‘deference’ was (and continues to be) used to
inversely identify the likelihood that judicial interference would be necessary; a
reviewing court obligated to be deferential needed to interfere in fewer circumstances to
preserve the rule of law, whereas a court showing no deference needed to interfere in
comparatively more circumstances.
In section 3 I explain how the facts and judicial history in Dunsmuir made it, in
the eyes of the majority, an ideal vessel in which to simplify the process of judicial
review. I also offer a brief descriptive account of the changes made to the ‘pragmatic and
functional’ approach. I end with an introduction to the defining statement of the single
reasonableness standard and the sense in which it requires courts to defer to
administrative bodies. In section 4 I survey the scholarly commentary arising in response
to Dunsmuir as a means of situating my position. I will, in particular, be concerned to
summarize and organize the attempts to understand how the introduction of the
reasonableness standard affected the circumstances in which judicial interference is
necessary. There are three views expressed in the literature: (i) The ruling had no impact
1

New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir]
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on the need for judicial interference, (ii) Dunsmuir increased the need for judicial
interference, or (iii) The majority ruling decreased the need for interference.

2. Judicial Review Immediately Preceding Dunsmuir
I rely primarily on the majority opinion in Dunsmuir to structure my general
account of the process of judicial review in and prior to Dunsmuir.2 As noted in Chapter
1, the goal of courts engaged in judicial review was and continues to be maintaining the
balance between the rule of law and Parliamentary supremacy. That goal is fulfilled when
courts “have the last word on jurisdiction, and... [determine] the applicable standard of
review... by establishing legislative intent.”3 The process of judicial review was,
following this assertion, in large part an exercise in statutory construction since “[a]ll
decision-making powers have legal limits, derived from the enabling statute itself, the
common or civil law or the Constitution.”4 In the language of Chapter 1, prior to
Dunsmuir judicial review ensured the actions of administrative bodies were not arbitrary
primarily by ensuring those actions were justified according to the existing legal
framework.
As an act of legislative interpretation, the first task for a court engaged in judicial
review was to determine how to approach the decision made in light of the particular

2

Almost every commentator on Dunsmuir offers a summary of the process of judicial review
prior to that ruling, making a similar survey on my part redundant. For more thorough summaries,
see Matthew Lewans “Deference and Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir” (2012) 38:1 Queen's LJ
59 at 64 – 74, or Paul Daly “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian
Administrative Law” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 317 at 319 – 324, or William Shores and David
Jardine “Theirs to Reason Why: A Synopsis of the Administrative Law Jurisprudence Relating to
Reasons” (2012) 25 Can J Admin L & Prac 253 at 254 – 258.
3
Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 30.
4
Ibid at para 28.
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legislative framework. In other words, a reviewing court had to begin by choosing the
appropriate standard by which to assess the decision. Prior to Dunsmuir, there were three
standards available to the courts when reviewing administrative decisions: correctness,
reasonableness simpliciter, and patent unreasonableness.5 Each was distinguished by
reference to the unique degrees of deference they required from a reviewing court.6

2(a) Three Standards of Review
The first standard of review, correctness, demanded no deference, meaning a
court was empowered to engage in its own de novo reasoning to articulate the correct
view of the matter.7 Courts did not need to respect the reasoning of the decisions they
reviewed for correctness typically because decisions that prompted correctness review
were outside the expertise of that body.8 It follows that ‘not showing deference’ signalled
an attitude reviewing courts were to take toward the reasons offered by the administrative

5

See for example Ryan v. Law Society (New Brunswick) 2003 SCC 20 at para 20 [Ryan] or
Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 34.
6
See Ryan, supra note 5 at para 45 and Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 34.
7
See, for example, ibid at para 50: “When applying the correctness standard, a reviewing court
will not show deference to the decision maker's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own
analysis of the question,” or Ryan, supra note 5 at para 50: “When undertaking a correctness
review, the court may undertake its own reasoning process to arrive at the result it judges
correct.” See also deBeer, Drake, Hoole, McGraw, and Régimbald Standards of Review of
Federal Administrative Tribunals 4th ed (Canada: LexisNexus, 2012) at 40: “Courts have spent
little time attempting to explain what ‘correctness’ means since, unlike the other standards, it is a
relatively intuitive term. Errors in this context are simply considered to be issues where the court
concludes the tribunal was incorrect.”
8
The Dunsmuir majority lists four instances in which a review according to the correctness
standard is appropriate: i. constitutional questions addressing the division of powers (at para 58),
ii. “determinations of true questions of jurisdiction” (supra note 1 at para 59), iii. issues that are
generally “of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator’s
specialized area of expertise” (ibid at para 60), and iv. conflicts between the jurisdictions of
distinct specialized tribunals (ibid at para 61). Note that all four can be plausibly interpreted as
instances that would in most circumstances be thought to lie beyond the expertise of an
administrative body, and fall squarely within the expertise of the courts.
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body to support their decision. Specifically, a review for correctness allowed a court to
ignore the reasons given and introduce their own to determine whether the administrative
body achieved the uniquely correct result. The correctness standard was (and continues to
be) the most ‘interventionist’ approach to administrative decisions precisely because
courts can ignore the reasons offered.9 When courts are not required to respect the
justification of a decision, the chances that they will deem interference necessary
increase.
The second available standard of review prior to Dunsmuir was patent
unreasonableness, defined by its imposition of the highest degree of deference on a
reviewing court. Dickson J (as he was then) introduced this standard in New Brunswick
Liquor Corp. v. CUPE, Local 963. On his account, the decision of an administrative
tribunal was patently unreasonable only when “its construction [could] not be rationally
supported by the relevant legislation and [so] demand[ed] intervention by [a] court.”10
Courts engaged in a review according to this standard were required to refrain from
introducing their own reasons, and could only interfere if the flaw in the reasons offered
was evident on its face.11 This standard represented the highest degree of deference a
court could show by respecting any decision that did not suffer from an obviously
significant defect. In other words, patent unreasonableness set out few circumstances in

9

See, for example, Lewans, supra note 2 at 65 or deBeer et. al., supra note 7 at 40.
New Brunswick Liquor Corp. v. C.U.P.E., Local 963, [1979] 2 SCR 227, at para 16
11
Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Southam Inc. [1997] 1 SCR 748 [Southam]
at para 57: “If the defect is apparent on the face of the tribunal's reasons, then the tribunal's
decision is patently unreasonable.”
10
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which courts could interfere since the decisions being reviewed were to be regarded as
prima facie legitimate exercises of statutorily delegated powers.12
The third pre-Dunsmuir standard of review introduced in Southam,13
reasonableness simpliciter, created a degree of deference that stood between correctness
and patent unreasonableness.14 A mid-point was necessary because it would not always
be possible for a reviewing court to neatly distinguish between questions of law (which
would suggest the correctness standard) and questions of fact (which would point toward
the patently unreasonable standard); sometimes the issue was a mixture of law and fact.15
According to Iacobucci J, “[a]n unreasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not
supported by any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination.”16 A
court was not, on this standard, permitted to engage in its own de novo reasoning, but it
was permitted to engage in “significant searching or testing to find the defect...”17 In
Ryan, Iacobucci J attempted to clarify his earlier characterization:
A decision will be unreasonable only if there is no line of analysis within the
given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it
to the conclusion at which it arrived. If any of the reasons that are sufficient to
support the conclusion are tenable in the sense that they can stand up to a
somewhat probing examination, then the decision will not be unreasonable and a
reviewing court must not interfere.18

Ibid at para. 55: “The standard of patent unreasonableness [was] principally a jurisdictional
test...” inasmuch as it was used to determine whether the administrative body had the power it
claimed was conferred by its enabling legislation, an interpretation that required the courts grant
the body under review a wide breadth of discretionary leeway with respect to that legislation.
13
Ibid at para 58.
14
Ibid at paras 54 and 55.
15
Ibid at para 44.
16
Ibid at para 56.
17
Ibid at para 57. See also Ryan, supra note 5 at para 50.
18
Ibid at para 55.
12
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As a mid-point of deference between correctness and patent unreasonableness,
reasonableness simpliciter required reviewing courts to be more deferential than when the
correctness standard was applied; they were not permitted to introduce their own novel
reasons. Courts applying reasonableness simpliciter were, however, also required to be
less deferential than when using the patent unreasonableness standard since they were to
engage in a ‘somewhat probing examination’ of the ‘sufficiency’ of the reasons to
determine whether they were ‘tenable’. A reviewing court would therefore be less likely
to interfere when assessing according to the reasonableness simpliciter standard as
compared to correctness, and be more likely to interfere than an assessment under the
patent unreasonableness standard. In the words of Daly: “The standards of review formed
something of a spectrum, ranging from correctness as the most interventionist point and
patent unreasonableness as the most deferential.”19

2(b) The Pragmatic and Functional Analysis
The pragmatic and functional analysis, introduced in U.E.S., local 298 v.
Bibeault,20 was used to determine which standard to apply prior to Dunsmuir. The
specific elements of that analysis were most clearly elaborated by Bastarache J in
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration).21 He identified four

19

Daly UTFS, supra note 2 at 322.
U.E.S., local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 SCR 1048 at para 123: “The formalistic analysis of the
preliminary or collateral question theory is giving way to a pragmatic and functional analysis....
[wherein] the Court examines not only the wording of the enactment conferring jurisdiction on
the administrative tribunal, but the purpose of the statute creating the tribunal, the reason for its
existence, the area of expertise of its members and the nature of the problem before the tribunal.”
21
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982
[Pushpanathan] at paras 23 – 26.
20
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factors that determined whether deference was owed, and if so which of the two
reasonableness standards applied:
(i) Courts needed to determine whether the enabling legislation contained a
privative clause restricting judicial review, or whether it granted a full review.22 If
a privative clause existed, the level of deference owed would be higher, whereas it
would be lower if the legislation included an explicit right to judicial review.
(ii) The level of expertise of the members of the administrative body and how
their expertise compared with the expertise of the reviewing court had to be
assessed. If the administrative body held the greater degree of relative expertise,
the deference owed by the court would be higher.23
(iii) Courts needed to consider the purpose of the enabling legislation as a whole,
as well as the provision upon which the administrative body relied as a basis for
justifying their particular decision.24 If, for example, the legislation involved “a
large number of interlocking and interacting interests and considerations,”25 then
the degree of deference owed would be higher.
(iv) A reviewing court had to determine whether the issue was a question of law,
fact, or mixed law and fact.26 Questions of fact weighed in favour of greater
deference (i.e., the patent unreasonableness standard), questions of law weighed
in favour of less deference (i.e., the correctness standard), and mixed questions
weighed in favour of a mid-point between the two standards (the reasonableness
simpliciter standard).
The pragmatic and functional approach required that courts weigh four categories
of factors, “none of which are alone dispositive, and each of which provides an indication
falling on a spectrum of the proper level of deference to be shown the decision in
question.”27 It served as the legal test upon which courts were to rely to determine which
of the three available degrees of deference (none, some, or a lot) they were required to
show an administrative decision by either ignoring, partially respecting, or nearly entirely

Ibid at paras 30 – 31.
Ibid at paras 32 – 35.
24
Ibid at para 36.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid at para 37.
27
Ibid at para 27.
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respecting the reasons offered. As such this analysis determined the attitude courts had to
adopt toward an impugned decision, an attitude which in turn determined the likelihood a
reviewing court would need to interfere to preserve the rule of law.
Apart from articulating the connections between correctness, the two
reasonableness standards, deference, and the likelihood of judicial interference, my
summary in this section provides some insight into the need for the Dunsmuir majority’s
revisions; judicial review as it existed was both vague and complex. To appreciate this
complexity, it is worth noting that I have only articulated how the three standards of
review were relied upon to give meaning to the concept of ‘judicial deference,’ the
indicator of the likelihood of judicial interference. I have not, by contrast, said much
about the substance of the four categories, about how those categories were to be
weighed against each other to choose the appropriate standard, or about the substance of
the analyses judges needed to undertake once one of the three standards had been chosen.
The rising discomfort with the complexity of the process of judicial review was
expressed twice by Lebel J prior to the ruling in Dunsmuir.28

See first Chamberlain v. Surrey School District no 36. 2002 SCC 86 at paras 188 – 215. Lebel
J’s opinion was primarily critical of the limited applicability of the four categories of the
pragmatic and functional approach. Since the body under review was not appointed but was
instead an elected school board neither the presence nor absence of a privative clause, nor the
expertise of the board members, were believed by Lebel J to be relevant to deciding which
standard of review applied (ibid at para 193). For that reason, he maintained, courts should not be
required to “go through the same checklist of factors in every case, whether or not they are
pertinent - a methodology which, I would suggest, is neither pragmatic nor functional” (ibid at
para 195). He also briefly introduced concerns about distinguishing between the two distinct
forms of reasonableness (ibid at paras 204 – 05). A year and a half later, in Toronto (City) v.
C.U.P.E., Local 79 2003 SCC 63, at paras 60 – 134, Lebel J wrote another concurring minority
opinion that explored in great detail the “growing criticism with the ways in which the standards
of review currently available... are conceived of and applied” (ibid at para 63).
28
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3. Dunsmuir: The Need for Clarity
In this section I outline the issues faced by the Court in Dunsmuir. First I review
the changes made to the ‘pragmatic and functional’ approach, then I introduce those
passages that define the single reasonableness standard. My goal is to first isolate the two
aspects of a decision with which a court reviewing for reasonableness is to be concerned,
i.e., reasons and outcomes. I then explain the priority of reasons over outcomes implied
by the Court as a means of providing a partial justification for my exclusive focus on the
assessment of reasons as the singular and defining feature of the reasonableness standard
in Chapters 3 and 4.
The question before the Court was whether to uphold two lower court rulings
overturning the decision of a labour arbitrator to reinstate the complainant, David
Dunsmuir.29 The full Court unanimously concurred in upholding that result, i.e., all
agreed the reinstatement order was unreasonable.30 The basis for the arbitral ruling was
David Dunsmuir's grievance of a decision of the Deputy Minister of the Department of
Justice for the Province of New Brunswick to dismiss him with pay in lieu of notice.31
The choice to use Dunsmuir as a venue to revise the process of judicial review
was likely inspired by the conflicting ratios of the lower courts; both agreed in the result,
but disagreed over the appropriate standard of review. The trial judge reviewed the
adjudicator's interpretation of his statutory powers using the correctness standard,32 the
factual elements were reviewed using the patent unreasonableness standard, and the
mixed fact and law elements were reviewed using the reasonableness simpliciter
29

Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 21.
Ibid at paras 117 - 18 , 157, and 173.
31
Ibid at paras 7 - 9 As opposed to dismissing Dunsmuir for cause.
32
Ibid at para 18.
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standard.33 The Court of Appeal maintained that the privative clause weighed in favour of
the reasonableness simpliciter standard for the adjudicator’s interpretation of his statutory
powers, while the correctness standard applied to the adjudicator's effort to interpret the
case law.34 So while there was no disagreement over the result, there was significant
disagreement about how and when to apply the existing standards of review. The problem
these discrepancies highlight is two-fold: (i) These competing applications of different
standards to a single set of facts do not alter the outcome of either ruling, which (ii)
Suggests that too much attention is devoted to drawing conceptual distinctions that have
no effect on the result, detracting from the ability of courts and litigators to remain
focused on the primary issues in the case at bar.

3(a) The Standard of Review Analysis
In Dunsmuir, Justices Bastarache and Lebel chose to make only those minimal
changes to the pragmatic and functional approach that would satisfy the related goals of
clarity and simplicity. They leave the defining elements largely untouched, explicating
roughly the same ‘four factors’ detailed in Pushpanathan: “(1) the presence or absence of
a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of
enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at issue, and; (4) the expertise of the
tribunal.”35
There are (at least) two substantive amendments made by the majority to the
process of identifying which standard to apply in any given case. The first allows
33

Ibid at para 20.
Ibid at para 21.
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Ibid at para 64. See Ryan, supra note 5 at para 21 “there is no shortcut past the components of
the pragmatic and functional approach.”
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28

reviewing courts to refrain from performing the analysis altogether if the applicable
standard has been set out in the case law: “[C]ourts ascertain whether the jurisprudence
has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded
with regard to a particular category of question.”36 The second change overturns a
requirement set out in Ryan; “[i]n many cases, it will not be necessary to consider all of
the factors, as some of them may be determinative in the application of the
reasonableness standard in a specific case.”37 The standard of review analysis is therefore
simplified with the introduction of two shortcuts; the process can be avoided by an appeal
to the case law, and all four factors need not be considered in each case.

3(b) The Single Reasonableness Standard
The primary means by which Bastarache and Lebel JJ simplified the process of
judicial review in Dunsmuir was by reducing the number of standards of review. To
demonstrate the need for simplification they considered examples in the case law
showing the two reasonableness standards were the primary source of confusion.38
[T]he analytical problems that arise in trying to apply the different standards
undercut any conceptual usefulness created by the inherently greater flexibility of
having multiple standards of review. Though we are of the view that the threestandard model is too difficult to apply to justify its retention, now, several years
after Southam, we believe that it would be a step backwards to simply remove the
reasonableness simpliciter standard and revert to pre-Southam law. As we see it,
the problems that Southam attempted to remedy with the introduction of the
intermediate standard are best addressed not by three standards of review, but by
two standards, defined appropriately.39

36

Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 62.
Ibid.
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A single reasonableness test was necessary to avoid conceptual confusion, but also had to
be defined in a manner that preserved the flexibility made available with the existence of
a third standard of review.
The Court began its revision by noting that reasonableness would continue to be
distinguished from correctness by demanding deference,40 and that a deferential court
would continue to be one that did not introduce novel reasons.41 The majority then
identified the two objects of concern of every review for reasonableness: (i) the process
of reasoning, and (ii) the extent to which the result of that process fell within a family of
reasonable outcomes.
A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that
make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the
reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly
with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of
the facts and law.”42
My immediate concern is to highlight the priority of reasons over outcomes
implied by the last two sentences: ‘reasonableness is concerned mostly with... But it is
also concerned with...’ There are two objects of concern, but most of a reviewing court’s
attention is to be directed at the reasons. In NLNU v. Newfoundland & Labrador
(Treasury Board) Abella J made the priority of reasons over outcomes explicit: “I do not
see Dunsmuir as... advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses —
one for the reasons and a separate one for the result. It is a more organic exercise — the
reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing
40

Ibid at para 45.
Ibid at para 48: “deference imports respect for the decision-making process”.
42
NLNU v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board) 2011 SCC 62 [NLNU] at para 47
[emphasis added].
41
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whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes.”43 The ‘purpose’ of the
assessment of reasons is to ‘show’ that the outcome falls within the acceptable range. It
follows that the assessment of reasons is the substantive component of an ‘assessment’
for reasonableness, and the product of that assessment answers the question: ‘Does this
outcome fall within the reasonable range?’ The answer is: ‘Only if and when the reasons
satisfy the three criteria of reasonable reasons’.
The need for me to note the priority of reasons over outcomes is a result of the
structure of my analysis. In Chapters 3 and 4 I rely on that priority by treating the phrase:
‘reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility in the decision making process’ as a complete expression of the substantive
elements of a review for reasonableness. My goal in doing so is to develop a clear
account of the circumstances under which interference owing to unreasonableness is
necessary. Having articulated the substantive assessment a review for reasonableness
entails, I devote Chapter 5 to articulating the role of outcomes in the context of
reasonableness review. Before I can proceed to fulfill either goal, however, I have one
more ‘context-setting’ task to complete; I need to briefly outline how the single
reasonableness standard, and in particular its impact on the likelihood of judicial
interference, has been understood by academics and practitioners.

4. The Scholarly Commentary
We saw in Chapter 1 that several commentators would be likely to reject my
claim that the majority ruling in Dunsmuir introduces a clear and workable framework
43

Ibid at para 14 [emphasis added].
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for reasonableness review.44 One particular source of confusion prompted by the new
reasonableness standard is the uncertainty it causes in respect of judicial interference.
This concern was first expressed by Binnie J’s concurring but critical reasons in
Dunsmuir. On his account, there is a danger in
labelling the most "deferential" standard as "reasonableness"… it may be taken
(wrongly) as an invitation to reviewing judges not simply to identify the usual
issues, such as whether irrelevant matters were taken into consideration, or
relevant matters were not taken into consideration, but to reweigh the input that
resulted in the administrator's decision as if it were the judge's view of
"reasonableness" that counts.45
Note that the concern in this passage is the confusion a single standard creates; with the
least deferential standard (patent unreasonableness) eliminated, interference owing to
unreasonableness could be wrongly taken to be necessary more often. The secondary
literature inspired by this concern can be organized into three categories.
A plurality of those contemplating the effect of the single reasonableness standard
immediately following Dunsmuir defended a more robust version of Binnie J’s concern.
Specifically, they argued the elimination of the patent unreasonableness standard does not
merely imply judicial interference could be necessary more often, but demands
interference occur more often. Goltz is one proponent of this view: “[I]f patent
unreasonableness has been eliminated completely as a level of judicial deference, such an

Apart from David Mullan “Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, Standard of Review and Procedural
Fairness for Public Servants: Let’s Try Again!” (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 117, Ron Goltz
“Patent Unreasonableness is Dead. And We Have Killed It. A Critique of the Supreme Court of
Canada Decision in Dunsmuir” (2008) 46 Alta L Rev 253, Paul Daly “Dunsmuir’s Flaws
Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” (2012) 58:2 McGill 1 483 [Daly], and
Lewans supra note 2, see also Dave Edwards “Judicial Review of Administrative Action” (2011)
24 Can J Admin L & Prac 151 for an argument maintaining the decision in Dunsmuir has
confused rather than clarified the process of judicial review for Ontario courts in particular.
45
Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 141.
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outcome must necessarily result in increased intrusion by the courts.”46 His is the position
that appears to have dominated the first attempts to understand the impact of the single
reasonableness standard.47 The second view, also well represented in the commentary,
maintained that the amendments to reasonableness had no impact at all on the need for, or
frequency of, interference.48 The third group expressed the position that was least
common initially, i.e., the single reasonableness standard has decreased the number of
46

Goltz, supra note 44 at 261.
For an account of the fear of greater judicial interference with municipal decision making in
particular see Jared Craig “Defending City Hall After Dunsmuir” (2008) 46 Alta L Rev 275 at
para 41. For a case note maintaining that courts are more willing to interfere with the decisions of
labour arbitrators following Dunsmuir see Piper Henderson “Supreme Court of Canada's New
“Reasonableness” Standard of Review Applied in Recent Education Cases” (2008) 18 Educ & LJ
179 at 185. For a defence of the claim that practitioners representing those seeking to overturn the
decisions of administrative tribunals have more to gain from the language of Dunsmuir than
practitioners who defend administrative tribunals, see David E. Gruber “Judicial Review
Advocacy in the Post-Dunsmuir Era” (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 303 at 313. For a brief
expression of concern that the re-introduction of ‘true jurisdictional questions’ in Dunsmuir will
lead to greater judicial interference with administrative bodies, see Hudson Janisch “Something
Old, Something New” (2010) 23 Can J Admin L & Prac 219 at 223 – 24. For a defence of the
claim that the single reasonableness standard did increase the circumstances in which judicial
interference is necessary, see Shores and Jardine, supra note 2. For arguments claiming the effect
of the application of reasonableness in Dunsmuir (rather than the revision of the reasonableness
standard) represents a significant increase in judicial interference with administrative tribunals in
particular, see Nicolas Lambert “Dunsmuir v. New-Brunswick: The Perceived Choice between
Fairness and Flexibility in Public Service Employment” (2009) 59 UNBLJ 205 and Ron Ellis
“Dunsmuir and the Independence of Adjudicative Tribunals” (2010) 23 Can J Admin L & Prac
203.
48
As I noted in Chapter 1, this is the position that was explicitly defended by Justice Bastarache
extra-judicially in “Modernizing Judicial Review” (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 227 at page
6 and implicitly by Justice Cromwell in “From the New Despotism to Dunsmuir: A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to the Apocalypse” (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 285. See also Mark
G. Underhill “Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick: A Rose by Any Other Name” (2008) 21 Can J Admin
L & Prac 247, or Alice Woolley “The Metaphysical Court: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick and the
Standard of Review” (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 259 where at 266 – 68, she enumerates
four reasons for thinking the decision will have little impact on the frequency of judicial
interference in Alberta. See also Gerald P. Heckman “Substantive Review in Appellate Courts
since Dunsmuir” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 751 at 784 – 85, or Basile Chiasson and André
Daigle “New Brunswick Municipal Decision-Making Post Dunsmuir: Farewell to the Patent
Unreasonableness Statutory Standard of Review?” (2010) 65 MPLR (4th) 279, or Allison Woolley
and Shaun Fluker “What has Dunsmuir Taught?” (2010) 47 Alta L Rev 1017. Of course, none of
these authors applaud the single reasonableness standard as establishing a new paradigm of
clarity; they simply do not argue confusion arises from its impact on the frequency of judicial
interference.
47

33

circumstances in which judicial interference is necessary.49 My position in this project
falls within this third category.
The most prominent voice among those who initially maintained the revised
standard was designed to reduce the frequency of judicial interference was Mullan. While
accepting Binnie J’s concern that the elimination of patent unreasonableness might well
lead to greater interference, he nonetheless recognized “that that was not the intention of
the majority... there seems to be an implication that, even within the new
unreasonableness standard, there should be great hesitation or caution in setting aside a
decision.”50 More recent commentators agree that it was at least the goal of the majority
to reduce the permissibility of judicial interference with the introduction of the single
reasonableness standard. They also maintain, however, that the post-Dunsmuir Supreme
Court case law has revealed an inability to develop a consistent application of that
reduction.
Jennifer Klinck, for example, has argued that while the single reasonableness
standard is conceptually coherent, its application in both Dunsmuir and Khosa v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration fails to properly respect that coherence.51
Similarly, Lewans’ maintains the revised reasonableness standard holds the promise for
See, for example, Evan Fox-Decent “Democratizing Common Law Constitutionalism” (2010)
55 McGill LJ 511 at 532 – 33 who criticizes the Court’s assessment of the facts in Dunsmuir on
the grounds that the Court was being overly deferential. For a defence of the sense in which
Ontario courts in particular are more deferential toward (and thereby less likely to interfere with)
administrative tribunals following Dunsmuir see Dustin Kenall “De-Regulating the Regulatory
Compact: The Legacy of Dunsmuir and the “Jurisdictional” Question Doctrine” (2011) 24 Can J
Admin L & Prac 115 at 117: “regulatory agencies can expect greater leeway to devise novel,
innovative mechanisms for fulfilling their statutory mandates, while regulatory targets can expect
the courts to continue to be receptive to procedural fairness and constitutional questions, but not
to questions concerning the substantive mechanisms or equities of regulation.”
50
Mullan, supra note 44 at 134.
51
Jennifer A. Klinck “Reasonableness Review: Conceptualizing a Single Contextual Standard
from Divergent Approaches in Dunsmuir and Khosa” (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 41.
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fewer instances of judicial interference,52 but his optimism is accompanied by a concern
that “... the case law on reasonableness remains muddled.”53 The case law is ‘muddled’
precisely about whether, and the grounds upon which, courts ought to be willing to
interfere with administrative decisions owing to unreasonableness. In A.T.A. v. Alberta
(Information & Privacy Commissioner)54and NLNU, for example, the Court seemed to
assert a commitment to the idea that reasonableness significantly restricts the
circumstances in which interference will be necessary. In Dunsmuir, British Columbia
(Workers' Compensation Board) v Figiola,55and Canada (Attorney General) v Mowat56
by contrast, the Court overturned administrative decisions that were, for Lewans,
undeniably supported by ‘transparent and intelligible’ reasons.57 Daly suggests the
inconsistencies in the case law are unlikely to ever be resolved because “different types
of decisions attract different degrees of deference, and they do so on the basis of a factor
or factors external to the elegant elucidation of reasonableness.”58
Both Daly and Lewans maintain the criteria introduced in Dunsmuir represent a
reduction to the need for judicial interference.59 But they both also maintain
reasonableness is confused because the ‘standard of review analysis’ is confused. The
problem is its conflicting demands; courts must apply a set of four factors that vary
52

Lewans, supra note 2 at 63.
Ibid at 82.
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A.T.A. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) 2011 SCC 61 at para 47.
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British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Figliola, [2011] 3 SCR 422.
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Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat 2011 SCC 53.
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Lewans, supra note 2 at 92. There is, of course, not universal agreement on the effect of the
single reasonableness standard. As I noted above, for example, Shores and Jardine, supra note 2
argue at 259 that the single reasonableness standard increased the likelihood of judicial
interference “because courts were not required to show tribunals any deference related to the duty
of fairness.” It was only in NLNU that “... the Supreme Court stamped out the emerging heresy of
reasons as a free standing ground of appeal or judicial review” at 264.
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across each individual case, and must also determine whether a case ‘fits’ a predetermined list of categories.60 Each author maintains judicial review generally, and
reasonableness review in particular, will only be clarified once the four factors are
designated as the only considerations. For Daly, doing so will provide reviewing courts
with a better ability to identify the contextual factors that guide the application of the
three criteria.61 For Lewans, clarity will be achieved when “review for reasonableness [is]
reconceived as a tool for reconciling judicial respect for administrative decisions with a
judicial concern for ensuring administrative decisions are legally acceptable in a
particular regulatory setting.”62
My analyses in the chapters that follow do not directly address Daly’s or
Lewans’s shared concerns about confusion resulting from the standard of review analysis.
There is no denying the standard of review analysis must be understood to properly
understand the process of judicial review in Canada. But there is also no denying that
reasonableness is an independent standard that can be distinguished and isolated from the
process of determining whether correctness or reasonableness is to be used in any given
case. To the extent that my analyses are able to narrowly capture the consistent
conceptual foundation, application, and threshold point at which interference owing to
unreasonableness is necessary according to the case law, they show that Daly’s and
Lewans’s concern about a lack of clarity with respect to reasonableness in particular is, at
the very least, overstated. Their focus on the impact of confusions in the means by which

Both attribute the introduction of the ‘categorical approach’ to Fish J’s majority opinion in
Alliance Pipeline Ltd v. Smith [2011] 1 SCR 160 at paras 25 and 26; see Daly, supra note 44 at
487 and Lewans, supra note 2 at 61.
61
Daly UTFS, supra note 2 at 354.
62
Lewans, supra note 2 at 94.
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reasonableness is selected has led both to fail to recognize the clear and coherent features
that define a reasonableness review.

5. Conclusions
Prior to Dunsmuir, the process of judicial review consisted in three standards
courts used to determine when interference was necessary. The least deferential standard,
correctness, would be most likely to demand interference by requiring courts to ignore
any reasons offered by the administrative body and seek out, of their own accord, the
uniquely correct result. Patent unreasonableness, by contrast, demanded judicial
interference in the fewest number of cases, since it required courts to largely accept the
reasons offered by the administrative body. Finally, the need for interference according to
reasonableness simpliciter represented a mid-point between the two other standards since
courts were required to respect the reasons offered, while simultaneously undertaking a
more vigorous critical assessment.
Justices Bastarache and Lebel offer two sets of revisions intended to clarify the
process of judicial review in Dunsmuir. The least dramatic are the shortcuts to the
standard of review analysis; if the matter has been previously determined in the case law
the question can be avoided altogether, or courts can avoid a consideration of all four
factors if one or more is dispositive. The more significant revision is the unification of the
two reasonableness standards, which continues to allow courts the flexibility to show
varying degrees of deference. That flexibility will be directed toward the two aspects of
each administrative decision with which a reviewing court is concerned, i.e., the reasons
and the outcomes. More specifically, the assessment of reasons is the primary concern
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which, following the opinion in NLNU, means that any outcome that can be supported by
a set of reasons that satisfy the three criteria falls within the reasonable range.
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Chapter 3: The Three Criteria of Reasonable Reasons Demand Courts Confirm that a
Justification Exists, and Nothing More
1. Introduction
In this chapter I articulate the principled and coherent framework that defines the
single reasonableness standard in the post-Dunsmuir Supreme Court case law. Following
my brief analysis at the end of Chapter 2, I assume throughout that the claim
“reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process”1 expresses in its entirety the
substantive elements of reasonableness review. On my account, those three criteria
demand courts confirm administrative decisions are justified, and nothing more. I begin
by identifying the five distinct requirements the three criteria impose on administrative
decision makers. I then turn to the case law to show the Court consistently follows the
same pattern of analysis to ensure each of those requirements are satisfied, invoking the
same ground for interference when they are not. The resultant framework of
reasonableness is therefore clear in the sense that it relies on a cluster of familiar
concepts, assessed according to the same process, always requiring interference for the
same reason (when necessary).

2. The Prevalence of ‘the Existence of Justification, Transparency, and Intelligibility in
the Decision Making Process’ in the Post-Dunsmuir Case Law
As noted toward the end of Chapter 2 the majority in Dunsmuir imply, and Abella
J in NLNU explicitly asserts, that reasons take priority over outcomes when assessing for

1

New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] at para 47. See
supra at 29 – 30 for my account of the priority of reasons over outcomes.
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reasonableness.2 The centrality I attribute to the phrase ‘the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility’ might nonetheless be thought to be overstated. After all,
Bastarache and Lebel JJ only invoke those criteria when describing the single
reasonableness standard, notably failing to invoke them again in their application to the
facts in the case. So the primacy of the three criteria in a review for reasonableness is not
set out explicitly by the majority in Dunsmuir. Nor is the exact meaning of the phrase
‘the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility’ elaborated in their ratio.
The centrality of the three criteria arises in the post-Dunsmuir case law. The
number of times a judicial reference has been made to the majority ruling is astonishing;
almost seven thousand times a little more than seven years after its release.3 With respect
to the three criteria, the exact phrase ‘the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility in the decision making process’ is cited in more than two thousand trial,
appellate, and Supreme Court rulings. That search result notably does not include the
many opinions in which the ordering of the phrase is amended, or the three criteria are
paraphrased.4 We can minimally infer from their prevalence that the criteria have, since

2

NLNU v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board) 2011 SCC 62 [NLNU] at para 47.
The total number of judicial considerations yielded by a LexisNexis Quicklaw ‘QuickCITE’
shows Dunsmuir has been at least mentioned in 6922 rulings as of August 31st, 2014. Dunsmuir
is, based on my limited investigation, the most widely referenced judicial opinion in the history of
the Canadian legal system (again, a mere six and a half years after having been handed down!).
4
2019 according to a QuickLaw search of the exact phrase on August 31st, 2014. Supreme Court
opinions invoking the three criteria include Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration [2009] 1 SCR 339 at para 59; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat 2011 SCC 53
[Mowat] at para 28; A.T.A. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) 2011 SCC 61
[ATA] at paras 52 and 72; NLNU, supra note 2 at paras 9, 11, and 13; Halifax (Regional
Municipality) v. Canada (Public Works and Government Services) 2012 SCC 29 at para 44;
Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright) 2012 SCC 37
at para 60; and Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2103 SCC 36 at
para 89. A random sampling of appellate court decisions invoking the three criteria include:
Alberta Health Services (Calgary Area) v. Health Sciences Assn. of Alberta (Paramedical
Professional/Technical Unit) 2011 ABCA 306 at para 14; Allsop v. Alberta (Appeals Commission
for Alberta Workers’ Compensation) 2011 ABCA 323 at paras 20 and 35; Amherst (Town) v.
3
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Dunsmuir, been interpreted to be an essential component of any reasonableness review.
Of course, their prevalence says little about their substantive content.
A single phrase referenced more than two thousand times would normally be
expected to be accompanied by a plurality of explicit judicial pronouncements unpacking
its meaning. One remarkably consistent feature across the decisions invoking the criteria,
however, is that courts most often behave as did the majority in Dunsmuir; the slogan is
asserted as a means of characterizing reasonableness review, but precise definitions are
not provided. When discussed explicitly by the Supreme Court in post-Dunsmuir rulings
like Khosa, ATA, and NLNU, statements clarifying reasonableness do not normally

Nova Scotia (Superintendent of Pensions) 2008 NSCA 74 at para 63; Anderson v. Manitoba 2010
MBCA 113 at para 106; Backx v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency) 2011 FCA 36 at
para 6; Bluebird Investments Ltd. v. International Assn. of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and
Reinforcing Ironworkers, Local 764 2011 NLCA 78 at paras 14 and 19; Boddy v. Nova Scotia
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal 2012 NSCA 73 at para 18; Boulos v. Public Service
Alliance of Canada 2012 FCA 193 at para 7; Bowater Maritimes Inc. v. Communications, Energy
and Paperworkers Union, Locals 117, 146, 164 and 263 2011 NBCA 22 at paras 4, 24, and 25;
Brian Neil Friesen Dental Corp. v. Director of Companies Office (Manitoba) 2011 MBCA 20 at
paras 87 and 99; BTC Properties II Ltd v. Calgary (City) 2012 ABCA 13 at para 23; Calgary
(City) v. Alberta (Municipal Government Board) 2012 ABCA 13 at para 23; Calgary (City) v.
Nortel Networks Corp. 2008 ABCA 370 at para 33; Canada (Border Services Agency) v. Miner
2012 FCA 81 at para 11; Canada Post Corp. v. Carroll 2012 NBCA 18 at paras 62 and 71;
Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers 2011 FCA 24 at paras 22 and 27;
Casino Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Labour Relations Board) 2009 NSCA 4 at paras 29 and 30
[Casino Nova Scotia]; Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union Local 707 v. Suncor
Energy Inc. 2011 ABCA 90 [CEPU Local 707] at paras 20 and 21; Darcis v. Manitoba 2012
MBCA 49 at paras 37 and 38; Deschênes v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 2011 FCA
216 at paras 42 and 43; Friends of Davy Bay v. British Columbia 2012 BCCA 293 at para 31;
Inter Pipeline Fund v. Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board) 2012 ABCA 208 at paras
26 and 48; Kane v. Canada (Attorney General) 2011 FCA 19 at para 68; Kelly v. Alberta (Energy
Resources Conservation Board) 2011 ABCA 325 at para 13; Lines v. British Columbia
(Securities Commission) 2012 BCCA 316 at paras 26 and 32; Maritime Paper Products Ltd. v.
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers’ Union, Local 1520 2009 NCSA 60 [Maritime
Paper Products] at paras 22 – 23 and 36; Mellor v. Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation
Board) 2012 SKCA 10 at para 26; New Brunswick Liquor Corp. v. Small 2012 NBCA 53 at paras
10 and 30; Pridgen v. University of Calgary 2012 ABCA 139 at para 53; Public Service Alliance
of Canada v. Senate of Canada 2011 FCA 214 at paras 31 and 38; Regular v. Law Society of
Newfoundland and Labrador 2011 NLCA 54; Saint John (City) v. Saint John Firefighter Assn.
2011 NBCA 31 at paras 40 and 41; Whelan v. Ontario (Racing Commission) 2011 ONCA 299 at
para 15.
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articulate the meaning of the criteria. Instead, the Court focuses on questions about the
relationship between the criteria, legislative context, the degree of deference courts owe
administrative bodies, and how all these considerations relate to the idea of a ‘range of
possible, acceptable outcomes’. The failure to clarify the meaning of three criteria can be
explained at least in part by the Dunsmuir majority ruling; a return to the distracting
conceptual discussions of the pre-Dunsmuir era needs to be avoided. Since, however, my
goal is to identify and elaborate the consistent application of those criteria in the case law,
this aversion to abstract conceptual definitions complicates my analysis.

3. The Conceptual Framework Implied by the Three Criteria
My goal in this section is to explicate the five separate concepts implied by the
three criteria of reasonable reasons. On my account, those criteria establish ‘a
justification exists’ when (a) there are statements that (b) genuinely served as the
considerations made while deliberating, (c) statements that satisfy basic linguistic
requirements, (d) can be consistently combined, and (e) are relevant to that decision in
light of the legislative framework. My ordering of these five elements proceeds
intuitively from ‘most basic’ to ‘most complex’; merely uttering a statement is the easiest
requirement to satisfy, whereas showing the reasons uttered are relevant in the particular
legal context is the most difficult.
One of the few early judicial attempts to articulate the meaning of the three
criteria comes from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Casino Nova Scotia5. The

Supra note 4 at para 1 for a summary of the facts: The Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board “...
certified a bargaining agent for a unit of security officers at a casino. The employer applied to
quash the certification. The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia dismissed the application...” The
unanimous Court denied the appeal and upheld the certification.
5
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definition set out by Fichaud JA has been cited in a number of appellate court rulings in6
and outside7 Nova Scotia, and has also been invoked in at least one Supreme Court
opinion8. On his account,
[j]ustification, transparency and intelligibility relate to process. They mean that
the reviewing court can understand why the tribunal made its decision, and that
the tribunal's reasons afford the raw material for the reviewing court to perform its
second function of assessing whether or not the Board's conclusion inhabits the
range of acceptable outcomes.9
There are six separable concepts that reside within the criteria according to this sentence
(two concepts per criterion), inferred from the common use of each term. I begin with the
most general idea, i.e., ‘a justification’. Its meaning is implied by the assertion that a
reviewing court must be able to ‘understand why’ a particular decision was reached, and
recognize that the ‘reasons afford the raw material’. So ‘a justification’ refers to the
presentation of a set of reasons in support of a decision.10 The remaining concepts specify
the substantive requirements that must be satisfied for any set of reasons to qualify as ‘a
justification’.11
One necessary but not sufficient requirement for any set of reasons to qualify as a
justification, and the most important element of any assessment for reasonableness, is that
the reasons be, at a minimum, relevant to the plausibility (or ‘sufficiency’ or ‘strength’)

6

See, for example, Maritime Paper Products, supra note 4 at paras 23 and 36.
See, for example, CEPU Local 707, supra note 4 at para 21.
8
Montreal (City) v. Montreal Port Authority [2010] 1 SCR 427, at para 38, [Montreal Port
Authority].
9
Casino Nova Scotia, supra note 4 at para 30 [emphasis added].
10
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘a justification’ consists in “3. a. The action of
justifying or showing something to be just, right, or proper;” The means by which that action is
performed requires the individual presenting the justification to “5.a. To make good (an
argument, statement, or opinion); to confirm or support by attestation or evidence; to corroborate,
prove, verify.” OED 2nd ed. (1989); online version June 2012.
11
Recalling from Chapter 1 that an obligation to provide reasons was established in Baker v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker] at para 43.
7
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of the decision they are intended to support. In other words, if a reason actually supports
a particular decision then that reason matters to its plausibility. That a relevance
requirement is implied by Justice Fichaud’s definition of the criteria follows from his
assertion that a court reviewing for reasonableness is trying to ‘understand why’ those
reasons support that decision. It is not possible to understand the sense in which a set of
reasons support a decision without being able to specify how they matter to the
outcome.12
Determining that a set of reasons are ‘relevant’ demands a reviewing court
establish the reasons presented are appropriate to the legal and factual context. It will be
made clear in section 4 below that according to the Supreme Court, reasons matter to an
administrative outcome when they accord with the legal framework that empowers the
decision maker. So when reviewing courts are considering whether the reasons presented
are consistent with an administrative body’s enabling legislation, or the common law, or
the Constitution, they are assessing for relevance. Accordingly, assessing a set of reasons
for their ‘relevance’ is uniquely significant; following my discussion of the rule of law in
Chapter 1, it is the final step toward ensuring that an exercise of state power is consistent
with the agreed upon system of rules and is, in that sense, not arbitrary.
As the final step in confirming a decision is justified, relevance is the most
important element of the criteria because it marks the threshold between an ‘existent’ and
a ‘non-existent’ justification. In other words, the point at which a consistent set of
genuine and meaningful statements are shown to be relevant to the plausibility of some
decision is the point at which an otherwise random collection of claims are transformed
12

The Oxford English Dictionary definition shows this meaning is consistent with common use; a
reason is ‘relevant’ when it establishes a “2.a. connection with the subject or point at issue; [a]
relation to the matter in hand” OED 2nd ed (1989); online version June 2015.
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into ‘an existent justification’. It follows on my account that when a set of reasons are
relevant to an outcome, judicial interference is prohibited because the rule of law is not in
danger.
That relevance serves as the threshold between an existent and non-existent
justification can be inferred from what is missing in Fichaud JA’s description; courts are
required to understand how the reasons support the decision, but no mention is made of
the possibility of assessing the relative strengths or weaknesses of those reasons as
compared with alternatives. That omission reflects the introduction of the three criteria in
Dunsmuir; according to Bastarache and Lebel JJ, a review for reasonableness is
‘concerned mostly with the existence of justification.’ The majority notably does not, by
contrast, say that reasonableness is ‘concerned with the quality, strength, adequacy,
sufficiency, or plausibility of the justificatory reasons presented’; the only concern is to
ensure reasons that matter exist. Of course for a set of reasons to matter, there must first
be reasons for a court to review.
For a set of reasons to be relevant, they must be intelligible. An administrative
decision will normally be accompanied by more than one reason, so how they can
consistently combine to support the particular decision must be decipherable.13 This
meaning is implied by Fichaud JA’s assertion that the reasons are the ‘raw material’ used
to understand how the decision was reached; if the reasons contained, for example,
obvious contradictions, no such understanding would be possible. A second sense of
‘intelligibility’ follows from the first; the possibility of reasons being able to be
consistently combined presupposes words and sentences formulated in accord with the
13

The ruling in Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (Public Works and Government
Services) 2012 SCC 29 [Halifax], to be discussed in section 4 below, serves as a clear example of
the Court determining that the reasons offered in support of a decision are inconsistent.
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syntactic and semantic rules of English or French.14 In other words, reasons do not exist
when the utterances purportedly offered in support of some decision are gibberish.15 This
is implied by Fichaud JA’s claim that reasons must allow a court be able to ‘understand
why’ a particular decision was reached; understanding the sense in which reasons support
a decision presupposes the reasons are able to be independently understood by an English
or French reader/speaker.
Finally, the possibility of a set of intelligible reasons that matter to the decision
they are intended to support suggests they must be ‘transparent’ in two senses. First, a set
of reasons must be genuine, i.e., they must be the reasons that were actually used by the
body under review to justify their decision. A reviewing court could not possibly
understand why a decision follows from some set of reasons if those were not really those
used in coming to that decision; if they were, for example, a façade intended to hide the
‘true’ reasons.16 The second sense of ‘transparent’ is presupposed by the first: For a set of

14

Again, both senses of intelligibility are consistent with common usage; according to the OED,
intelligible reasons i.e., possess “2. The quality or character of being intelligible; capability of
being understood; comprehensibility.” OED 2nd ed. (1989); online version June 2012.
15
I have been unable to find a single judicial authority in which a court determined that a set of
reasons were gibberish and so interfered on those grounds. The absence of such a ruling from the
case law does not, however, detract from my conceptual claim that if a set of utterances that were
gibberish had been presented as reasons in support of a decision, their unintelligibility would
demand judicial interference. What it suggests instead is that, consistent with my claim that the
five elements of the criteria proceed from least to most complicated, administrative bodies have
not had difficulty developing reasons that consist in meaningful words strung together in the form
of proper sentences.
16
For an example of the Court at least suggesting that an administrative body made a decision for
reasons other than those proffered, see McGillivray v. Kimber (1915) 52 SCR 146. At issue was
whether McGillivray could recover damages in tort for a decision of the pilotage authority of the
Port of Sydney to dismiss him for incapacity. The Court held the defendants liable because they
did not have any legal basis to withhold a licence from the plaintiff without his incapacity having
been “proved on oath before the pilotage authority” (at 1). The defendants maintained at trial they
were not liable because they enjoyed an absolute authority with respect to licencing harbour
pilots. The Appellate Court overturned the finding for the plaintiff at trial, ruling that the Board
was fulfilling a quasi-judicial duty and so was immunized from liability without proof of malice.
In his concurring judgment, Idington J maintained the testimony of the defendant at trial suggests
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reasons to be assessed for either intelligibility or relevance, they must satisfy a minimal
publicity requirement. That is, they must be presented either orally or in writing and
cannot therefore merely reside in the mind of their purported author.17 ‘Transparent’
reasons are those that have really led the administrative body to that decision and have
therefore been made ‘public’ in the requisite manner.18
The five concepts extrapolated from the three criteria in this section are
‘substantive’ owing to the role they serve; they exhaust the grounds for judicial
interference owing to unreasonableness. They require a reviewing court to overturn a
decision for unreasonableness only when either (a) there are no reasons, or (b) those were
not the reasons used reaching that decision, or (c) the actual reasons presented are not
meaningful words and sentences, or (d) the actual meaningful words and sentences
cannot be consistently combined in support of that decision, or finally (e) the genuine,
meaningful, and consistent reasons are irrelevant to the conclusion reached in light of the

the requisite degree of malice was present. Specifically Kimber’s admission that his own
reasoning was partly political, and his suggestion that “some of the Board seemed incidentally
moved by considerations relative thereto. The surprising thing is that on the issues presented we
should find accidentally disclosed so much evidence of those indirect motives of action which
constitute malice… it is hard to understand how, unless moved by improper motives, any one in
such a position… could have conceived it his right or duty to dismiss a man unheard” (at 7). So
there was no hearing establishing the plaintiff was incapacitated, and there was evidence from the
defence that the actual reasons of the Board had little to do with their legal rights and obligations
to grant or withhold pilotage licences meaning the decision was, in the eyes of Idington J,
tortious. A similar suspicion was raised but not explored in Anglin J’s concurring opinion: “There
is some evidence which indicates that the defendants' action in cancelling the plaintiff's licence
was induced by motives other than zeal for the public welfare, and a finding of malice on their
part would not entirely lack support. It is, however unnecessary to deal with this aspect of the
case” (p. 19). For both Justices then, the presentation of non-genuine reasons would serve as
ground for a successful action.
17
Finally, the OED definition of ‘transparent’ supports these two implications: Reasons are
‘transparent’ when they are “2. a. Frank, open, candid, ingenuous. b. Easily seen through,
recognized, understood, or detected; manifest, evident, obvious, clear.”
18
Though the requirement that the reasons be capable of being articulated does not entail that
they be made explicit in each and every administrative decision subject to the obligation to
present reasons set out in Baker; I clarify this subtlety in section 5 below.
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legal framework. Any set of reasons that satisfy these requirements constitute an existent
justification, meaning interference is not necessary to preserve the rule of law and is
therefore prohibited. My task now is to both show that, and explain how, the Court
determines these five elements are satisfied when assessing for reasonableness since
Dunsmuir.

4. The Consistent Application of the Three Criteria by the Supreme Court
In this section I show the Court has developed a patterned approach to
determining the five elements of the criteria are satisfied: (i) The Court summarizes the
reasons offered in support of the impugned decision, ensuring the first four elements are
satisfied (i.e., ensuring that a set of reasons exist); then (ii) the Court determines whether
those reasons satisfy the final element, i.e., whether they are relevant given the particular
legal context. My analyses therefore also establish the unique significance of the
relevance requirement; it is the most difficult and final conceptual step in confirming that
a justification exists, and so receives the most judicial attention. On my account, when
the Court appeals to the ‘legal framework’ during an assessment for reasonableness they
are attempting to establish whether the reasons offered are relevant. This characterization
should help to allay the concerns of some commentators that those appeals are too vague
to provide meaningful guidance for determining whether a decision is reasonable.19

A concern first articulated by Binnie J in his concurring reasons in Dunsmuir at paras 150 –
155. Versions of that concern have subsequently been raised by David Mullan “Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick, Standard of Review and Procedural Fairness for Public Servants: Let’s Try Again!”
(2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 117at 135, Ron Goltz “Patent Unreasonableness is Dead. And
We Have Killed It. A Critique of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in Dunsmuir” (2008) 46
Alta L Rev 253 at 259 and 261, Paul Daly “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in
Canadian Administrative Law” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 317 at 352 – 355, and Matthew
Lewans “Deference and Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir” (2012) 38:1 Queen's LJ 59 at 94.
19
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Given that my analyses are designed to identify the several bases upon which
reasonableness requires reviewing courts to interfere with the decision of an
administrative body and the plurality of decisions applying reasonableness, I have chosen
to only discuss cases in which the Court determined interference was necessary. That
choice is motivated by a simple observation: In those comparatively rare circumstances in
which interference occurs, the Court devotes considerable effort to explaining the flaw
with the administrative decision maker’s reasoning.20 My first analyses of Halifax
(Regional Municipality) v. Canada (Public Works and Government Services) in 4(a) and
Dunsmuir in 4(b) are the most detailed. Once the pattern is clear, I will in 4(c) undertake
accelerated analyses of post-Dunsmuir decisions in which judicial interference owing to
unreasonableness is deemed to be necessary.

4(a) Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (Public Works and Government
Services)
Federal government properties in Canada are constitutionally exempt from
provincial and municipal taxation. In an effort to avoid undermining the taxation
revenues of those bodies, Parliament adopted the Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. M-13 (the PILT Act).21 The PILT Act grants the Minister of Public Works and
Government Services the discretion to decide the value of each payment in lieu of
taxation according to “the value that in the opinion of the Minister would be attributable
by an assessment authority to the property if it were taxable.”22 The City of Halifax

20

The rarity of interference on the part of the Court is significant: In a total of 42 cases explicitly
engaging the single reasonableness standard heard since Dunsmuir, the Court has found the
impugned decision to be unreasonable in only 7.
21
Halifax, supra note 13 at para 2.
22
Ibid at para 10.
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objected to the Minister’s valuation of the unoccupied 42 acres surrounding the Halifax
Citadel National Historic Site at a nominal value of $10.23 Writing for the unanimous full
Court, Cromwell J found the Minister’s valuation to be unreasonable and remitted the
matter for redetermination.24
The primary explanation of the gulf between the municipality’s and Minister’s
valuations was the significance attributed to the use restrictions arising from the historical
site designation; Halifax gave them little significance, whereas that appeared to be the
lone consideration upon which the Minister’s valuation depended.25 While the Minister is
not bound by the PILT Act to simply accept a value determined by the local assessment
authority,26 he does not enjoy an unfettered discretion either; the valuation must be
informed by the local tax system as though the federal property were taxable.27 Since
valuing land solely on the basis of land use restrictions is not an approach used by any
recognized Canadian assessment authority and is inconsistent with the purpose of the
PILT Act inasmuch as the PILT Act is intended to provide payments for national historic
sites, the Minister’s valuation was unreasonable.28
In his attempt to summarize the facts of the case, Justice Cromwell encounters
the first problematic element; there were no clear reasons presented by the PILT Dispute
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Ibid at para 4.
Ibid at para 59.
25
Ibid at para 48.
26
Ibid at para 39 – 40.
27
Ibid at paras 42 and 49. Justice Cromwell cites Montreal Port Authority, supra note 8 in
support of the point that PILTs must use the existing municipal taxation system as a meaningful
point of reference, rather than inventing their own system of taxation; see para 40: “calculations
must be based on the tax system that actually exists at the place where the property in question is
located. The PILT Act and the Regulations require that the tax rate be calculated as if the federal
property were taxable property belonging to a private owner.”
28
Halifax, supra note 13 at para 48.
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Advisory Panel to justify the $10 valuation.29 The Court’s analysis therefore begins by
noting that the decision is problematic in part because (a) no clear reasons exist and (b) it
is not obvious the reasons that do exist actually informed the Minister’s valuation.30 The
failure to satisfy the two transparency requirements would constitute sufficient grounds
for overturning the valuation had there been no possible reasons to review. Since,
however, the reasons of the Minister’s designated appraiser were available they could be
treated as the basis for the valuation. That those reasons could be summarized by
Cromwell J shows there was no issue with respect to the first intelligibility requirement,
i.e., the reasons of Canada’s appraiser were meaningful words and sentences of the
English language. The remaining flaws were, however, determinative; the reasons given
were both (d) inconsistent and (e) irrelevant.
According to the Court, the Minister’s reasons contradicted the purposes of the
PILT Act: “Parliament intended that the land on national historic sites of Canada be
included in the PILT scheme. That being the case, it is inconsistent with this inclusion to
reason in a categorical way, as the Minister did here, that such sites, by virtue of that
status, have no value for assessment purposes and are therefore ineligible for PILTs
under the scheme.”31 This is a clear example of reasons that are unintelligible because
they cannot be consistently combined. To see how the contradiction renders the reasons
unintelligible, we need to recognize Cromwell J’s assumption that the first reason
supporting any valuation is necessarily the legislative purpose; in this case to ensure
municipal tax revenues are not adversely affected by federal properties. Given that
purpose, to then argue that the federal properties whose use restrictions the PILT Act is
29

Ibid at para 28.
Ibid at paras 45 and 46.
31
Ibid at para 54.
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attempting to address are without value owing to those very use restrictions is a direct
contradiction, and therefore makes no sense. The reasons that led to the decision (the
purpose of the PILT Act to compensate for tax losses caused by federal historical
properties conjoined with the assertion that the historical designation negated all value)
could not be understood by the Court just because they were contradictory, i.e., not able
to be consistently combined in support of a single conclusion.
The second basis for interference in Halifax is the failure of the appraiser’s
reasons to be relevant given the legal context. According to the Court, “there is no
evidence... to suggest that, with regard to sites of this nature, any assessment authority
anywhere in Canada applies the approach to valuation used by Canada's appraiser.”32
Since the assessment method is not used in Canada, the Minister’s reasons are not within
the limited boundaries set upon his discretion under the legislation. It follows that even if
the method of assessment used has some foundation in economic theory (as claimed by
the Minister’s appraiser), its absence from any jurisdiction in Canada means the legal
framework does not recognize those theoretical foundations for the purposes of PILT
valuation. As such, that method of valuation was a legally irrelevant method; the reasons
offered simply do not matter to the outcome, irrespective of their theoretical pedigree.
In Halifax the Court assessed the impugned decision according to all five
elements of the three criteria. Cromwell J’s approach to that task began with a summary
of the available reasons, followed by a determination of the degree to which those
reasons conformed to the legal context. The two grounds upon which he determined
interference was warranted both rested on showing the Minister’s reasons failed to
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Ibid at para 48.
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conform to the discretion granted by the PILT Act and were in that sense irrelevant.33 The
ruling therefore helps to emphasize the extent to which reasonableness narrowly focuses
a reviewing court’s analysis; the question is not primarily whether the decision itself
conforms to the legal framework, but whether the reasoning that led to that decision
conforms. That narrow focus leads to a significant implication: If in this case it would
have been possible to present a justification that did not contradict the purposes of the
PILT Act and did appeal to a method of valuation relied upon by an existing assessment
authority in Canada, the Court would have had no basis to interfere with the $10
valuation.
Consistent with my analysis in section 3 above, Cromwell J’s ratio does not
include any mention of the relative quality of the reasons produced as against available
alternatives. Accepting that the $10 valuation could have been left to stand had the
reasons presented not been irrelevant in the manner identified, his omission implies a
threshold of judicial interference. Again, interference was necessary because the reasons
given were inconsistent with the accepted rules and so irrelevant, not because the reasons
were relevant but otherwise weak or inadequate. By implication, had the Minister
presented reasons that were relevant, a justification would have been confirmed to exist.
In that case, the reasons supporting the decision would have not been arbitrary, meaning
no interference would be necessary to uphold the rule of law.
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I should clarify: Owing to the conceptual order I have maintained is implied by the five
elements of the three criteria, contradictory reasons are by definition irrelevant reasons. That is,
when reasons are unintelligible because they are inconsistent, they are also irrelevant. The
assumption is that it would not be possible to present a set of reasons that are inconsistent but are
somehow relevant to the outcome they are intended to support.
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4(b) The Application of Reasonableness in Dunsmuir
My analysis of the application of reasonableness in Dunsmuir mimics my analysis
of Halifax. First I identify the five elements of the framework and the pattern by which
the analysis proceeds, then I explain how the legal context is used to establish that the
reasons offered in support of the arbitrator’s decision were irrelevant. I should also note
explicitly that my limited goal in this section is to understand the Court’s application of
the five elements of the three criteria. I therefore offer no assessment of the extent to
which the majority opinion qualifies (or does not) as a consistent application of the
principles of employment law, a topic addressed in much of the scholarly commentary.34
That the arbitrator’s ruling satisfied the two senses of transparency and the first
sense of intelligibility is evident in the majority’s summary of his reasons. In his
preliminary ruling the arbitrator interpreted s. 97(2.1) of the Public Service Labour
Relations Act (PSLRA) to grant him the power to “substitute another penalty for the
discharge”35 if he finds that the employee was in fact dismissed for cause. In his ruling on
the merits, he decided that Dunsmuir was both a contract employee and an office holder
‘at pleasure’, the latter of which meant “the appellant was entitled to procedural fairness
in the employer's decision to terminate his employment.”36 Owing to Dunsmuir not
having been granted the procedural fairness to which he was entitled, the arbitrator
ordered his reinstatement. So the arbitrator (a) presented reasons for the Court to

See for example Mullan, supra note 19, or Nicolas Lambert “Dunsmuir v. New-Brunswick: The
Perceived Choice between Fairness and Flexibility in Public Service Employment” (2009) 59
UNBLJ 205, or Ron Ellis “Dunsmuir and the Independence of Adjudicative Tribunals” (2010) 23
Can J Admin L & Prac 203, or G. Van Harten, G. Heckman, and D. J. Mullan, Administrative
Law: cases, texts, and materials 6th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd, 2010) at
869 – 870.
35
Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 11.
36
Ibid at para 15.
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54

scrutinize, reasons accepted as (b) the genuine basis for the arbitrator’s conclusion,
reasons that (c) were expressed in meaningful sentences.
The majority’s analysis of the arbitrator’s finding that Dunsmuir was the holder of
an office ‘at pleasure’ and was as such entitled to procedural fairness is the flaw that
necessitates interference according to the Court.37 The arbitrator’s mistake in applying
procedural fairness was a result of his understanding of the legal character of an
employee in the public service.
[W]hat matters is the nature of the employment relationship between the public
employee and the public employer. Where a public employee is employed under a
contract of employment, regardless of his or her status as a public office holder,
the applicable law governing his or her dismissal is the law of contract, not
general principles arising out of public law.38
It follows that “[t]he dismissal of a public employee should generally be viewed as a
typical employment law dispute.”39 And since the arbitrator did not treat the dispute as a
matter of employment law, the majority concluded that owing to the imposition of
“procedural fairness requirements on the respondent over and above its contractual
obligations and [on that basis] ordering the full ‘reinstatement’ of the appellant, the
adjudicator erred in his application of the duty of fairness.”40
The problem identified by Bastarache and Lebel JJ shows the reasons of the
arbitrator also satisfied (d) the consistency requirement since there is “nothing
problematic with a grievance adjudicator considering a public law duty of fairness issue
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where such a duty exists.”41 The problem was that no such duty existed in this instance.
There are only two exceptional cases in which a duty of procedural fairness apply to the
dismissal of a public employee.42 Since Dunsmuir was not in one of the two categories,
the arbitrator’s line of reasoning was meaningful but (e) simply did not matter in the legal
context. It began with a mistaken characterization of an office holder ‘at pleasure’ as one
who is entitled to a duty of fairness beyond those found in the common law of contract,
and was therefore not sensitive to the limited circumstances in which such an obligation
exists. While everything that followed from that characterization might be internally
consistent, it was irrelevant given the limited scope of the exceptional categories.
Like Halifax, the majority in Dunsmuir assessed the reasons presented in support
of the arbitrator’s decision according to same patterned approach; they first summarized
the reasons, and doing so ensured the first four elements of the criteria were satisfied.
They then turned their attention to articulating the appropriate legal context to determine
whether the reasons as summarized were relevant. Also like Halifax, the failure to
provide reasons that were relevant to the legal context served as the basis for interference.
Unlike Halifax, the legal context was not set by a particular statute. Instead, the legal
context in Dunsmuir was set by the common law duty of procedural fairness and the way
in which it relates to the law of contract. But the nature of that flaw is the same in both
cases: Had the arbitrator been able to provide reasons consistent with the scope of the
public law duty of fairness and its effect on employment relations, the Court would have
had no grounds upon which to interfere with a reinstatement order. So if a set of reasons
41

Ibid at para 84.
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do matter to a decision in the context set by the legal framework, the decision is not
arbitrary, the rule of law is respected, and judicial interference is therefore prohibited.
I end by again emphasizing the sense in which the counter-factual implied by the
relevance requirement as discussed in Dunsmuir suggests it is the minimum threshold,
the ‘tipping-point’, for judicial interference under the single reasonableness standard. As
noted, had the arbitrator’s reasons conformed to the context, the Court would have had no
basis upon which to interfere. In other words, all the arbitrator had to do, and what he
failed to do, was establish that his reasoning mattered given the context. He did not have
to also show that the reasons he presented were ‘good’ or ‘better’ or ‘the best’ among the
possible alternatives. It follows that a reviewing court is required to interfere only when it
can establish that no justification exists as defined by the three criteria, and is prohibited
from interfering in all other cases.

4(c) Post-Dunsmuir Supreme Court Instances of Interference Owing to Unreasonableness
Having described how the Court ensures the five elements are satisfied with my
analyses of Halifax and Dunsmuir, my goal in this section is to both bolster its
plausibility and highlight the repeated pattern in the Court’s subsequent applications of
the single reasonableness standard. I accomplish that goal by undertaking analyses that
are structurally similar to those developed in 4(a) and 4(b), focusing on four postDunsmuir rulings in which the Court deemed interference to be necessary. First the Court
summarizes the reasons, establishing that they are transparent and intelligible, then they
determine whether those reasons are relevant given the context, which serves as the
repeated basis for interference.
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The first decision in which the Court interfered with an administrative body for
unreasonableness following Dunsmuir was Montreal Port Authority. The issue before the
Court in that case was similar to the issue raised in Halifax, i.e., to determine whether the
revised PILTs assessed by the Montreal Port Authority (MPA) and the CBC for the City
of Montreal were reasonable. A series of amalgamations of municipalities into the City of
Montreal began in 2000, a process which led to significant amendments in its property
tax system. Both the MPA and the CBC offered PILT’s under the new system that were
considerably lower than the values deemed appropriate by the City. Writing for the
unanimous full Court, Lebel J ruled that both bodies unreasonably exercised their
discretion calculating their PILT amounts.43
After summarizing the bases for the MPA and CBC valuations, Justice Lebel
noted explicitly that they fulfill the first two criteria: “Neither the transparency nor the
intelligibility of the corporations' decisions is in issue. The respondents made
management decisions and clearly explained the basis for those decisions to the City.”44
The Court thereby accepted that (a) there were reasons that (b) really were those relied
upon by the MPA and the CBC in coming to their valuations, presented in the form of (c)
meaningful sentences, and (d) able to be consistently combined. The problem was that
neither Crown corporation was empowered to “base their calculations on a fictitious tax
system they themselves have created arbitrarily. On the contrary, those calculations must
be based on a tax system that actually exists at the place where the property in question is
located.”45 By grounding their justifications in an amended version of the preamalgamation tax system, they failed to (e) exercise their discretion in a manner that was
43
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relevant given the specific provisions of the PILT Act. The decision was therefore
unreasonable and interference necessary; allowing the assessments to stand would have
allowed the MPA and CBC to arbitrarily devise their own tax systems, contrary to what
the law permitted.
In British Columbia (Worker’s Compensation Board) v. Figliola, Figlioa and two
co-complainants suffered from chronic pain conditions they developed on the job that
rendered them unable to work. Each sought compensation from the British Columbia
Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB), and all three were awarded the same flat rate of
compensation in accord with WCB policy.46 All three appealed to the Review Division of
the WCB, arguing in part that a fixed award policy for chronic pain was discriminatory
on the grounds of disability under s. 8 of the British Columbia Human Rights Code (the
Code). The Review Officer concluded the policy was not discriminatory, and so rejected
their appeal.47 Instead of seeking judicial review, the complainants then submitted a
substantively identical complaint to the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (the
Tribunal). The WCB submitted a motion asking the Tribunal to dismiss the complaints, a
motion the Tribunal rejected; the WCB sought judicial review. The Supreme Court was
split 5 – 4 in their result. Abella J, writing for the majority, found the decision of the
Tribunal unreasonable and dismissed the complaints.48
The Court’s assessment for reasonableness in Figliola focuses on the Tribunal’s
response to the WCB motion. The Tribunal determined that the WCB appeals procedure
was not appropriate, that the Review Officer did not properly interpret his mandate for
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addressing human rights complaints, that his decision was not final, and that he did not
have the necessary expertise to interpret or apply the Code.49 This summary shows the
majority recognized (a) there were reasons that were (b) actually contemplated by the
Tribunal in deciding to reject the submission of the WCB. Moreover, those reasons (c)
were all meaningful sentences and (d) consistently combined in a manner such that the
Court could articulate the nature of the support they provided.
The need for interference in Figliola followed from the failure of the reasons to
(e) be relevant given the legislative framework. Specifically, they were insensitive to the
lateral nature of the authority of the Tribunal as compared with the WCB. In the eyes of
Abella J, the complainants were attempting to relitigate in a different forum “[r]ather than
challenging the Review Officer’s decision through the available review route of judicial
review,”50 and “[t]he Tribunal’s analysis made it complicit in this attempt to collaterally
appeal the merits of the Board’s decision.”51 Since the WCB had the authority to hear and
resolve human rights complaints, and the Tribunal has no power under the Code to hear
appeals from decisions of the WCB, the reasons of the Tribunal relied on “predominantly
irrelevant factors [that] ignored its true [legislative] mandate.”52 In other words, the
reasons of the Tribunal simply did not matter to the outcome owing to the legislative
context, so the decision was arbitrary and in that sense a threat to the rule of law.
One day after the ruling in Figliola the Court handed down a second decision in
which it deemed interference owing to unreasonableness necessary, i.e., Canada
(Attorney General) v. Mowat. Writing for the unanimous Court, Lebel and Cromwell JJ
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found that the decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (the Tribunal) to award
Ms. Mowat $47,000 for legal costs was unreasonable.53 Ms. Mowat was a traffic
technician for the Canadian Forces. Three years after leaving the Forces, she filed a
human rights complaint “alleging sexual harassment, adverse differential treatment, and
failure to continue to employ her on account of her sex.”54 The Tribunal found her
complaint was partially substantiated and awarded her $4,000 for her suffering.55 In a
separate decision, the Tribunal awarded Ms. Mowat a partial reimbursement of her legal
costs, proportioned according to the number of complaints that were found to be
substantiated.56
The reasons for the Tribunal’s costs award were focused on determining whether
the powers conferred under ss. 53(2)(c) or (d) of the Canadian Human Rights Act
(CHRA) to compensate “for any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the
discriminatory practice, permits an award of legal costs.”57 The Tribunal offered two
reasons in support of their decision to award costs; the phrases ‘any expenses incurred’
includes legal costs, and denying that remedial power undermines “access to the human
rights adjudication process.”58 These then are the (a) reasons presented by the Tribunal
which the Court treats as the (b) reasons that actually led to the finding that they could
award costs. That the Court was able to summarize those reasons entails they were both
(c) meaningful sentences that were (d) able to be consistently combined. Interference is
again therefore warranted in this case because the reasons fail to be (e) relevant in the
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legal context. Specifically, the Tribunal’s interpretation of ‘any expenses’ to include legal
costs is insensitive to the bases for compensation listed in the CHRA,59 to the meaning of
‘legal costs’ as a term of law,60 to the legislative history of the CHRA,61 and to parallel
legislation in the provinces and territories.62 So the reasons of the Tribunal were easily
understood by the Court, they simply did not matter to the conclusion that the CHRA
confers the authority to award costs and were in that sense arbitrary.
More recently, the Court deemed interference owing to unreasonableness
necessary in Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General).63 The case arose as a
result of a decision by the Quebec Minister of Education, Recreation and Sports to deny
Loyola High School, a private Catholic institution, an exemption from the Province’s
mandatory Ethics and Religious Culture program (ERC).64 One of the primary features
and requirements of the ERC is that the multiple religious and ethical views discussed be
presented in a neutral manner to foster respect for the diversity of views in Canadian
society.65 The exemption from the ERC sought by Loyola required the school to provide
an equivalent program, where assessing its ‘equivalence’ would be left to the Minister.66
The Minister denied both of Loyola’s requests for an exemption on the grounds that their
proposed alternative was faith-based rather than cultural and was as such an alternative to
the ERC, not an alternative means of delivering the same content in a neutral manner.67
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Loyola sought judicial review, arguing the pluralism assumed by the ERC violated its
right to freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.68
That the first four elements of the framework are satisfied is again evidenced by
the Court’s summary of the Minister’s reasons. The Minister denied an exemption owing
to the religious nature of the alternative, maintaining that “a program that departs in any
way from the ERC Program’s posture of strict neutrality, even partially, cannot achieve
the state’s objectives of promoting respect for others and openness to diversity.”69 So this
is (a) the reason that is (b) relied upon by the Minister to justify denying Loyola’s request
for an exemption from the ERC. That this reason is summarized shows it is (c)
meaningful and, since it is only one reason, (d) internally consistent. It follows that the
problem with the reason offered by the Minister is again a function of its (e) relevance
within the legal context.
Since the issue in this case concerns a Charter value, establishing relevance
requires the Court follow the approach set out in Doré v. Quebec (Tribunals des
professions)70: “the discretionary decision-maker is required to proportionately balance
the Charter protections to ensure that they are limited no more than is necessary given
the applicable statutory objectives.”71 In this instance, “the Minister’s task was to arrive
at a decision that proportionately balanced the realization of the ERC Program’s
objectives… with respect for Charter-protected religious freedom.”72 She failed to fulfill
that task because her reason assumes “that engagement with an individual’s own religion
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on his or her own terms can simply be presumed to impair respect for others.”73 So the
Minister’s reasoning was not relevant in the legal context because it failed to minimally
impair freedom of religion. That failure was the product of an unsupported assumption
about an inevitable negative impact, viz., non-neutral discussions of belief among
members of the same faith lead to intolerance. In other words, her decision to deny the
exemption was unreasonable because her justification made an assumption that was
contrary to the goal of promoting mutual respect for diverse religious views, and
therefore did not actually weigh in favour of the legitimacy of the Minister’s position in
that context.
I end this subsection by emphasizing what my analyses are not, i.e., they are not
attempts to critically assess the Court’s decision to interfere in these cases. I need to make
this point explicit because several of these rulings have attracted critical responses. Recall
from Chapter 2 that on Lewans’s account, for example, both Figliola and Mowat
represent inconsistencies in the development of the single reasonableness standard.74 The
Court’s robust engagement with the reasons of the administrative bodies in these cases
suggest that reasonableness is applied inconsistently.75 I also noted that Daly argues the
Court actually applied the correctness standard in Mowat under the guise of
reasonableness; they ruled the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable owing to its failure
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to correctly interpret the home statute.76 For both authors, the Court’s decision to
interfere in these cases are at least confusing. My analyses in this section, by contrast,
have intentionally ignored the possibility of substantive inconsistencies in an effort to
isolate the Court’s consistent approach to reasonableness.

4(d) Conclusions – A Consistent Set of Concepts, Pattern of Analysis, and Basis for
Interference
I have reviewed six rulings in which the Supreme Court decided it was necessary
to interfere with an administrative decision on the grounds that it was unreasonable. My
immediate goal has been to establish that the five elements implied by the three criteria
reveal a pattern in the application of the reasonableness standard. The Court begins every
reasonableness review by summarizing the reasons presented in support of the decision.77
The act of summarizing reasons ensures the transparency and intelligibility requirements
are satisfied; a summary establishes that there are reasons that (a) exist outside the mind
of their author, (b) are actually used to support the result, (c) are meaningful, and (d) can
be consistently combined. When a clear and consistent summary is not possible, as was
the case in Halifax, the Court takes note of the problem. The second step of a
reasonableness review is to determine whether the reasons as summarized conform to the
legal context. That is, a reviewing court must determine whether (e) the reasons presented
are actually relevant to the decision given the home statute, the common law, and the
constitutional framework.
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My analyses also show the relevance requirement occupies a uniquely important
role, in two senses. First and most obviously, assessing for relevance demands the bulk of
a reviewing court’s intellectual efforts. Identifying the specific elements of the legal
context that apply in a given case, then determining whether the reasons presented
conform to that context in a manner that offers support for the selected outcome, is
unavoidably an exercise in abstract reasoning. The case law provides guidance with
respect to the structure of such analyses, but the sheer variety of, and potential
dissimilarity between, legal and factual contexts ensures specific substantive guidance
will rarely be available. While summarizing the reasons for a decision to confirm the first
four elements have been satisfied will require interpretive effort on the part of a court,
that kind of analysis is a comparatively more determinate, hence easier, task.
The second sense in which the relevance requirement is uniquely significant is
that it is repeatedly the basis upon which the Court determines interference is necessary.
In other words, when decisions are unreasonable they are unreasonable because they fail
to satisfy the limits imposed on the set of possible, eligible reasons by the specific
legislative context. This repeated basis for interference implies that relevance is the
threshold criterion for a review for reasonableness; a justification has been confirmed to
exist when a set of existent, genuine, meaningful, and consistent reasons are shown to
matter to the plausibility of an outcome in that particular context. Alternatively, when an
administrative body has presented reasons that fall within the identified contextual limits
their decision is reasonable precisely because it is justified. And once it is established that
a justification exists there is, by definition, no danger the impugned decision is arbitrary
and so no sense in which the rule of law is threatened. In the absence of such a threat,
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judicial interference is no longer necessary and is therefore prohibited out of respect for
the foundational democratic principle. By extension, this limit on interference obtains
even in those cases where superior justifications for alternative outcomes exist; the
limited task of a reviewing court is to confirm the existence of a justification and is not,
by contrast, to assess the relative merits of a justification that has been confirmed to exist.

5. Refining the Framework: Violating the Transparency Requirement is not automatically
Grounds for Interference
Throughout sections 3 and 4 I have characterized the five elements of the three
criteria as the substantive requirements the single reasonableness standard imposes on
administrative decision makers. Accordingly, each marks a distinct concept which, when
not satisfied, necessitates judicial interference. The cases I consider in this section show
that characterization is imprecise. More specifically, they identify and explain one
circumstance in which a failure to present any reasons at all will not, immediately,
warrant interference: When reasons are missing but the decision taken implies a
justification that would, if made explicit, conform to the requirements of the criteria. In
other words, these cases show that a decision is reasonable and interference prohibited so
long as it is justifiable by reference to the law, even if it has not actually been justified by
the administrative body under review.
The shared issue between the two cases I analyze in this section, the issue that
requires I refine my characterization of the three criteria is: In both instances, the
administrative body was subject to the duty to justify their decision per Baker, an
obligation that each failed to discharge. In ATA, the administrative body had no
opportunity to present reasons in support of its position because the issue raised on
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judicial review was not raised before that body. In Maclean v. British Columbia
(Securities Commission), the administrative body issued an order that was not
accompanied by explicit reasons. In both cases the Court holds that interference is not
appropriate even though the reasons necessary for a justification are missing. It follows
that the absence of reasons does not always warrant judicial interference owing to
unreasonableness, a result that is seemingly at odds with my claims in sections 3 and 4
that an absence of reasons does necessitate interference.
To show the rulings in ATA and Maclean do not undermine the importance I have
attributed to the three criteria, I invoke the distinction between a decision that is justified
and one that is justifiable, first introduced in Chapter 1.78 As I noted then, starting with
Dicey, a primary and necessary requirement for upholding the rule of law is that
exercises of state authority be justifiable by reference to regular law. That is, all actions
of the state could, in principle, be justified by reference to the law. Starting with Baker
administrative bodies in Canada are, in most circumstances, obligated to ensure their
actions are justifiable by actually being justified. What the rulings in both ATA and
Maclean therefore clarify is the priority of the possibility of a justification. That is, they
show that when there is an obvious sense in which the impugned decision could be
justified by reference to the regular law, judicial interference is not necessary because the
rule of law is not in danger. This result does not undermine my account of the
significance of the three criteria; as we will see, if the decision is not obviously
justifiable, the administrative body will be required to provide reasons for a court to
review.
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5(a) A.T.A. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner)
Rothstein J makes one statement in ATA which, if accepted in isolation, directly
contradicts my repeated assertion throughout this chapter that the five elements of the
three criteria are the only substantive components of a review for reasonableness:
“Obviously, where the tribunal's decision is implicit, the reviewing court cannot refer to
the tribunal's process of articulating reasons, nor to justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the tribunal's decision-making process. The reviewing court cannot
give respectful attention to the reasons offered because there are no reasons.”79 Indeed,
Lewans interprets this pronouncement to convey just that meaning: “Justice Rothstein's
decision is striking because it asserts that the requirement of ‘justification, transparency
and intelligibility’ is not a universal feature of reasonableness review.”80 My primary
goal in this section is to show this statement does not actually alter the universal
applicability of the criteria; I argue all that is being claimed is that the absence of reasons
(and so the absence of any justification) does not automatically demand interference.
The Alberta Teacher’s Association (the ATA) violated Alberta’s privacy
protection legislation, a finding made by an adjudicator appointed by the Information and
Privacy Commissioner. The decision was completed twenty-nine months after the
complaints were initially received. No explicit extension was made until twenty-two
months after those complaints, contrary to the statutory provision requiring notification
within 90 days.81 The ATA sought judicial review to quash the adjudicator’s decision
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owing to the violation of the 90 day period.82 In the result, the Court reversed the
decisions of the two lower courts and reinstated the adjudicator’s decision.83
The timelines issue was not raised in front of the adjudicator, meaning there were
no reasons offered to rebut the ATA’s claim that a failure to give notice of an extension
within the 90 day period was a ground for ending the proceedings.84 Rothstein J therefore
articulated the way in which the single reasonableness standard is to be applied when
reasons are missing: “If there exists a reasonable basis upon which the decision maker
could have decided as it did, the court must not interfere.”85 Reviewing courts can expect
to have to engage in this activity “when only limited reasons are required, [in which case]
it is entirely appropriate for courts to consider the reasons that could be offered for the
decision when conducting a reasonableness review.”86 But the search for possible reasons
is limited: “It will generally be inappropriate to find that there is no reasonable basis for
the tribunal's decision without first giving the tribunal an opportunity to provide one.”87
So, when explicit reasons are absent courts can determine whether there exists an implied
justification that satisfies the criteria. If the reviewing court determines the decision is
indeed justifiable then it is reasonable, meaning interference is prohibited. If a court
cannot identify a possible set of reasons, or if the postulated reasons do not satisfy the
three criteria, the court must provide an opportunity for the administrative decision maker
to justify their position.
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That ATA does not weaken the universal applicability of the three criteria is clear
when the Court assesses the adjudicator’s implied reasons. “The Commissioner and his
delegated adjudicators have considered the issue… on numerous occasions and have
provided a consistent analysis.”88 Rothstein J provided a detailed assessment of the
Commissioner’s prior ‘consistent analyses’ in terms of the three criteria.89 Following the
pattern set out in section 4 above, he assessed similar prior rulings according to the three
criteria. According to the ruling in ATA then, when a court is required to postulate
implicit reasons, the three criteria are the standards those reasons must satisfy; they
therefore remain a necessary component of any assessment for reasonableness.
The one change to the role of three criteria Justice Rothstein’s majority ruling in
ATA makes is that a violation of either or both the transparency requirements, i.e., that (a)
there be reasons that (b) have actually been contemplated as the basis for coming to a
particular decision, does not automatically necessitate interference. This ‘interruption’ to
interference follows from the fact that the absence of reasons is not sufficient to establish
that a justification could not be produced. The rule of law is at least not always in danger
and interference is therefore not always warranted if a decision is justifiable by reference
to the legal framework, even if it has not actually been justified. Following ATA, in those
rare cases that reasons are not provided, courts have two options: Either (i) they can
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decide that reasons implied by the decision satisfy the criteria, or (ii) they can remit the
matter to the decision maker to produce a justification. In either case, the criteria need to
be satisfied; genuine, intelligible, and relevant reasons will still need to be produced.

5(b) Maclean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)
Moldaver J’s majority opinion in Maclean v. British Columbia (Securities
Commission) provides additional support for two separate points defended in this chapter.
Most obviously, it upholds the treatment of implicit reasons set out in ATA and thereby
preserves the primary claim of section 5, i.e., that the three criteria are, in all cases, the
substantive requirements imposed on administrative bodies by reasonableness, even when
explicit reasons are absent. It also provides support for a claim implied by my analyses in
section 4, i.e., courts reviewing for reasonableness are to confirm that a justification
exists, and nothing more. More specifically, the ruling in Maclean shows that the relative
quality of a particular justification as compared to other reasonable alternatives is not an
assessment reviewing courts are permitted to undertake, thereby bolstering my claim that
the relevance requirement serves as the threshold for judicial interference.
Patricia Maclean entered a settlement agreement with the Ontario Securities
Commission (the OSC) in September of 2008, accepting bans in Ontario from trading
securities for five years and from serving as an officer or director of some registered
entities for ten years.90 The misconduct leading to these bans occurred in 2001 or
earlier.91 In 2010, the British Columbia Securities Commission (the Commission)
commenced secondary proceedings under the British Columbia Securities Act (the Act)
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against Maclean on the basis of her settlement agreement with the OSC. Those
proceedings yielded a reciprocal order, subjecting her to identical bans in the province of
British Columbia.92 She appealed, arguing the six year limitation period in the Act barred
the Commission from issuing the order.93 In the result, the Court found the order implied
a reasonable interpretation of the limitation period, and so dismissed Maclean’s appeal.94
The basis of Maclean’s action was that the phrase ‘the events’, used in s. 159 of
the Act to mark the start of the limitation period, referred to her underlying misconduct
and not her agreement with the OSC.95 Since her last alleged misconduct occurred in
2001, and the Commission did not commence proceedings until 2010, the six year period
had expired. No reasons were initially offered to rebut Maclean’s assertion; “instead, the
Commission issued its order and, in doing so, impliedly decided that the proceeding was
not time-barred.”96 Like the ruling in ATA however, the Court was nonetheless able to
examine reasons supporting the interpretation of the Commission, viz., those presented to
the Court.97 And as occurred in ATA, Moldaver J summarizes the basis of that
interpretation98 then proceeds to determine it is consistent with the ordinary meaning of
the phrase,99 its context in the statute,100 as well as the broader purposes of secondary
proceedings101 and limitations periods.102 So again, the Court repeats the same patterned
approach to reasonableness demonstrated in section 4 above, accompanied by one
92
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additional step. First they identified a set of reasons that could be attributed to the
decision maker, followed by the normal summary and subsequent assessment of their
relevance given the legal context.
There is a sense in which the rulings in ATA and Maclean actually strengthen my
claims about the universal applicability of the three criteria; even when missing, reasons
that satisfy the criteria will either need to be inferred or produced before a reviewing
court can conclude that an impugned decision is reasonable. Maintaining the rule of law
demands that the decisions of administrative bodies be justifiable, meaning they will need
to actually be justified when disputes arise. As I have claimed repeatedly throughout this
chapter, the minimum requirements for any justification (legal or otherwise) is that there
be (a) written or oral reasons that (b) are genuinely contemplated, (c) meaningful, (d) able
to be consistently combined, and (e) relevant to the outcome given the context in which
they appear. Though ATA and Maclean both restrict reviewing courts from automatically
interfering with a decision that is not accompanied by reasons because it could be
justifiable, neither frees administrative decision makers from eventually having to satisfy
the criteria.
I end by highlighting a second important point made in Maclean, one that
supports my claim that relevance is the threshold criterion for interference, viz., the
Court’s assertion that interference is only permitted when the decision subject to review
has been shown to be unreasonable. One unique feature of the dispute in this case is that,
according to Moldaver J, both the appellant’s and respondent’s independent
interpretations of ‘the events’ in s. 159 of the Act are reasonable.103 The fact that both
positions are reasonable, however, makes no difference since “the Commission holds the
103
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interpretive upper hand: under reasonableness review, we defer to any reasonable
interpretation adopted by an administrative maker, even if other reasonable decisions may
exist.”104 Once a court confirms a justification exists according to the three criteria,
interference is prohibited. The existence of alternative justifications supporting
competing but nonetheless reasonable decisions is therefore of no consequence from the
perspective of a reviewing court; it is not within a court’s power to decide which is
‘better’, only to determine that the available reasons matter, given the legal context.

6. Conclusions – The Substance and Structure of Reasonableness Review
My primary goal in this chapter has been to articulate the clear and coherent
framework of reasonableness review that has evolved since Dunsmuir. Achieving that
goal has consisted in explaining how reasonableness requires courts to confirm the
existence of a justification, and nothing more, a confirmation made by assessing reasons
according to the three criteria. I began by noting the prevalence of the criteria in the case
law. I then described the five distinct concepts they imply which, when taken in
combination, constitute an ‘existent justification’. The Supreme Court’s repeated
attempts to ensure those elements have been satisfied in the post-Dunsmuir case law
revealed the internal structure applied in each reasonableness review: First the Court
summarizes the reasons for the decision, an action that ensures understandable reasons
exist. Then the Court attempts to determine whether those reasons actually matter to the
decision adopted given the legal context.
One of the primary elements of the single reasonableness standard my analyses
have been intended to clarify are the circumstances in which it demands judicial
104
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interference. A failure to satisfy any one element of the three criteria results in a failure to
produce a justification. A decision that is not justified is arbitrary and in that sense
undermines the rule of law. So violating any one of the five elements is, at least in
principle, a sufficient basis to warrant interference. In practice, however, the first four
elements are almost always satisfied and are easily assessed; so long as a court can
summarize the reasons offered then genuine, meaningful, and consistent reasons exist.
Establishing that those reasons matter to the specific decision made in light of the legal
context, by contrast, is more difficult. The result is that a review for reasonableness will
in almost all circumstances be devoted primarily to establishing the relevance of the
reasons offered. Not surprisingly, a failure to produce relevant reasons will serve as the
most common basis for judicial interference. And when reasons are relevant, interference
is prohibited out of respect for the foundational democratic principle.
The single reasonableness standard introduced by the majority in Dunsmuir (i)
relies on a cluster of five familiar concepts that have (ii) been repeatedly applied by the
Court according to a coherent pattern of analysis, (iii) an analysis that always relies on
the same threshold as a basis for judicial interference. Readers will recall from my review
of the scholarly literature in both Chapters 1 and 2 that one of the most prominent
criticisms of the single reasonableness standard is that it has failed to clarify the process
of judicial review. I take myself to have, at this point, shown that criticism is at the very
least overstated with respect to these three aspects of reasonableness.
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Chapter 4: The Clear Impact of the Single Reasonable Standard on Judicial Interference
– the Difference between ‘Relevance’ and ‘Adequacy’
1. Introduction
Having articulated the coherent framework that defines reasonableness in the
Supreme Court case law, I now bolster my case for clarity by using that framework to
resolve one question arising in the scholarly commentary. Specifically, I use it to
characterize the reduction to the circumstances in which judicial interference is
necessary. To properly situate my analysis, I remind readers of the dispute that arose in
respect of its impact on interference: The majority in Dunsmuir, and a significant number
of scholarly commentators, maintained the revisions to reasonableness neither increased
nor decreased the need for judicial interference.1 In his concurring reasons in Dunsmuir,
Binnie J argued that the elimination of patent unreasonableness would likely increase
instances of judicial interference, a position also well represented in the secondary
literature.2 Finally, Mullan suggested the single reasonableness standard signalled a
reduction to the need for judicial interference, a view that has risen to prominence more
recently.3 My position falls in the last of these three groups; on my account, the single
reasonableness standard has decreased the circumstances in which interference is
necessary to uphold the rule of law.
My primary goal in this chapter is not to argue that the need for judicial
interference has been reduced, since that position is well-defended. Instead my goal is to
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clearly characterize that reduction; using the framework, and in particular the relevance
requirement, I explain why a reduction was unavoidable. According to the reasonableness
simpliciter standard, courts were required to interfere with an administrative decision
when the reasons failed to provide adequate support for the outcome in some
circumstances. What I show is that the possibility of interference owing to inadequacy
qualifies as a sixth basis for interference in addition to the five elements implied by the
three criteria. So courts were not limited to merely confirming that a justification exists
but were, in some cases, required to interfere on the grounds of unreasonableness when
the reasons offered were insufficient to support the decision.
As I argued in Chapter 3, my account of relevance as the threshold criterion for
interference was most clearly supported by Moldaver J’s assertion in Maclean that courts
must not interfere when reasonable alternatives exist, but only when the selected
alternative has been shown to be independently unreasonable.4 What is notably missing
from my analyses, however, is an explicit statement prohibiting interference when the
relevance requirement is satisfied but the decision is nonetheless weak. That
pronouncement was made by Abella J in NLNU v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury
Board): “Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir as standing for the proposition that the
‘adequacy’ of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision...”5 Justice Abella’s
assertion that adequacy is not a basis for interference, combined with my account of the
4
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sense in which relevance is the threshold requirement for interference, set my primary
task in this chapter; to clearly explicate the difference between an assessment of
relevance and adequacy as a means of characterizing with precision the change to the
circumstances in which interference is necessary.
In section 2 I articulate the distinction as it is normally understood. In section 3 I
explain how Dunsmuir introduced a change by analyzing Iacobucci J’s descriptions of the
reasonableness simpliciter standard in Southam6 and Ryan.7 Finally, in section 4 I argue
that there exists a clear explanation of this change, viz., interference owing to inadequacy
cannot be allowed because inadequate reasons are not arbitrary reasons, meaning they
present no threat to the rule of law. Interference on such grounds would therefore
unnecessarily undermine the foundational democratic principle.

2. ‘Relevance,’ ‘Adequacy,’ and the Permissibility of Judicial Interference
In this section I present the distinction between ‘relevance’ and ‘adequacy’ to
explain why an assessment for relevance implies fewer grounds for judicial interference.
I rely on a textbook often used in first year Critical Thinking courses on Canadian
university campuses, i.e., Critical Thinking: An Introduction to the Basic Skills (CTB).8
The value of this text is its intended breadth: The authors strive to elaborate those aspects
of human reasoning that are intuitively familiar to all. In other words, they attempt to
identify and clarify relationships that obtain between familiar concepts easily expressed
in natural language.
6
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The authors of CTB offer a clear summary statement of the distinction: “if the
premises are irrelevant, then they give us no reason to think that the conclusion is true.
But if the premises are inadequate, they provide some support for the conclusion,
although this support may be too weak or inadequate to make the conclusion
acceptable.”9 In other words, irrelevant reasons simply do not matter to the acceptability
of a conclusion, whereas inadequate reasons matter but do not provide enough support to
establish its acceptability. Accordingly, relevance is conceptually prior to adequacy: If a
set of reasons are irrelevant to an outcome, they are by definition inadequate. If, by
contrast, a set of reasons are relevant to an outcome, they may or may not be inadequate.
Establishing relevance according to CTB requires showing the reasons matter
given the context in which they are presented.10 To highlight the significance of context
when assessing for relevance, the authors list common examples of irrelevant premises.
These include reasons that depend exclusively on sympathy, or coercive threats, or
popular opinion, or celebrity endorsements, or negative personal characteristics. When
these sorts of reasons do not matter to the outcome they are intended to support it is
because they are unsuitable to the context in which they appear.11 One context in which
each member of this particular list is irrelevant is when they are offered as part of an
‘objective’ justification. Since an appeal to emotion (sympathy, fear), or other people’s
beliefs (popular opinion, celebrity endorsements) is an appeal to individual and therefore
subjective states of mind, such appeals are irrelevant to establishing an ‘objective’ truth
(e.g., my feelings about global warming are irrelevant to the truth of global warming).
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That this account of relevance matches my analyses of the post-Dunsmuir case
law in Chapter 3 seems obvious. As we saw then, after summarizing reasons subject to
review the Court devotes the bulk of its efforts to articulating the legal context in which
the decision has been made, in an effort to determine whether the reasons matter to the
decision given that context. In the words of Mullan: “Issues of relevancy… normally boil
down to questions of statutory interpretation.”12 Assuming that when courts appeal to the
legal framework they are setting a context to assess for relevance is accurate, the practice
of the Court matches the definition of relevance presented in CTB.
An inquiry into adequacy, by contrast, is concerned to establish that the strength
of the conclusion and the strength of the reasons presented match. If, for example, it is
claimed a set of reasons establish a conclusion ‘with certainty’ all the reasons must be
‘true as a matter of certainty’ to provide adequate support for that claim. Similarly, if the
argument attempts to establish that the conclusion is ‘more likely to be true than not’, the
reasons presented need to each be true on the balance of probabilities.13 Some of the
common examples of inadequate reasons discussed in CTB include mistaken appeals to
authority, mistaken appeals to the absence of contrary evidence, fallaciously accepting
slippery slope arguments, and mistaken assessments of causal relationships.14 In each of
these examples, the reasons do matter to the outcome; the problem is that they do not
matter enough to provide the support the conclusion demands.
The only ruling discussed in Chapter 3 I can rely upon to connect this account of
adequacy to my discussion is Maclean, specifically the complainant’s position. Recall
12

David J. Mullan, Administrative Law: cases, texts, and materials 5th ed. (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications Ltd, 2003) [Mullan, 2003] at 905.
13
CTB, supra note 8 at 140.
14
Ibid at 142 – 150.
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that the Court had to address the existence of two incompatible but nonetheless
reasonable interpretations of the same legislative provision.15 The appellant maintained
hers was the better of the two; the support for her interpretation was stronger than the
relative support available for the Commission’s interpretation. In other words, she
maintained that her reasons better supported her conclusion than the support provided by
the Commission’s reasons for its conclusions; in that sense her reasons were ‘more
adequate’ than those of the Commission. We can extrapolate an account of an assessment
for adequacy in a reasonableness review: A court assessing for adequacy must determine
whether the reasons offered are among the set of better reasons that have already been
shown to be relevant.
That inadequacy demands interference in a greater number of circumstances
follows from the conceptual priority of relevance over adequacy. Reasons assessed for
adequacy must have already been shown to be relevant, by definition. In this sense, an
assessment for adequacy constitutes a sixth substantive requirement beyond the five
implied by the three criteria and is therefore one more test that could serve as a ground
for interference. Further, that particular addition would require courts to invoke qualities
that define a ‘good’ justification as compared to alternative possible justifications.
Whatever standards are devised, they will of necessity be an additional set of tests
beyond those implied by the three criteria. So trying to determine whether a set of
genuine, meaningful, and consistent reasons matter given a particular legislative context
implies judicial interference will be necessary in fewer circumstances than if an
additional assessment of the quality of those reasons was also required.
15

Maclean, supra note 4 at para 37.
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3. The (Limited) Pre-Dunsmuir Possibility of Judicial Interference Owing to Inadequacy
This section explicates the limited sense in which inadequacy was a basis for
interference according to the reasonableness simpliciter standard as defined in Southam
and Ryan. By doing so, I draw the clear comparison with the post-Dunsmuir
reasonableness framework. I show, in particular, that reasonableness simpliciter implied
all five elements of the three criteria16 and added a sixth ground for judicial interference,
i.e., inadequacy.17 I should note, however, that the limited possibility of interference
owing to inadequacy was not actually realized in either decision. That is, the Court
decided in both Southam18 and Ryan19 that the impugned administrative decision was
reasonable. These results do not undermine my analyses in this chapter since I am only
trying to characterize the possibility of interference on the grounds of inadequacy under

16

Even though the three criteria were not explicitly introduced until Dunsmuir, their implicit
components are, we will see, evident in Iabobucci J’s descriptions of reasonableness simpliciter.
17
That ‘inadequacy’ served as one basis for interference under reasonableness simpliciter seems
to have been an evident feature of that standard; see, for example, Mullan, 2003 supra note 12 at
470: “A duty to give reasons means adequate reasons must be given;” and at 482: “The trend in
the more recent case law is that a decision that is not accompanied by adequate reasons may be
set aside as erroneous in law”. Mullan also suggests that the introduction of reasonableness
simpliciter in Southam increased the chances of interference owing to inadequacy when compared
to the prior existence of only correctness and patent unreasonableness at 823: “it may be that we
are presently in the middle of another swing of the pendulum back to greater interventionism”.
The suggestion that the reasonableness simpliciter standard provided more grounds for
interference than the single reasonableness standard is made by G. Van Harten, G. Heckman, and
D. J. Mullan, Administrative Law: cases, texts, and materials 6th ed. (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications Ltd, 2010) at 861 – 62: “The pre-Dunsmuir decision[s] of the Supreme
Court [like Southam and Ryan]… revealed that a court, while deferring, may also need to review
carefully the key evidence before a decision-maker in order to work out whether the decisionmaker’s conclusions were reasonable… the Court’s definition of reasonableness… has changed
with Dunsmuir.” In other words, reviewing courts had been in some cases been required to
interfere owing to the weakness of reasons, a requirement that does not appear to apply postDunsmuir.
18
Southam, supra note 6 at para 63.
19
Ryan, supra note 7 at para 59.
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reasonableness simpliciter. I offer no discussion of the frequency with which reviewing
courts actually used inadequacy as a basis to interfere in practice.20
Recall from Chapter 2 that reasonableness simpliciter served as a ‘mid-point’
between patent unreasonableness and correctness.21 As I noted then Iacobucci J defined
“[a]n unreasonable decision [as] one that, in the main, is not supported by any reasons
that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination.”22 He expanded on what it would
mean for a set of reasons to ‘stand up to a somewhat probing examination’ shortly
thereafter:
The defect, if there is one, could presumably be in the evidentiary foundation
itself or in the logical process by which conclusions are sought to be drawn from
it. An example of the former kind of defect would be an assumption that had no
basis in the evidence, or that was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence. An example of the latter kind of defect would be a contradiction in the
premises or an invalid inference.23
We can infer from this passage that if courts are to assess the evidence or logical
process of an administrative decision, it is necessary first that (a) there be a set of
evidentiary and justificatory statements that are (b) actually treated by the body under
review as support for their decision. Such an assessment also presupposes those reasons
(c) can be understood by an English speaker. We need not merely infer that (d) the
reasons offered need to be able to be consistently combined, since one of Iacobucci J’s

The need to make this point explicit arises at least in part from Van Harten et al’s choice to
present the ruling in Southam as an example of a decision in which consistency with respect to
the need for interference is preserved between the pre and post-Dunsmuir era, owing to the
Court’s finding that interference is not warranted: “Southam offers an example of deference
doctrine in its most genuine form: an instance in which the court, out of respect for legislative
choices about administrative decision making, disciplines itself by declining to interfere with a
decision about which it holds significant reservations” (at 885).
21
Supra at 22 – 23.
22
Supra note 6 at para 56.
23
Ibid [emphasis added].
20
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two examples of an assessment of ‘logical process’ involves determining that the
premises are not contradictory. We do, however, have to infer that an assessment of
‘logical process’ includes determining the reasons offered (e) matter to the plausibility of
the outcome given the legal context. Inasmuch as an assessment of the validity of an
argument is an assessment of adequacy, and an assessment of relevance is conceptually
prior to an assessment of adequacy, relevance is presupposed.
I need to clarify my claim that Iacobucci J’s reference to the validity of an
inference is a reference to an assessment of adequacy. The ‘inference’ in any argument is
the rational step from the premises to the conclusion;24 in the case of an administrative
decision, the move from the reasons to the outcome. If that inference is characterized as
‘valid’, then the claim being made is that the rational leap from those premises to that
conclusion is a strong, or plausible, or good move; that is, the reasons offer enough
support for the decision such that the decision actually is supported by those reasons.
Inasmuch as the reasonableness simpliciter standard permitted courts to inquire into the
adequacy of a set of reasons after having established that they are transparent, intelligible,
and relevant, ‘a somewhat probing examination’ provided an additional ground for
judicial interference above and beyond the three criteria.
Of course, the clearest statement that reasonableness simpliciter required
interference owing to inadequacy in some circumstances comes in Ryan:
At all times, a court applying a standard of reasonableness must assess the basic
adequacy of a reasoned decision remembering that the issue under review does
not compel one specific result. Moreover, a reviewing court should not seize on
one or more mistakes or elements of the decision which do not affect the decision
as a whole.25
24
25

See, for example, CTB, supra note 8 at 17.
Ryan, supra note 7 at para 56 [emphasis added].
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Apart from asserting the need for courts to assess the adequacy of the reasons presented,
this passage also identifies two significant limits on interference owing to inadequacy.
First, the administrative body’s reasoning had to be assessed ‘as a whole’; courts were
not permitted to interfere owing to the inadequacy of a single (and/or set of minor)
detail(s). Second, the reviewing court had to show they appreciated that ‘the issue under
review does not compel one specific result’. Even if the reasons were insufficient in some
manner, courts nonetheless had to acknowledge the plurality of possibly reasonable
outcomes; a weaker set of reasons would not always be unreasonable, in particular, if
their ‘weakness’ entailed that only one possible alternative outcome remained. This limit
arises because “there will often be no single right answer to the questions that are under
review against the standard of reasonableness.” 26
The reduction that occurs to the need for judicial interference with the single
reasonableness standard can, therefore, be characterized with a relatively high degree of
precision simply by invoking the familiar distinction between ‘relevance’ and
‘adequacy’. Remember the majority’s locution when first setting out the three criteria:
“reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency, and
intelligibility in the decision making process.”27 As explained, a primary concern with the
‘existence’ of a justification is importantly not a concern with the adequacy of that
justification. Of course, the circumstances warranting interference prior to Dunsmuir
were still limited. Specifically, reviewing courts were prohibited from interfering when
the three criteria were satisfied and when, taken as a whole, the reasons were minimally

26
27

Ibid at para 5.
Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 47 [emphasis added].
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adequate in the sense that they plausibly supported one of several reasonable outcomes.
Following Dunsmuir, courts are limited to confirming the existence of a justification
only; a court will need to interfere when and only when no justification exists,
irrespective of whether it is minimally adequate in this sense.

4. Conclusions – Adequacy is Not Necessary to Ensure a Decision is Not Arbitrary, Not
Necessary to Preserve the Rule of Law, Hence Not a Ground for Interference under the
Single Reasonableness Standard
I begin my concluding remarks by making a concession; the reduction I have
characterized in this chapter is probably not empirically noteworthy, i.e., I suspect a close
analysis would show there has been no dramatic decrease in the instances of interference
owing to unreasonableness since the ruling in Dunsmuir. Since no clear reduction to
judicial interference as a result of the single reasonableness standard is evident, the
change that I have characterized is primarily conceptual in nature. Given the Court’s
tendency since Dunsmuir to prefer “on-the-ground guidance”28 over distracting
conceptual investigations, the need for my analysis might not be obvious; if the revisions
to reasonableness have not actually had a discernable practical impact on the frequency
with which judicial interference is necessary, why does it matter that the change can be
precisely characterized using the distinction between relevance and adequacy?
As I noted at the outset, the primary goal of characterizing the reduction to
interference brought about in Dunsmuir is to support my specific argument in Chapter 3
and broader argument throughout this project, viz., that the framework of the single
reasonableness standard is clear and coherent. The three criteria, and in particular the
28

Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 43.
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Court’s focus on determining that the reasons under review are relevant to the outcome
given the particular legal context, serve as the foundation for understanding the nature of
the change as elaborated. When the elements of the single reasonableness standard are
recognized as components of the reasonableness simpliciter standard, they (i) reveal the
continuity of reasonableness review pre and post-Dunsmuir and (ii) explicate the sense in
which interference owing to inadequacy served specifically as a limited additional basis
for interference. So the charge in the scholarly commentary that the single reasonableness
standard is unclear is overstated in yet another sense; the clarity of the framework implied
by the three criteria provides a means of articulating with precision the conceptual
character of the change to the need for interference those criteria have brought about.
More importantly, understanding the reduction to interference brought about by
the single reasonableness standard in terms of the difference between relevance and
adequacy, when considered in combination with my analyses in earlier chapters, points
toward an explanatory principle: Interference owing to inadequacy is prohibited because
it is not necessary to uphold the rule of law, and would therefore unnecessarily
undermine the foundational democratic principle. To show this explanation emerges from
my prior analyses, I retrace my steps.
First the rule of law and the courts. Recall from Chapter 1 that one of the primary
features of a state in which the rule of law obtains is that any exercise of state authority is
justifiable by reference to the pre-established rules. This requirement ensures actions of
the state are not merely a function of the individual whims of those in positions of power,
i.e., that no such actions are arbitrary. It is primarily and ultimately the role of the courts
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to ensure that state actions are justifiable in this manner.29 That the Supreme Court of
Canada understands the rule of law as a requirement prohibiting arbitrary state action,
respect for which is maintained by the courts, is apparent as far back as Rand J’s
concurring opinion in Roncarelli v. Duplessis.30 That the Court considers a review for
reasonableness in particular a means by which to ensure administrative decisions are not
arbitrary was set out, in a preliminary way, by the requirement in Baker v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) that those decisions would, in most
circumstances, need to be accompanied by reasons.31
One means by which I showed the single reasonableness standard is clear in
Chapter 3 was by articulating the narrow circumstances in which interference owing to
unreasonableness is necessary to preserve the rule of law. Specifically, only when there
are no reasons, or those that do exist are not genuine, meaningful, consistent, or relevant
to the outcome given the legal context will interference be warranted, because it is only in
those circumstances that the rule of law is in danger. My analyses in this chapter have
shown that reasonableness simpliciter contained an additional basis for interference, a
basis that has since been subtracted explicitly from reasonableness review by Abella J in
NLNU, viz., interference owing to the inadequacy of a set of reasons. This subtraction
suggests that in the eyes of the Court, avoiding an arbitrary exercise of state power does
not require determining which of the set of possible justifications for competing
reasonable decisions is among the ‘best’.

Supra at 10 – 14 for my summary of some of the dominant views in the scholarly literature on
the rule of law.
30
Roncarelli v. Duplessis [1959] SCR 121 at para 44. Supra at 15.
31
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 43. Supra
at 16.
29
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The plausibility of this explanation can be increased by identifying the intuition
upon which it is based; a decision that is poorly justified is, nevertheless, justified. As we
saw in the post-Dunsmuir case law, a justification exists when the decision maker has
presented reasons that satisfy the criteria. Any decision supported by reasons that satisfy
the criteria is, by definition, not merely a product of the subjective and arbitrary whims of
the decision maker. It follows that requiring a decision maker to ensure transparent,
intelligible, and relevant reasons are also adequate, i.e., among the set of better available
reasons, is not necessary to produce a justification. Any requirement that a reasonable
justification be ‘one of the better ones,’ by comparison, demands both that the decision
not be arbitrary and that it invoke a strong justification. While it may well be desirable to
require administrative decision makers to select ‘better’ justifications for their decisions,
satisfying that requirement is not necessary to ensure their decisions are not arbitrary,
hence not necessary to uphold the rule of law. And since the Court maintains that the rule
of law is to be sustained in a manner that minimizes interference with the foundational
democratic principle, allowing interference on grounds that exceed what is necessary
would be ‘undue’.32
At the outset of this project I asserted a primary sense in which the framework of
reasonableness that has emerged in the case law since Dunsmuir is coherent was the
single balancing principle it sought to implement: Judicial interference with an
administrative decision owing to unreasonableness should occur only when interference
is necessary to preserve the rule of law; in all other cases, interference should be
prohibited. The change I have articulated in this chapter, when combined with my
32

Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 27; Supra at 1.
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analyses of the three criteria in Chapter 3, shows this principle is a plausible explanation
of that change. The Court has come to recognize that even a limited assessment of
adequacy is not necessary to uphold the rule of law and should therefore not be included
as a possible basis for interference owing to unreasonableness out of respect for the
wishes of Parliament and the provincial legislatures, as expressed by administrative
bodies.
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Chapter 5: The Three Criteria Determine the Range of Reasonable Outcomes
1. Introduction
To complete my account of the sense in which the framework of the single
reasonableness standard is clear and coherent I must explicate the relationship between
the three criteria and the second ‘concern’ of a review for reasonableness, i.e., the “range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”1
The characterization I defend was implied by my arguments in Chapters 3 and 4:
Any set of reasons that satisfy the five elements of the three criteria justify an
outcome that falls within the reasonable range; a set of reasonable reasons always
produce a reasonable outcome, necessarily.
In Chapter 2 I appealed to the Dunsmuir majority and Abella J’s ruling in N.L.N.U. v.
Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board)2 to show that the three criteria are
conceptually prior to the range of reasonable outcomes. My position in this chapter is
stronger; I argue the three criteria ought to be understood as the lone elements of a review
for reasonableness and therefore determine in its entirety the possible scope of the
reasonable range.
The need to defend an account of (rather than simply describe) the relationship
between the criteria and the range of reasonable outcomes is not merely, or even
primarily, a result of my desire to provide a complete analysis of the reasonableness
standard. It is, instead, a product of the locution used by the majority in Dunsmuir when
first describing reasonableness. Specifically, the Court refers to the three criteria and the
reasonable range as the two contrasting, and so seemingly distinct, ‘concerns’ of a review

1
2

New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] at para 47.
N.L.N.U. v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board) 2011 SCC 62, [NLNU].
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for reasonableness. The sense in which that locution is confusing was first described by
Mullan:
[I]t is not clear whether... [a reviewing] court must [after an assessment according
to the three criteria] go on and ask the further question whether, in isolation from
the reasons provided, the outcome can be justified as reasonable in the sense of
coming within what the reviewing court regards as an acceptable range of results
by reference to its own assessment of the matter.3
By contrasting the three criteria and the reasonable range, Bastarache and Lebel JJ could
be understood to have characterized reasonableness as a two-step test, or not. If
reasonableness is indeed a standard that includes two separate grounds for assessment,
then the second step is vague; no means of identifying the limits of that range are
suggested apart from a reviewing court’s ‘own assessment of the matter’.
The characterization of reasonableness by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in
Casino Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Labour Relations Board), discussed in Chapter 3,4
explicitly interpreted the Dunsmuir majority to mean that the standard invokes two
separate assessments. According to Fichaud JA, “the tribunal's reasons afford the raw
material for the reviewing court to perform its second function of assessing whether or
not the Board's conclusion inhabits the range of acceptable outcomes.”5 This ‘two-step’
interpretation of reasonableness was, shortly thereafter, rejected by Binnie J in Khosa v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration).6 It was again rejected by Abella J in
NLNU: “the reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of

David Mullan “Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, Standard of Review and Procedural Fairness for
Public Servants: Let’s Try Again!” (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 117 at 136.
4
Casino Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Labour Relations Board) 2009 NSCA 4 Supra at 40 – 45.
5
Ibid at para 30 [emphasis added].
6
Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [2009] 1 SCR 339 [Khosa] at para
59.
3
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showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes.”7 In respect of the
relationship between the three criteria and the reasonable range, Abella J eliminated the
confusion most explicitly; satisfying the criteria shows the supported outcome falls
within the range. There is only one test, and a set of reasons that pass that test yield a
reasonable outcome necessarily.
In Catalyst v. North Cowichan, the ambiguity that had seemingly been resolved in
NLNU is reintroduced. The Court needed to assess the reasonableness of a municipal
bylaw. While describing the application of reasonableness McLachlin CJ, writing for the
unanimous court, abruptly severs the three criteria from the reasonable range:
Formal reasons may be required for decisions that involve quasi-judicial
adjudication by a municipality. But that does not apply to the process of passing
municipal bylaws. To demand that councillors who have just emerged from a
heated debate on the merits of a bylaw get together to produce a coherent set of
reasons is to misconceive the nature of the democratic process that prevails in the
Council Chamber.8
Unlike the rulings in ATA 9and Maclean,10 applying reasonableness to municipal policy
decisions is problematic owing not to missing reasons, but to the democratic and
deliberative character of municipal bodies. Since elected municipal policy-makers cannot
be required to produce reasons for their policy decisions, there will never be reasons
(implicit or otherwise) to scrutinize with the criteria. The Court therefore applies the
reasonableness standard by relying on the range of reasonable outcomes only.11 This
application entails that not only does reasonableness include two separate elements, but
the three criteria are not universally applicable. Relying on the understanding set out in
7

Supra note 2 at para 14.
Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 [Catalyst] at para 29.
9
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Catalyst, the range of reasonable outcomes has been treated as a second separate standard
of assessment by both the Court12 and at least one recent scholarly commentator.13
I have, over the course of Chapters 3 and 4, argued reasonableness is clear in four
particular senses: It (i) invokes a cluster of familiar concepts, (ii) applied according to a
consistent pattern of analysis, that (iii) relies on the same conceptual threshold as a basis
for interference. Finally (iv) the need for interference to preserve the rule of law is
reduced when compared to how that need was defined by the pre-Dunsmuir standard of
reasonableness simpliciter by eliminating the possibility of interference owing to
inadequacy. If, however, the range of reasonable outcomes is a separate standard as
McLachlin CJ’s ratio in Catalyst maintains, the substance of the reasonableness standard
is not very clear at all, since it cannot merely consist in the five elements of the three
criteria. And if the three criteria are not the only substantive elements of reasonableness
review, my claim that relevance is the threshold for interference is false. It is also likely
my claim in Chapter 4 that the single reasonableness standard reduces the permissible
instances of judicial interference is similarly false. At the very least, whatever reduction
occurs can no longer be characterized merely by reference to the distinction between
‘relevance’ and ‘adequacy’.
I therefore complete my characterization of the clarity of reasonableness since
Dunsmuir by first setting out the initially coherent account of the relationship between
12

See, for example, Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2013 SCC
36 at para 90.
13
See Paul Daly “Canada's Bipolar Administrative Law: Time for Fusion” (2014) 40:1 Queen's
LJ 213 – 248 [Daly CBAL] at para 76: “A decision that falls into one of the reasonableness
categories can be reviewed deferentially. Here too there are safeguards. The Court has
emphasized that a deferential standard of review permits judicial intervention where the
administrative decision lacks "justification, intelligibility and transparency" or falls outside the
"range" of acceptable outcomes” [emphasis added].
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reasons and outcomes, then rescuing my arguments from the confusion of Catalyst. In
section 2 I argue a careful interpretation of the introduction to the reasonableness
standard does not support the two-standard reading. In section 3 I analyze the rulings in
Khosa and NLNU to highlight the post-Dunsmuir characterization of reasonableness as an
assessment focused exclusively on determining whether the criteria are satisfied.
In section 4 I engage the ruling in Catalyst. I argue that the Court does not
actually apply the reasonableness standard, for two reasons: First, the application does
not match the characterizations of reasonableness outlined in Chapter 3. Second, the
application of reasonableness does resemble another standard for judicial review
developed in the seven years leading up to Dunsmuir, i.e., the ‘broad and purposive
approach’ to correctness.14 By showing the Court actually relied upon correctness, I
preserve my account of the role of the criteria because they were not ‘severed’ from the
reasonable range. I end by arguing, relying on Jared Craig’s predictions about the impact
of the single reasonableness standard on municipal law, that a ‘two-standard’ account of
reasonableness is undesirable because it undermines the goal of a single reasonableness
standard. Specifically, it admits the possibility that reviewing courts will interfere when a
decision is not arbitrary and thereby unnecessarily undermine the foundational
democratic principle.

2. The Criteria and the Range of Reasonable Outcomes in Dunsmuir
In this section I argue the Dunsmuir majority’s choice to invoke the ‘range of
reasonable outcomes’ as a contrast against the three criteria does not introduce a second
14

First introduced in Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2000 SCC 13 [Rascal Trucking] at
para 18.
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separate standard of assessment. In 2(a) I show the contrast drawn by the majority can be
plausibly construed as an attempt to distinguish the conceptual role of the reasonable
range; it is produced and therefore limited by the set of possible reasons that could satisfy
the criteria. I then explain what that distinct role was likely meant to highlight in 2(b),
viz., that decisions subject to a review for reasonableness do not admit a uniquely correct
outcome.

2(a) ‘But it is also...’
In the sentence immediately following the introduction of the three criteria the
Dunsmuir majority invoked the idea of a range of reasonable outcomes to complete their
description: “But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law.”15
An interpretation of this sentence focused only on the phrase ‘but it is also’ suggests it
establishes the conceptual independence of the reasonable range from the three criteria.
Those four words seem to clearly indicate a reviewing court is not merely concerned with
confirming the existence of genuine, meaningful, and consistent reasons that are relevant
given the legal context, but that they are also, and therefore independently, concerned to
determine whether the outcome falls in the reasonable range. The problem with that
interpretation is its narrow focus. Specifically, it fails to recognize the way in which the
contrast is qualified by the last clause, i.e., that any member of the acceptable range must
be ‘defensible in respect of the facts and the law’.

15
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Consider first the meaning of the word ‘defensible’. In the absence of any
indicators of a qualified definition, it is a synonym for ‘justifiable’. So requiring that an
outcome be ‘defensible’ just is to require there be reasons that either have been or could
be presented to justify (i.e., defend) the selected outcome. Since, following my analyses
of the post-Dunsmuir case law in Chapter 3, a set of reasons only ‘justify’ when they
satisfy the criteria, any outcome falling within the ‘range of outcomes that are defensible’
is justified, by definition. To suggest otherwise would imply there are unidentified
grounds for determining ‘the defensibility’ of an outcome apart from the three criteria,
and nothing in the majority opinion suggests that that is the case. Instead, this consistent
emphasis on the importance of reasons as the focus of reasonableness review merely
asserts that defensible reasons yield defensible outcomes; decisions within the reasonable
range are produced by reasonable reasons.
This interpretation of ‘defensible’ is further supported by the final portion of the
qualifier, i.e., that the justification be made by an appeal to ‘the facts and the law’. To
require an appeal to the facts and the law in the context of a reasonableness review is, as I
established in my survey of the case law in Chapter 3, to require that that outcome
follows from reasons that are relevant in the context of the case. The facts determine
which elements of the legal framework define the sorts of considerations the
administrative body must make, which in turn identify the sorts of reasons that would
qualify as relevant. Once those legal elements have been identified, the task before the
reviewing court is to determine that the reasons offered do indeed conform. So again, any
outcome supported by relevant reasons will ‘fall within the range of acceptable, possible
reasons’.
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As a final point of support for interpreting the reasonable range as the product of
any set of reasons that could satisfy the three criteria, consider Justice Bastarache’s extrajudicial response to the ‘confusion’ attributed to that sentence by Mullan above:
I find it difficult to contemplate a situation where rational and coherent reasons
could somehow arrive at a conclusion that is not within the range of acceptable
outcomes. Certainly, where only one outcome is preferred, such as on a
correctness standard, this would be possible. But such is not the case on a
reasonable standard, where deference necessarily permits a number of possible,
reasonable conclusions.16
So the range of reasonable outcomes is not a second standard of assessment since,
according to Bastarache J, it is not possible for a set of reasons to satisfy the three criteria
and somehow not fall within the reasonable range. The possibility of reasons that satisfy
the criteria and nonetheless warrant judicial interference exists only in the context of a
review for correctness, wherein ‘only one outcome is preferred’. The ‘but it is also...’
locution does distinguish the three criteria from the reasonable range. But that distinction
is between the process of assessing reasons and the result of that process, not two
separate bases of assessment.

2(b) ‘The Reasonable Range’ Emphasizes the Plurality of Possibly Acceptable Outcomes
If the qualifier ‘defensible in respect of the facts and the law’ as applied to the
range of reasonable outcomes simply invokes the three criteria, it would appear that the
Court is being redundant; it is not obvious what feature of decisions subject to review for
reasonableness the term is meant to clarify. What I offer in this section is an explanation
of the purpose of ‘the range of reasonable outcomes’; it emphasizes the plurality of
The Honourable Michel Bastarache “Modernizing Judicial Review” (2009) 22 Can J Admin L
& Prac 227 at 236.
16
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possible outcomes courts should expect, and are required to accept, when undertaking a
reasonableness review. The means by which reviewing courts accept that plurality is by
restricting their assessment to determining whether the reasons offered satisfy the three
criteria.
Throughout their opinion in Dunsmuir, Bastarache and Lebel JJ repeatedly
emphasized that a given reasonable outcome is only ever one among many. So, for
example, the earlier distinction between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness
simpliciter was difficult to articulate in part because “both standards are based on the idea
that there might be multiple valid interpretations of a statutory provision or answers to a
legal dispute and that courts ought not to interfere where the tribunal's decision is
rationally supported.”17 Immediately preceding the introduction of the three criteria the
majority reiterates a similar idea: “certain questions that come before administrative
tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give
rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of
appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions.”18 In describing
reasonableness then, the Court consistently returned to the notion that the existence of a
set of discretionary options are open to bodies subject to reasonableness review, a feature
they referred to as a ‘reasonable range’.
The idea that reviewing courts must recognize the existence of a plurality of
possibly reasonable outcomes did not, of course, begin in Dunsmuir. As I noted during
my discussion of the limits on interference owing to inadequacy in Chapter 4 for
example, Iacobucci J’s characterization of reasonableness simpliciter in Ryan v. Law
17
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Society (New Brunswick) also emphasized the pluralism inherent in decisions subject to
reasonableness review:
There is a further reason that courts testing for unreasonableness must avoid
asking the question of whether the decision is correct. Unlike a review for
correctness, there will often be no single right answer to the questions that are
under review against the standard of reasonableness... Even if there could be,
notionally, a single best answer, it is not the court's role to seek this out when
deciding if the decision was unreasonable.19
The decision in Ryan also explained how courts were to respect the plurality of options:
“How will a reviewing court know whether a decision is reasonable given that it may not
first inquire into its correctness? The answer is that a reviewing court must look to the
reasons given by the tribunal.”20 So owing to the pluralistic character of decisions subject
to a review for reasonableness and the need for reviewing courts to respect that plurality,
they had to restrict their assessment to the reasons offered in support of a particular
outcome. A focus on reasons minimizes the chance that a reviewing court will, by
assessing the reasonableness of the outcome independently, fail to recognize that plurality
and impose their preferred outcome without regard for the reasons given.
Assuming the Dunsmuir majority’s several references to ‘a range of acceptable
outcomes’ is not simply a redundant second reference to the three criteria, it is most
plausibly intended to emphasize the pluralistic nature of decisions subject to a review for
reasonableness. Courts are to refrain from seeking a singularly best outcome because
doing so is not within their power; it is not the kind of assessment needed to uphold the
rule of law because any decision that satisfies the criteria is justified and so is not
arbitrary, by definition. Following the suggestion of Iacobucci J in Ryan, the means by
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which courts accomplish that task is by remaining exclusively focused on the reasons
offered in support of the decision subject to review.
Note that this explanation is consistent with my analyses of the post-Dunsmuir
case law. As I showed in Chapter 3, the Court is only willing to interfere when the
reasons supporting the decision fail to be relevant in light of the legislative context. It
follows that the two ‘concerns’ of a review for reasonableness distinguished by the
majority in Dunsmuir are, and have for the most part been interpreted as, the process by
which the assessment is conducted and the expected results of that process. A set of
reasons that satisfy the three criteria always and necessarily produce a decision that falls
within the range of acceptable outcomes.

3. The Criteria and the Range of Reasonable Outcomes in Khosa and NLNU
I now show the opinions in both Khosa and NLNU offer clear support for my
interpretation of the relationship between the three criteria and the reasonable range as
defined by the majority in Dunsmuir. According to both rulings, any outcome that falls
within the reasonable range is, by definition, the product of a set of reasons that satisfy
the three criteria. In both decisions, references to the ‘range of reasonable outcomes’ are
most plausibly understood as an effort to emphasize the importance of courts refraining
from interference just because the decision does not match a preferred outcome. Finally,
both rulings hold that courts respect the plurality of possible outcomes when they remain
exclusively focused on confirming that a justification exists, i.e., by only assessing the
reasons provided according to the three criteria.
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3(a) Khosa
The issue before the Court in Khosa concerned the respondent’s request for
special relief against a valid removal order on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.
That request was denied by the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) of the Immigration
and Refugee Board, a decision that was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal.21 In
their result, the majority conclude the ruling of the IAD was reasonable and restore their
decision.22
That Justice Binnie sees the three criteria as the only standards of assessment in a
reasonableness review, standards which when satisfied necessarily produce a reasonable
outcome, is most clearly indicated by his summary of the Dunsmuir majority’s
introduction to the single reasonableness standard:
Reviewing courts cannot substitute their own appreciation of the appropriate
solution, but must rather determine if the outcome falls within ‘a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law.’ There might be more than one reasonable outcome. However, as long as the
process and the outcome fit comfortably with the principles of justification,
transparency and intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its
own view of a preferable outcome.23
A reviewing court must ‘determine’ whether an outcome falls within the reasonable
range, and they make that determination by ensuring ‘the process and outcome fit
comfortably with’ the three criteria. The criteria are therefore the standards used to assess
the reasons and when the reasons presented satisfy those standards, the resultant decision
just is a member of the set of reasonable outcomes. “Dunsmuir thus reinforces… the
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importance of reasons, which constitute the primary form of accountability of the
decision maker to the applicant, to the public and to a reviewing court.”24
That a decision falls within the reasonable range when and because it satisfies all
five elements of the three criteria is further evidenced by Binnie J’s application of
reasonableness. Consistent with the pattern of analysis I articulated in Chapter 3, he first
summarizes the reasons of both the majority and minority decisions of the IAD panel.25
He then sets out the relevant legislative provisions, which demand the IAD determine
“whether the prospects for rehabilitation were such that, alone or in combination with
other factors, they warranted special relief from a valid removal order. The IAD was
required to reach its own conclusions based on its own appreciation of the evidence. It
did so.”26 In the eyes of the majority, “this is [just] the sort of factual dispute which
should be resolved by the IAD in the application of immigration policy, and not
reweighed in the courts.”27 So the IAD made a decision based on its best assessment of
the available evidence, as required by its enabling legislation. Having done so, it simply
follows for the Court that the IAD decision falls within the range of reasonable outcomes;
the necessary consequence of confirming that a justification exists in that legislative
context.28
That Binnie J appreciates the sense in which a ‘range’ entails a possible plurality
of acceptable outcomes is most evident in his finding that the majority and dissent of the
IAD panel successfully justify their respective positions. “[B]oth the majority and
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dissenting reasons of the IAD disclose with clarity the considerations in support of both
points of view, and the reasons for the disagreement as to outcome.”29 By characterizing
the minority position of the IAD as reasonable, Binnie J makes a point similar to the
point made by the Court earlier in Ryan and later in Maclean; since reasonableness does
not require a uniquely correct outcome, the existence of a plurality of such outcomes is to
be expected. It follows by implication that the mere existence of an alternative reasonable
outcome cannot serve as grounds for interference; only when the reasons for the
impugned decision cannot satisfy the criteria is the decision independently unreasonable,
hence not a member of the range of reasonable outcomes.
I end my analysis of Khosa by noting the sense in which the majority opinion
implicitly relies on a point made most clearly by Iacobucci J in Ryan; the means by which
reviewing courts demonstrate the requisite sensitivity to the possibility of a plurality of
reasonable outcomes is by strictly limiting their assessment to the reasons offered in
support of the decision made. That narrow focus helps courts resist the temptation to
choose according to their preferences, a temptation that will likely be more pronounced
when competing but otherwise reasonable alternatives exist. In this case, the reasons
offered by both the majority and minority of the IAD qualify as an existent justification.
Since the three criteria do not, however, allow for the possibility of interference owing to
inadequacy, the presence of reasonable (and even objectively better) alternatives makes
no difference to a determination of reasonableness. Again, the only concern is the reasons
offered in support of the decision made.
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3(b) NLNU
In NLNU the Court had to determine the reasonableness of a labour arbitrator’s
finding that time as a casual employee did not count when calculating vacation benefits
for those casual employees that had subsequently been hired on a permanent basis.30 The
court of first instance accepted the position of the union and overturned the arbitrator’s
decision on the grounds that the reasons needed to both conform to the three criteria
(which the chambers judge determined they did) and needed to be minimally adequate
(which he determined they were not).31 The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of
the lower court, acknowledging that while stronger reasoning might have been available,
the reasons offered nonetheless satisfied the three criteria and therefore did not require
interference.32 In the result, Abella J dismisses the union’s appeal and upholds the finding
of the tribunal.33
One of the primary questions of law before the Court in this case is exactly the
issue I am addressing in this chapter, i.e., whether the criteria and reasonable range are
two separate standards of assessment. The chambers judge undertook two separate
assessments. The problem with that approach, according to Abella J, is that it fails to
properly capture the role of the three criteria in establishing reasonableness: “[T]he
reasons [of administrative decision makers] must be read together with the outcome and
serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a range of possible
outcomes.”34 Consistent with the rulings in Dunsmuir and Khosa, Abella J interprets the
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three criteria as the only means of determining reasonableness, criteria which when
satisfied yield an outcome within the reasonable range.
Justice Abella’s reference to the reasonable range, as in Dunsmuir and Khosa,
emphasized the need for reviewing courts to be cognizant, and sensitive to the possibility
of, a plurality of acceptable outcomes:
The fact that there may be an alternative interpretation of the agreement to that
provided by the arbitrator does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the
arbitrator's decision should be set aside if the decision itself is in the realm of
reasonable outcomes. Reviewing judges should pay "respectful attention" to the
decision-maker's reasons, and be cautious about substituting their own view of the
proper outcome by designating certain omissions in the reasons to be fateful.35
In other words, reviewing courts must recognize that reasonable alternative options will
exist, but their mere existence will not be sufficient to show the option selected is
unreasonable. Following the majority in Khosa, the Court implies that the temptation to
interfere in favour of a preferred outcome is avoided by remaining focused on the
assessment of reasons. By paying ‘respectful attention’ to the reasons offered as opposed
to the possibility of alternative reasonable outcomes, reviewing courts minimize the
chance they will give in to the temptation to satisfy their individual preferences.
I have, over the course of sections 2 and 3, established that reference to the range
of reasonable outcomes by the Court in and shortly after Dunsmuir is not plausibly
interpreted as a second, independent standard of assessment within reasonableness. It is,
instead, best understood as the product of any set of reasons that satisfy the three criteria;
any outcome supported by such reasons is justified and so is by definition reasonable.
The purpose of that description is to tailor the expectations of courts engaged in a review
for reasonableness; they ought to expect that the reasons and outcome they are
35
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scrutinizing are only one among many possibly reasonable outcomes. Creating that
expectation is important because it helps to emphasize the sense in which, when
competing reasons that satisfy the criteria and their concomitant outcomes are presented
by a party seeking judicial review, courts should not rely on their mere existence as a
basis for interference. The consistently implied means by which courts avoid the
temptation to interfere in favour of a reasonable outcome they find preferable is to remain
narrowly focused on the reasons provided, without regard for the possible alternatives.

4. An Assessment of Reasonableness by Reference to the Range of Reasonable Outcomes
Only: A Critical Analysis of Catalyst v. North Cowichan (District)
Chief Justice McLachlin’s ruling in Catalyst upsets this clear account of the
relationship between reasons and outcomes. The confusion returns owing to her
pronouncement that intra vires municipal policy decisions need not be accompanied by
reasons, but are nonetheless subject to reasonableness review. That claim represents a
sharp amendment to my account of the single reasonableness standard; satisfying the
three criteria cannot be the lone means by which to establish the reasonableness of an
outcome if there are, and can be, no reasons to assess. Moreover, the only remaining
element of the reasonableness standard once the three criteria are abandoned, viz., the
range of reasonable outcomes, must provide some basis for assessment that is
independent of those provided by the criteria. Preserving my account of reasonableness in
this project therefore demands I show either that it can accommodate the elimination of
the three criteria, or that the Court in Catalyst made some sort of error.
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I argue in this section that the test used to assess an intra vires municipal policy
decision in Catalyst is not reasonableness, notwithstanding the Court’s explicit assertion
to the contrary. The test applied is, instead, the ‘broad and purposive approach to
correctness’ developed in the years leading up to Dunsmuir. In 4(a) I review the ruling in
Catalyst, emphasizing the way in which the Court’s reliance on legislation differs from
the appeals normally made to the legal framework in a reasonableness review. In 4(b) I
outline the broad and purposive approach to correctness and articulate the way in which it
resembles the standard described in Catalyst. I end in 4(c) by arguing that allowing
municipal policy decisions to be subject to reasonableness review would actually thwart
the goal of restricting judicial interference to those circumstances in which it is necessary
to prevent arbitrary decision making, and therefore unnecessarily threatens the
foundational democratic principle.
To provide some preliminary support for my argument, I outline some of the prior
discussion among commentators about the implication of the majority ruling in Dunsmuir
on the treatment of municipal bodies. The possibility that the single reasonableness
standard might not be able to accommodate the large variety of administrative bodies
subject to judicial review, and municipal bodies in particular, has loomed since its
introduction. The concern was first raised in Binnie J’s minority opinion in Dunsmuir,
wherein he noted that part of the value of two reasonableness standards was that they
helped reviewing courts recognize “that different administrative decisions command
different degrees of deference, depending on who is deciding what.”36 The concern that
the revised reasonableness standard might not be able to accommodate municipal
36
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decision makers in particular was partially explored by Basile Chiasson. He argued the
single reasonableness standard will require a recalibration of the judicial review of
municipal decisions which will in turn “sew a new standard of review [uniquely tailored
to] municipal decision making.”37 In other words, the character of municipal bodies will
ultimately lead to the re-introduction of a third standard of review.
The stronger claim that the judicial review of municipal decisions actually
demands a third standard of review is defended by Jared Craig.38 On his account, the
majority ruling in Dunsmuir implies that municipal decisions will be assessed for
reasonableness because municipal decisions demand deference.39 He proceeds to argue
that this result is a problem because reasonableness cannot be respectful of the status of
municipal bodies as democratic institutions.40 He maintains a jurisdictional ‘threshold
test’ would be more likely to provide that respect, owing to the limited question courts
would be permitted to ask:
Whether government action is authorized would be a jurisdictional question,
construed narrowly. Was the municipal action within the general scope of what
the legislature contemplated when it granted power to the municipality? Is a
municipality clearly acting beyond its powers or for a clearly improper purpose?41
As will become clear in 4(b), the ‘threshold test’ Craig describes is nearly identical to the
test the Court actually conducts, i.e., the broad and purposive approach to correctness.
I am not the first to maintain that the Court in Catalyst failed to accurately
identify the standard of judicial review it applied. According to Daly, the ruling in
Basile Chiasson “Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick: Municipal Implications of the Changing
Landscape – Small Tremors, or Big Earthquakes” delivered at the International Municipal
Lawyers Association 73rd Annual Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, 2008 at 26.
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Catalyst reintroduces patent unreasonableness.42 In a manner that vindicates Chiasson’s
and Craig’s respective predictions, Daly maintains the ruling shows a “third standard is
necessary… the spectrum of factors in Catalyst cried out for a highly deferential
approach,”43 a degree of deference simply not available under the single reasonableness
standard. So while no commentator maintains the ruling in Catalyst invokes the broad
and purposive approach to correctness, at least three acknowledge the single
reasonableness standard cannot accommodate municipal bodies, and one argues that
ruling in particular does not rely on the reasonableness standard set out in Dunsmuir.

4(a) The Ratio in Catalyst: A Uniquely Uncharacteristic Description of ‘Reasonableness’
My goal in this section is to highlight the differences between the descriptions of
reasonableness review presented in Catalyst as compared with the descriptions of that
standard considered in Chapter 3. Toward that end, I begin with a sketch of the facts in
the case and the ratio. I then identify and articulate what I take to be the most significant
difference in the Court’s attempt to describe reasonableness without reference to the three
criteria, viz., the role of legal context. Rather than using legislation as a means of
establishing the relevance of a set of reasons without regard for the outcome those
reasons support, legislation is used as the means by which to determine which outcomes
are acceptable. For reasons that will be clear by the end of 4(b), the contrast between
Catalyst and the rulings from the case law reviewed in Chapter 3 is so significant it
suggests the Court did not assess for reasonableness at all.
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Catalyst Corporation had, since its formation in 2001, been paying a
comparatively high rate of property taxes on its holdings in the province of British
Columbia. In 2007, for example, Catalyst’s municipal tax bill amounted to one sixth of
all the Class 4 (Major Industry) property taxes collected in the province that year.44 Their
burden became more difficult to accommodate as their financial fortunes took a turn for
the worse; “In the five year period from 2004-2008 Catalyst posted an after-tax net loss
of $186 million. During that same period Catalyst paid $157 million in municipal taxes in
British Columbia.”45 Owing to the inability of Catalyst’s repeated lobbying efforts to
convince the District of North Cowichan (among others) to reduce the property tax rate of
Class 4 properties,46 they sought a judicial declaration that the North Cowichan Tax Rates
Bylaw 2009, Bylaw No. 3385 was unreasonable. The bylaw was upheld as reasonable at
trial and on appeal.47 In their result, the Court accepted the two lower court rulings.48
One of the primary issues of law in this case was similar to an issue that arose in
Khosa before and Maclean later, i.e., the availability of a potentially reasonable
alternative outcome. Catalyst maintained that the introduction of the three criteria in
Dunsmuir changed the character of a review of the reasonableness of a municipal
decision. In their view, the single reasonableness standard entails “that all municipal
decisions, including bylaws, must meet the test of demonstrable rationality in terms of
process and outcome… the municipality should [therefore] confine itself to objective
factors, such as those set forth in Catalyst’s ‘Municipal Sustainability Model’, in fixing

44

Catalyst Paper Corp v. North Cowichan (District) 2009 BCSC 1420 at para 7.
Ibid at para 11.
46
Catalyst, supra note 8 at paras 5 and 6.
47
Ibid at para 8.
48
Ibid at paras 9 and 36 – 37.
45

112

the property tax rates.”49 Since the appellant had devised a method for establishing tax
rates that was grounded in an objective appeal to consumption of municipal services, they
maintained that justification satisfied the requirements of the three criteria in a manner
the tax rate chosen by North Cowichan did not.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s rejection of Catalyst’s interpretation of reasonableness
focused on the limited set of factors for consideration their interpretation allowed. On her
account, the appropriate view of municipal bodies recognizes they are empowered, and
required, to consider a wide range of factors when making policy choices. As a result,
“[t]he applicable test is this: only if the bylaw is one no reasonable body informed by
these factors could have taken will the bylaw be set aside.”50 According to the Court, the
only limits implied by this test will be found either in the enabling legislation,51 or in the
procedural requirements that need to be fulfilled in passing bylaws.52 Since Catalyst
made no suggestion that North Cowichan violated voting procedures or acted in bad faith,
and “municipal councils are not required to give formal reasons or lay out a rational basis
for bylaws,”53 there exists no procedural grounds for judicial interference. And since the
enabling legislation grants “a broad and virtually unfettered legislative discretion to
establish property tax rates in respect of each of the property classes in the
municipality,”54 the choice to impose a disproportionately high percentage of the
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municipal tax burden on Class 4 property was not an unreasonable exercise of that
discretion.55
The most significant and obvious difference between the Court’s description and
application of the single reasonableness standard as compared with the remainder of the
post-Dunsmuir case law is the pronouncement that there can be no legal obligation
requiring municipal policy decisions to be accompanied by reasons, meaning the three
criteria are not applicable. The only possible remaining “question is whether the taxation
bylaw falls within a reasonable range of outcomes.”56 McLachlin CJ’s description of
reasonableness by reference to outcomes alone brings to light the unique character of the
‘reasonableness’ standard she applies, specifically the role played by the legal
framework. As I argued in Chapter 3, the law is normally used to establish that reasons
subject to review for reasonableness are relevant. In Catalyst, by contrast, the legal
framework is used to circumscribe the scope of possibly acceptable outcomes. Since the
central concern can no longer be the relevance of the reasons presented, it shifts to
ensuring the impugned bylaw is an exercise of the power granted by legislation. So
described, this version of reasonableness focuses a reviewing courts’ attention on the
outcome of a municipal decision, contrary to the Court’s repeated and consistent
warnings against doing so since their ruling in Ryan.
Articulating the way in which legislation limits the scope of the reasonable range
of municipal bylaws is a task to which the bulk of the Chief Justice McLachlin’s
reasoning in Catalyst is devoted. It begins with a general account of the role played by
legislation in the context of any judicial review of a municipal body:
55
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[M]unicipal acts may be set aside because they fall outside the scope of what the
empowering legislative scheme contemplated. This substantive review is
premised on the fundamental assumption derived from the rule of law that a
legislature does not intend the power it delegates to be exercised unreasonably, or
in some cases, incorrectly.57
It follows that when “passing delegated legislation, a municipality must make policy
choices that fall reasonably within the scope of the authority the legislature has granted
it.”58 Indeed, “[t]he rule of law insists on judicial review to ensure that delegated
legislation complies with the rationale and purview of the statutory scheme under which
it is adopted.”59So the “fundamental question is the scope of decision-making power
conferred on the decision-maker by the governing legislation.”60 According to the case
law, a “review of municipal bylaws must reflect the broad discretion provincial
legislators have traditionally accorded to municipalities engaged in delegated
legislation.”61 In other words, “[r]easonableness limits municipal councils in the sense
that the substance of their bylaws must conform to the rationale of the statutory regime
set up by the legislature. The range of reasonable outcomes is thus circumscribed by the
purview of the legislative scheme that empowers a municipality to pass a bylaw.”62
Chief Justice McLachlin’s description of the role of enabling legislation in a
review for reasonableness differs markedly from similar descriptions in non-municipal
decisions like Dunsmuir, Khosa, Montreal Port Authority, Figliola, Mowat, ATA, NLNU,
Halifax, and Maclean. As I have shown, in each of those decisions the appeal to the
legislative context was used to establish the relevance of the reasons offered, irrespective
57
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of the particular outcome reached, i.e., it provided the legal standard to determine
whether the reasons qualify as a justification of the decision. As I argued in sections 2
and 3 above, the primary purpose of that focus is to minimize the possibility that a court
will interfere on the basis that some alternative outcome they prefer is also reasonable.
The descriptive contrast with the ruling in Catalyst is stark; in that case, the legal
framework is applied directly to the outcome reached. Rather than helping reviewing
courts resist the temptation to engage directly with the selected outcome, this variant of
‘reasonableness’ requires just that type of direct engagement, a requirement fulfilled by
ensuring municipal actions do not ‘fall outside the scope’ of their home legislation
The reasonableness standard applied in Catalyst is, at the very least, not identical
with ‘reasonableness’ in the post-Dunsmuir case law. Most obviously, the three criteria
have been eliminated as necessary elements of a reasonable decision. Owing to the
elimination of the criteria, the role of enabling legislation is recast; now it will serve to
guide courts in assessing the substance of, and procedures followed when adopting, a
specific bylaw. As a result, reviewing courts are not discouraged from engaging with
discretionary outcomes, but are instead required to do so. Of course, the nature of the
engagement with municipal outcomes described in Catalyst is highly deferential; so
much so that it bears a striking resemblance to the jurisdictional test Craig had
recommend four years earlier, i.e., ‘Was the municipal action within the general scope of
what the legislature contemplated when it granted power to the municipality?’
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4(b) The ‘Broad and Purposive Approach’ to Correctness and Catalyst
In this section I argue the version of reasonableness relied upon by Chief Justice
McLachlin in Catalyst is identical to a standard of judicial review that existed prior to
Dunsmuir, viz., the broad and purposive approach to correctness. I begin with an analysis
of the ruling in which this variant of correctness is first presented, i.e., Nanaimo (City) v.
Rascal Trucking, followed by a sketch of the four subsequent rulings in which it is
elaborated.63 I then articulate the way in which its three primary features are evident in
Catalyst. Specifically, the broad and purposive approach (i) ensures municipal actions are
within the scope of their enabling legislation, in a manner that is nonetheless (ii) sensitive
to the status of municipal actors as democratically elected representatives. The most
significant similarity is what this standard, as a variant of correctness, entails; like
McLachlin CJ’s revised account of reasonableness, the broad and purposive approach
(iii) does not require reasons in support of a municipal bylaw.
In Rascal Trucking the City of Nanaimo, prompted by complaints from local
residents about noise and dust, decided that 15,000 cubic yards of soil on private land
leased by Rascal Trucking Ltd. was a nuisance and ordered its removal under their
enabling legislation.64 In the court of first instance, Nanaimo’s resolution that the pile
was a nuisance was upheld, then quashed on appeal.65 In their result, the Court concluded
both that the City was correct in determining it had the power to declare the pile a
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nuisance,66 and that the subsequent removal order was a reasonable exercise of that
power.67
Taking a cue from Justice McLachlin’s (as she was then) dissenting opinion in
Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City)68, Major J introduces the broad and
purposive approach as a preliminary guide to his interpretation of the relevant legislative
provision: “The process of delineating municipal jurisdiction is an exercise in statutory
construction. There is ample authority, on the interpretation of statutes generally and of
municipal statutes specifically, to support a broad and purposive approach.”69 On his
account, that means that a statute is to be “construed purposively in [its] entire context
and in light of the scheme of the Act as a whole with a view toward ascertaining the
legislature’s true intent.”70
Justice Major elaborates the two elements of this approach with his interpretation
of the legislative provision: It is ‘broad’ owing to his willingness to acknowledge that
since “a pile of soil does not materialize on its own, [it] must at least be erected
presumably by piling or dumping,”71 meaning Rascal’s pile can be plausibly understood
to fall within the domain of a ‘building, structure, or erection of any kind’. The Court’s
interpretation is ‘purposive’ inasmuch as Major J reads the phrase ‘or other matter or
66

Ibid at para 26.
Ibid at para 39.
68
Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 SCR 231 [Shell Products] Justice
McLachlin endorses a ‘benevolent construction’ of municipal powers (at para 59) primarily
because “the elected members of council are discharging a statutory duty. The right to exercise
that duty freely and in accordance with the perceived wishes of the people they represent is vital
to local democracy. Consequently, courts should be reluctant to interfere with the decisions of
municipal councils. Judicial intervention is warranted only where a municipality's exercise of its
powers is clearly ultra vires” (at para 69).
69
Supra note 14 at para 18.
70
Ibid at para 20.
71
Ibid at para 24.
67

118

thing’ as extending the list of possible physical structures and watercourses that can be
declared nuisances beyond those explicitly listed in the provision. Since the purpose of
this particular power is to permit municipal bodies to remove any object within town
limits that it ‘believes is so dilapidated or unclean as to be offensive to the community’,
excluding Rascal’s pile because the list does not explicitly include ‘piles of soil’ would
contravene that purpose.
That the broad and purposive approach informs an assessment of the correctness
of Nanaimo’s resolution is a point made while Major J is trying to determine which
standard of review ought to be applied. He notes that municipal authority is subordinate
to the provinces, and that councillors are not selected owing to their expertise in either
municipal law or municipal planning, meaning their being elected “does not give [them]
any particular advantage in deciding jurisdictional questions in the adjudicative context.
As a result, the courts may review those jurisdictional decisions on a standard of
correctness.”72 In other words, statutory construction is not an activity for which
municipal councillors must be experts and their being elected representatives does not
provide them that expertise. Courts therefore owe no deference to the reasons offered by
municipalities in support of an assertion of some statutory power. Again, however, courts
are to interpret such assertions charitably by reading the enabling legislation in a broad
and purposive manner.
Over the course of seven years following the ruling in Rascal Trucking and
preceding Dunsmuir, the Court affirms and refines the broad and purposive approach four
times. It repeatedly asserts the combined ideas that while deference is not owed to
72
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municipal bodies as experts in statutory construction, reviewing courts are nonetheless
required to interpret municipal powers in a manner respects their status as democratic
institutions. So, for example, in PNI Lebel J, writing for the majority, notes that “our
Court has adopted such principles as the one that ambiguities in municipal government
statutes are to be interpreted so as to favour the citizens and their ability to undertake a
path of shared self-governance.”73 The broad and purposive approach therefore implies a
presumption in favour of assertions of municipal powers because on their face, those
assertions reflect the interests of citizens as expressed by their elected representatives.
Lebel J reiterates a similar explanation of the need for the broad and purposive approach
less than a year later in his concurring opinion in Spray-Tech: “A tradition of strong local
government has become an important part of the Canadian democratic experience. This
level of government usually appears more attuned to the immediate needs and concerns
of the citizens... a grant of power must [therefore] be construed reasonably and
generously.”74
Three years later in United Taxi Bastarache J reaffirms the broad and purposive
approach as an assessment of correctness, meaning no deference is owed to the reasons of
municipal decision makers: “Municipalities do not possess any greater institutional
competence or expertise than the courts in delineating their jurisdiction. Such a question
will always be reviewed on a standard of correctness.”75 Nonetheless, he notes there has

PNI, supra note 63 at para 71. It is worth noting that this statement is a reversal of the Court’s
earlier stated position as set out by the majority in Shell Products at para 30: “Any [legislative]
ambiguity or doubt is to be resolved in favour of the [individual] citizen especially when the grant
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been a shift in the drafting of municipal legislation whereby municipal bodies are most
often intentionally granted “broad authority over generally defined matters… [an
authority that] reflects the true purpose of modern municipalities which require greater
flexibility in fulfilling their statutory purposes.”76 It follows that a court determining the
scope of municipal powers needs to assess such claims using a standard that better
reflects this flexibility. Finally, in RSJ Holdings the Court decides judicial interference
with a municipal bylaw is warranted owing to the failure of the municipal body to fulfill
its democratic obligations. According to Charron J, “The democratic legitimacy of
municipal decisions does not spring solely from periodic elections, but also from a
decision-making process that is transparent, accessible to the public, and mandated by
law. When a municipal government improperly acts with secrecy, this undermines the
democratic legitimacy of its decision.”77
The broad and purposive approach is a version of the correctness standard
inasmuch as it does not require reviewing courts to show deference to the reasons offered
by municipal bodies in support of their policy choices. It is, nonetheless, a variant of that
standard inasmuch as it demands a type of deference from reviewing courts; specifically,
it demands a presumption in favour of an assertion of power implicit within any given
decision. Every time a municipal bylaw is passed, a municipal body is implicitly and
necessarily maintaining that the power the bylaw invokes is a power they enjoy under
their enabling legislation. While courts are free to ignore any justification of power from
a municipality, their own de novo justification is not unfettered; courts must construe the
contribute to the public good, see Hoi Kong, “Something to Talk About: Regulation and
Justification in Canadian Municipal Law” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ at para 28.
76
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enabling statute charitably out of respect for the character of municipal bodies as
democratic institutions. Courts are therefore required to ‘defer’ to municipal bylaws when
engaged in a review for correctness according to the broad and purposive approach by
presuming the powers municipal bodies implicitly assert therein are powers they enjoy,
and interpreting the enabling statute accordingly.78
That the standard of review applied in Catalyst more closely resembles the broad
and purposive approach than reasonableness is not difficult to establish. As I noted in
4(a) above, a review of a municipal bylaw according to the Court ultimately attempts to
(i) establish the impugned bylaw is within the scope of the powers conferred by the
enabling legislation, in a manner that properly (ii) “reflects the broad discretion
provincial legislators have traditionally accorded to municipalities engaged in delegated
legislation”79 owing to their character as democratic institutions. In other words, a review
of municipal bylaws is an exercise in statutory construction that occurs (iii) without
regard for any of the reasons offered, an exercise that is nonetheless guided by the unique
democratic but subordinate legislative role of municipalities in the Canadian
constitutional order.
Consider also how the ratio in Catalyst could have easily been framed as an
exercise in statutory construction. The question was whether it lie within the power of the
municipality to impose property tax rates that include a large imbalance between separate
classes. The difference between Class 1 (Residential) and Class 4 (Major Industry) set
78
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under the Bylaw amounted to a ratio of 1:20.4, or $2.14 per $1,000 for Class 1 property
as compared to $43.35 per $1,000 for Class 4 property.80 So do ss. 197 and 199(b) of the
Community Charter grant North Cowichan the power to perpetuate this type of inequity?
Since s. 197 requires the imposition of a regulation under s.199(b) to mandate a specific
inequality in tax rates, and no such regulation has existed since 1985, it follows that there
is nothing to “detract from the broad power of British Columbia municipalities to vary
rates between different classes of property.”81 As in cases like Rascal Trucking, SprayTech, and United Taxi, the enabling legislation failed to explicitly confer the power
implied by the municipal action. The resolution of that omission adopted by the Court is,
as it was in those cases, an interpretation that presumed the interests of citizens as
expressed by their democratically elected representatives were, on their face, within the
scope of the powers contemplated by the enabling legislation.
My analyses in section 4(a), when considered in combination with my description
of the broad and purposive approach, weigh heavily in favour of the view that the
standard described and applied in Catalyst is not, in fact, reasonableness. Instead, the
standard invoked bears the defining features of correctness. Most obviously, the broad
and purposive approach to correctness does not require courts defer to the reasons of
municipal bodies in support of their assertions of power. For the Court in Catalyst,
municipal bodies are under no obligation to present reasons in support of those assertions.
Instead, judicial review of municipal bylaws focuses on determining whether the implicit
assertion of power made by each bylaw is within the scope of the power implied by the
enabling legislation. That determination is made by presuming the assertion of power is
80
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consistent with the enabling legislation, a unique species of ‘deference toward assertions
of power’ intended to ensure courts respect the status of municipal bodies as legitimate
democratic institutions. What most clearly distinguishes this approach from the single
reasonableness standard is that it is not incumbent upon (because it is not possible for)
municipal bodies to justify the powers their bylaws imply, meaning the responsibility for
showing any given bylaw is intra vires rests exclusively with the courts.

4(c) Conclusions – Why Municipal Policy Decisions are not Suitable for Reasonableness
Review
I summarize my analyses of the ruling in Catalyst by articulating the genuine
conceptual dilemma they identify. This case was the first (and remains the only)
municipal decision of the post-Dunsmuir era. On the one hand, the pre-Dunsmuir
Supreme Court case law on municipal bodies had, owing to a genuine lack of expertise
on the part of elected municipal officials, deemed correctness to be the appropriate
standard of review.82 Nonetheless, courts reviewing municipal policies for correctness
were to show a great deal of leeway, i.e., a type of ‘curial deference in statutory
construction’ owing to those policy decisions being made in a legitimate democratic
institution. In Dunsmuir, however, the sharp line between correctness and reasonableness
on the basis of deference was reaffirmed; the former required none, the latter required
whatever amount was appropriate given the factual and legal context. If the defining
distinction between those two standards as set out in Dunsmuir was to be maintained, the
82
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Court in Catalyst was barred from invoking correctness, since a municipal policy choice
must be entitled to deference. The alternative, the option chosen by the Court, was to
abandon the relationship between reasons and outcomes as the respective object and
product of a reasonableness review. The result was a description of reasonableness unlike
any earlier description, relying only on the range of reasonable outcomes.
Whether Chief Justice McLachlin decided to rely on correctness or
reasonableness in Catalyst, the Court was faced with a genuine quandary; either the clear
distinction between correctness and reasonableness based on deference, or the clear
understanding of reasonableness understood as an analysis of reasons by reference to the
three criteria only, would need to be abandoned. This dilemma suggests Binnie J’s
concern that the single reasonableness standard introduced in Dunsmuir would not be
sufficiently flexible to accommodate every administrative body was well-founded.
Chiasson’s and Craig’s respective predictions that that lack of flexibility would become
apparent in the context of a municipal policy decision have been vindicated. And Daly’s
claim that the Court did not rely on the single reasonableness standard is compelling,
even if his claim that they reintroduced patent unreasonableness is not.
My last step in this section is to provide two reasons for thinking it is preferable to
understand the Court’s ratio in Catalyst as an application of the broad and purposive
approach to correctness, rather than accepting Daly’s contention that it reintroduces the
patent unreasonableness standard. My first reason is the clarity in the structure of judicial
review my account preserves, specifically in the distinction between correctness and
reasonableness. I note first that the distinction between these standards has two separate
components. Most obviously, reasonableness demands deference to reasons, whereas
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correctness demands none. But the distinction also identifies two separate objects of a
court’s focus; since no deference to reasons is owed on a review for correctness, the only
possible objects of review are either the existence of a delegated power implied by an
outcome, or the outcome itself. In the context of a review for reasonableness by contrast,
the only object of review is the reasons offered. If the broad and purposive approach is
the appropriate standard of review for municipal policy choices because they need not be
supported by reasons, then correctness remains exclusively concerned to review
outcomes or the legislative foundation for the powers those outcomes imply, not reasons.
Of course, my account does not completely retain the clarity provided by using
deference and non-deference as a rigid point marking the distinction between
reasonableness and correctness. Had the Court explicitly chosen to apply the broad and
purposive approach in Catalyst, doing so would endorse a variant of correctness that
requires courts show deference, undermining the Dunsmuir characterization of
correctness as a ‘non-deferential’ standard.83 That having been said, the distinction would
be at least partially retained; it would remain the case that reviewing courts are to refrain
from showing deference to reasons in particular. The only change would be that curial
deference needs to be shown to the defining object of a correctness review, i.e., the
outcome reached. Adopting the broad and purposive approach would not distinguish
correctness from reasonableness by appealing to deference alone then; instead, it would
distinguish the two by reference to their respective objects of deference. The broad and

And herein lies the confusion created by the Dunsmuir majority’s appeal to United Taxi;
presumably that appeal qualifies as a tacit endorsement of the broad and purposive approach as a
legitimate but uniquely ‘deferential’ standard of correctness.
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purposive approach requires deference toward outcomes and statutory powers, whereas
reasonableness continues to require deference toward reasons only.
Were we to accept that the Court in Catalyst did, by comparison, reintroduce the
patent unreasonableness standard, the differences between the standards of judicial
review are considerably more confusing. Most obviously, reasonableness no longer
requires reviewing courts to remain exclusively focused on the reasons offered in support
of an outcome. Instead, they would be required to focus on outcomes, in a manner that
has not been previously articulated. And since the correctness standard (unmodified by
the broad and purposive approach) also requires reviewing courts to focus on outcomes
(and the delegated power every outcome implies), the manner by which that focus would
differ in the context of a review for reasonableness in particular would need to be
clarified. The cost to clarity is therefore less if the Court in Catalyst is taken to have
relied on the broad and purposive approach rather than patent unreasonableness.
The second reason the broad and purposive approach is preferable is that it better
respects the status of municipal bodies as legitimate democratic institutions than patent
unreasonableness. That a reasonableness review is generally not well-suited to assessing
municipal policy decisions is a point made by Craig: “Is there compelling justification for
a reasonableness review of constitutional, intra vires municipal bylaws? Federal
legislation cannot be challenged on the grounds that it is unreasonable. Provincial
legislation cannot be challenged on the grounds that it is unreasonable. Why is a court
entitled to quash constitutional municipal legislation where it sees that legislation as
unreasonable?”84 So long as a decision is being made in a manner consistent with the idea
84
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of ‘responsible democracy’, the resulting decision should not then be subjected to the
further question of whether it is ‘reasonable’.85
Craig’s concern is exacerbated if the ruling in Catalyst is understood to have
applied patent unreasonableness. In sections 2 and 3 we saw that the purpose of requiring
reviewing courts to remain narrowly focused on reasons was so they would not be
tempted to interfere with an outcome based on a potentially idiosyncratic understanding
of ‘reasonable’. In the context of a democratic body, concerns about idiosyncratic
understandings are heightened since interference with the decision of a democratic
institution is at least in principle interference with the will of the majority. If the standard
used in Catalyst was patent unreasonableness however, then the possibility of
interference increased since a reviewing court is focused on the ‘reasonableness’ of the
outcome itself, a concept that by definition cannot be grounded in the determinacy
provided by the three criteria.
Though McLachlin CJ relied on a highly deferential standard in Catalyst,
understanding that standard as a variant of ‘reasonableness’ admits the possibility that a
court could interfere with an intra vires municipal policy decision on the grounds that it
is unreasonable. The broad and purposive approach is, by contrast, a jurisdictional test
only; it is left entirely to the courts to determine whether the power claimed is justifiable
by reference to the legislative grant, a determination that begins with the presumption the
power is justified. Once a municipal policy decision is determined to be intra vires
according to this standard, the rule of law is preserved and the possibility of judicial
interference on any further grounds is therefore extinguished.
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5. Conclusions: A Clear Account of the Relationship between Reasons and Outcomes
This chapter completes my account of the sense in which the framework of the
single reasonableness standard is clear and coherent. For my purposes, the most
important result is the foundation in law my analyses provide for the assumption upon
which my arguments in Chapters 3 and 4 depended, i.e., that the five elements of the
three criteria are the only standards by which to assess the reasonableness of an
administrative decision. The means by which I articulated that support involved
defending an account of how the Court understood the relationship between reasons and
outcomes in Dunsmuir. Specifically, the majority held the range of reasonable outcomes
are the product of any reasons that satisfy the three criteria, not a separate standard of
assessment; the function of that concept is, instead, to denote the unavoidable plurality of
possibly reasonable outcomes. This understanding of the reasonable range was affirmed
and elaborated by the Court in both Khosa and NLNU.
Of course, since the Supreme Court of Canada is the final and conclusive
authority on all matters of Canadian law,86 one misstatement can upset an otherwise
coherent legal standard. The misstatement in respect of the single reasonableness
standard was made in Catalyst. The cost to clarity presented by that ruling is significant;
accepted on its face, the Court severs the necessary connection between reasons and
outcomes, and abandons the universal applicability of the three criteria as a basis for
determining whether a decision is justified. The result is that there is no well-established
set of criteria to serve as a basis for determining whether the decision subject to review is
unreasonable, and therefore no clear means by which to establish whether the rule of law
86
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is in jeopardy and interference is necessary. The clarity of reasonableness in the postDunsmuir case law is significantly undermined by this one ruling.
Rescuing reasonableness from the ruling in Catalyst relied on articulating the
Court’s mischaracterization; first I identified the way in which the standard applied by
McLachlin CJ differed from the consistent description in the case law, then how that
standard incorporated the defining features of the broad and purposive approach to
correctness. The success of that argument preserves the notion of reasonableness as an
assessment that can only be conducted on a decision subject to the obligation to present
reason set out in Baker.87 But my analysis of Catalyst has also served to bolster my case
for the clarity of reasonableness by serving a role similar to the comparative argument I
made in Chapter 4. That is, it shows the framework defended in Chapter 3 is coherent
inasmuch as it can be used to identify and at least partially resolve confusions arising in
the case law.
My account of reasonableness by reference to the three criteria helped to identify
and resolve the confusion of Catalyst first by pointing toward the two unique features of
the description of reasonableness, i.e., (i) Municipal bodies are under no obligation to
justify their policy choices with reasons, meaning (ii) The legal framework is not used to
establish the context by which to determine the relevance of reasons. My account also
provided a more precise foundation for articulating the difference between the broad and
purposive approach to correctness and reasonableness, viz., by reference to the objects of
assessment toward which deference is to be shown. There are two further but as yet
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unstated senses in which my attempt to identify and resolve the confusion introduced in
Catalyst contributes to the clarity of the framework of reasonableness.
First, my analyses provide a means by which to recast the distinction between
correctness and reasonableness, in terms of the roles each assign a reviewing court and
administrative decision maker. A decision subject to reasonableness review is one in
which it is, following Baker, incumbent upon the decision maker to establish that their
decision is justified. By presenting a justification, the decision maker shows their
decision is not merely a function of their arbitrary whims but is, instead, at least
supported by reasons that are relevant given the legal context. The task of a reviewing
court in those circumstances is merely to confirm that justification exists. Decisions
assessed for correctness, by contrast, place no justificatory demand on the decision
maker. The burden of showing the decision and/or the assertion of power implied by the
decision is justified within the legal framework rests with the reviewing court. So the role
of a court engaged in reasonableness review is to ensure the administrative body fulfilled
their justificatory burden. In a review for correctness, that burden rests with the court.
There is a second unavoidable and undeniably clear implication of my claim that
the only substantive components of reasonableness are the five elements of the three
criteria. Accepting that municipal bodies are not subject to the obligation to present
reasons in support of their policy decisions, it follows that municipal policy decisions are
immune from reasonableness review. Indeed, the implication is broader; any
administrative decision not subject to the obligation to present reasons is immune from a
review for reasonableness. And since it is not possible for an administrative body to be
free from the scrutiny of the courts if the rule of law is to obtain, any species of decision
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immunized from reasonableness review in this manner must be subject to review for
correctness. In other words, if the administrative body has no obligation to show the
impugned decision is justified, the task of providing that justification falls to the courts.
I cannot deny that the ruling in Catalyst confuses the single reasonableness
standard. Even if my critical analysis is accepted in its entirety, questions remain. If my
analysis is compelling however, those questions are thankfully directed toward the broad
and purposive approach to correctness, and the usefulness of the concept of deference as
a means of distinguishing between the two standards. Specifically, is the broad and
purposive approach a third standard of judicial review, or is it merely a unique
application of the existing correctness standard to municipal bodies? And since the broad
and purposive approach demands a ‘deference in statutory construction’ by incorporating
a presumption in favour of an assertion of power, how useful is ‘deference’ as a means of
distinguishing between reasonableness and correctness? While both of these questions are
in need of answers to properly understand the process of judicial review in Canada,
neither affects the clarity of reasonableness, my narrow focus throughout.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions – Reasonableness, Judicial Interference, the Rule of Law, and
Canadian Democracy

1. The Clarity of Reasonableness: A Single, Coherent Balancing Principle
The primary goal of these concluding remarks is to explain how the defining
features of the single reasonableness standard, presented in and clarified since
Dunsmuir,1are all unified by the single balancing principle I identified at the outset, i.e.:
Judicial interference owing to unreasonableness needs to occur when the impugned
decision is arbitrary in the sense that it is not justifiable within the legal context; and it
needs to be prohibited in all other cases out of respect for the foundational democratic
principle. The coherent unity is a result of the features of reasonableness I have identified
throughout pointing toward this single end; arbitrary administrative decisions are the
necessary grounds for, and the simultaneous limit on the possible grounds for, judicial
interference owing to unreasonableness.
To connect the features of the single reasonableness standard I have identified, I
first remind readers of each. I began by showing that
(i) A review for reasonableness relies on a clear conceptual foundation, viz., the
five elements implied by the three criteria. Those elements are substantively clear,
and also imply an intuitive conceptual hierarchy.
I used the order implied by the five elements of the three criteria to identify the threshold
criterion for judicial interference:
(ii) Relevance is the threshold criterion which, when satisfied, ensures that a
justification exists. This follows from the fact that relevance cannot be established
until there exists a set of public, genuine, meaningful, and consistent sentences.
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What came to light from my analyses of the conceptual features of reasonableness in the
post-Dunsmuir case law was evidence of the Court’s consistent pattern of application:
(iii) The reasons supporting the impugned decision are summarized by the Court,
the aspects of the legal framework that bear on the case are identified, and finally
the reasons are tested for relevance given that legal context.
By isolating the threshold for interference, and the pattern evident in every application of
reasonableness, I was able to generate a clear point of contrast. In Chapter 4 I was
therefore able to precisely characterize the substantive change to the circumstances in
which judicial interference is necessary on reasonableness review:
(iv) The adoption of relevance as the threshold criterion of the reasonableness
standard entails that interference owing to inadequacy is not necessary to preserve
the rule of law, and is therefore prohibited.
Finally, I was able explain in Chapter 5 the relationship between, owing to the respective
roles of, the two ‘objects of concern’ of any court undertaking a review for
reasonableness:
(v) The three criteria serve as the lone standard by which decisions are assessed
for reasonableness, while an outcome within the reasonable range is the product
of any reasons that satisfy that standard.
To highlight the unifying conceptual thread running throughout these features of
reasonableness, I begin by reminding readers of the balancing act that is the process of
judicial review: Courts are required to preserve the rule of law while simultaneously
respecting the foundational democratic principle.2 I briefly discussed, in Chapter 1, how
the ‘the rule of law’ is understood by the Supreme Court of Canada as a prohibition on
arbitrary state action, drawing in particular on Rand J’s concurring opinion in Roncarelli3
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and the majority in Baker.4 Consistent with the views of scholars like Dicey,5 Hayek,6
Fuller,7 and Raz,8 an action of the state is ‘arbitrary’ and so offends the rule of law in
Canada when it cannot be justified by reference to the existing legal framework. Since at
least Baker, courts ensure the decisions of administrative bodies in particular are
justifiable in the legal context and so not arbitrary by requiring that, for the most part,
those decisions actually be justified by reasons. Understood as an attempt to preserve the
rule of law by preventing arbitrary administrative action only, reasonableness restricts
interference to a single point. Specifically, judicial interference with administrative action
owing to unreasonableness occurs only when it is necessary to maintain the rule of law.
In all other circumstances, reviewing courts are obligated to accept the administrative
decision out of respect for the foundational democratic principle.
The precise meaning of ‘a justification’, and so the precise meaning of an action
that is ‘not arbitrary’ is, on my account, provided exclusively by the five concepts of the
three criteria. That those five concepts reflect an effort to restrict judicial interference to
the absolute minimum necessary to preserve the rule of law is evidenced in part by the
relative ease with which their requirements can be satisfied. If a reviewing court can
confirm the existence of genuine, meaningful, and consistent reasons that matter to an
outcome the decision is not arbitrary by definition, so interference is prohibited. This
narrow limit on the possibility of interference precludes the possibility of courts
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demanding that reasons that are relevant also be ‘good’ or ‘better than other sets of
relevant reasons’. So the framework of reasonableness entails that interference can only
occur when no justification exists, meaning the relative quality of competing
justifications is not a matter for a reviewing court to consider.
The conceptual order implied by the five elements of three criteria isolate the
relevance criterion in particular as the threshold for judicial interference. That precise
threshold significantly bolsters the strength of my claim that the single reasonableness
standard demands interference only when a decision is arbitrary, and prohibits
interference in all other cases. When a set of reasons simply do not matter to an outcome,
they are undeniably arbitrary; the set of possible reasons that could be cited in support of,
but do not actually matter to some decision are infinite. And since, as was noted in
Chapter 3, the assessment for relevance occupies the bulk of a court’s efforts during a
reasonableness review, the narrow focus of any such review is the ‘tipping-point’
between an arbitrary action and one that is justified. This narrow assessment, as I
established in Chapter 4, reduced the circumstances in which judicial interference is
necessary by prohibiting the possibility of interference owing to inadequacy.
I have argued throughout this project that a court undertaking a review for
reasonableness is assessing reasons only, meaning they are to have little or no regard for
the particular decision selected. My most explicit defence of that claim appeared in
Chapter 5, wherein I articulated the relationship between reasons and outcomes. I then
used that account to identify and set-aside the problems to that characterization presented
by the ruling in Catalyst.9 Specifically, since the ‘range of reasonable outcomes’ refers to
9
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the product of any set reasons that could satisfy the three criteria only, it contains no
standard for assessment by which to determine whether a particular outcome is arbitrary
and is therefore a threat to the rule of law. If the standard applied in Catalyst is
reasonableness, then the possibility of judicial interference with a justifiable decision, and
therefore the possibility of undue interference with the foundational democratic principle,
has been reintroduced, contrary to the otherwise consistent prohibition in the case law.
Each clear feature of reasonableness my analyses have identified coheres with
every other by reference to a single general principle. That principle is most evident in
the consistent narrative the evolution of reasonableness in the Supreme Court case law
has allowed me to develop. With the exception of the decision in Catalyst, none of the
refinements or clarifications made to the single reasonableness standard in the postDunsmuir case law are dramatic or surprizing. Instead, each is the sort of refinement that
should be expected if judicial interference is to occur only when the rule of law is
jeopardized by an arbitrary decision, and is prohibited in all other cases out of respect for
democracy.

2. The Relative Degrees of, and Limited Expectations for, the Possibility of Clarity in the
Process of Judicial Review
On my account, the defining features of reasonableness since Dunsmuir are clear
and coherently united by a single general principle. Of course, as I noted in Chapters 1
and 2, that conclusion is not widely endorsed in the academic commentary. My goal in
this section is to briefly offer a speculative explanation of how commentators like
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Mullan,10 Goltz,11 Daly,12 and Lewans13 could have reached a conclusion that is, in at
least one sense, diametrically opposed to my own. I will suggest that the difference in our
results is a function of our distinct approaches. Specifically, all four were seeking out
sources of confusion, primarily in the form of inconsistencies in the case law. I by
contrast have been driven to identify point of structural clarity that are a result of a
consistent pattern of similarities throughout the case law.
Mullan’s and Goltz’s claims that the single reasonableness standard is lacking in
clarity appeared immediately after its introduction in Dunsmuir, so I will focus on the
more recent criticisms of Daly and Lewans. At the end of Chapter 2 I noted that both
authors maintain that the primary confusion arising in the post-Dunsmuir case law is an
inconsistent account of the standard of review analysis prompted by Fish J’s majority
opinion in Alliance Pipeline.14 I discussed their concerns about reasonableness in both
Chapters 2 and 3; both Daly and Lewans argue the decision in Mowat15 is not a consistent
application of the reasonableness standard. Lewans levels the same charge against the
ruling in Figliola,16 and as we saw in Chapter 5 Daly argues that the opinion in Catalyst
is also inconsistent.17 As I noted, my analyses do not speak directly to any of their
concerns, meaning each may qualify as a genuine inconsistency in the application of
David Mullan “Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, Standard of Review and Procedural Fairness for
Public Servants: Let’s Try Again!” (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 117 at 150.
11
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reasonableness. The important point for my purposes is the approach Daly and Lewans
share; each is looking to articulate ways in which the case law defining reasonableness
strays from, or highlights a confusion inherent within, the original definition set out in
Dunsmuir.
With the exception of my analysis of the ruling in Catalyst, my analyses in this
project have, in contrast with Daly’s and Lewans’s, sought to highlight the broad
similarities that persist in the post-Dunsmuir case law on reasonableness. That approach
has revealed a clear conceptual foundation, a precise threshold for interference, a
consistent procedure for conducting a reasonableness review, a precise characterization
of the changes to the circumstances in which judicial interference is necessary, and a
clear account of the relationship between reasons and outcomes. Because clarity is a
relative term however, it remains possible the charges of Daly and Lewans do not
actually oppose my account. Only if they are maintaining the isolated inconsistencies
they identify in the case law show there are significant structural problems with the
reasonableness standard would I disagree, since my arguments imply that no such
structural problems exist. Otherwise, it remains entirely possible that the single
reasonableness standard is both structurally clear, and has suffered from several particular
confusions in its application.
There is, however, one shortcoming of any attempt to articulate isolated
inconsistencies in the case law, a shortcoming that is pronounced in the context of
administrative law, a shortcoming from which my choice to emphasize structural
similarities does not suffer. The problem is the scope of the process of judicial review;
there are a vast and disparate set of delegated decision makers to whom these standards
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apply. To criticize the clarity of principles that are so general by pinpointing isolated
inconsistencies in the case law unrealistically implies a ‘clear’ account of those principles
ought to prevent such inconsistencies from occurring. Given the many types of
administrative body that can be subject to reasonableness review in particular, the
possibility of a standard that provides courts and practitioners determinate case by case
guidance simply does not exist. If those criticizing the clarity of the evolution of
reasonableness in the post-Dunsmuir case law mean to have these expectations fulfilled, I
respectfully submit that their hopes are the problem, not the clarity of reasonableness.
It is for this reason that I maintain the approach I have adopted in this project, and
the results that approach has yielded, represent (close to) the highest degree of clarity that
could be expected from any general legal standard. By elaborating the consistent themes
expressed in the Supreme Court case law I have constructed a clear account of a standard
that is designed to apply to a wide variety of administrative bodies. While much of that
construct is a result of my own interpretive efforts, my interpretations were nonetheless
grounded in the clear structural similarities that appeared every time a decision was
assessed for reasonableness. Given that the Canadian legal system is shaped by fallible,
finite, and well-meaning humans, particular inconsistencies in the application of that
standard will inevitably occur. What I have shown is that no particular inconsistencies
that threaten the structural clarity and coherence of reasonableness have emerged in the
post-Dunsmuir case law (apart from the ruling in Catalyst).
Of course, clarity in the structure of a set of general standards is limited. There is
one legitimate and significant confusion in the structure of the reasonableness standard
that is, in a practical sense, unresolved. Irrespective of my attempt to show in Chapter 5
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that the Court in Catalyst relied on the broad and purposive approach to correctness, the
reality is that McLachlin CJ explicitly maintains the appropriate standard for reviewing
municipal policy decisions is reasonableness. If that position is left to stand, then Daly’s
concern that the Court reintroduced patent unreasonableness needs to be addressed. If, by
contrast, my claim that the Court relied on the broad and purposive approach to
correctness is accepted, confusion persists. Is this a third standard of review, or simply a
unique application of the traditional correctness standard? And if correctness was the
standard used, how is the notion of curial deference meant to serve as a clear point of
distinction between reasonableness and correctness, given the seemingly deferential
character of the broad and purposive approach? Unfortunately, these confusions will have
to remain topics for future investigation. I end simply by noting that so long as my claim
that the Court applied the broad and purposive approach in Catalyst is compelling, these
confusions do not directly impact the clarity of the single reasonableness standard.

3. Recommendations for Practitioners of Administrative Law in Canada
One final test of my claim that the single reasonableness standard is clear; it must
be able to provide guidance to those engaged in the practice of administrative law. There
are four related recommendations for practitioners that follow from my analyses. All are
directed primarily toward those representing parties seeking to challenge administrative
decisions on the grounds that they are unreasonable, because their chances for success are
most directly affected my discussion. The first recommendation is general; clients should
be generally discouraged from seeking judicial interference owing to unreasonableness,
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because reasonableness warrants interference in fewer cases than prior to Dunsmuir.18
More specifically, there are no longer any circumstances in which interference owing to
inadequacy will warrant interference. In the abstract, challenging an administrative
decision on the grounds of unreasonableness is now more of an uphill battle at the outset
than it had previously been.
The second recommendation follows from the first, but provides a more specific
strategic warning; presenting an alternative outcome that is also reasonable will never be
sufficient to justify interference. In the case law, this rule is set out most clearly in
Maclean. But of course, this rule is required as a matter of consistency; since the burden
on an administrative body is merely to show that the reasons they present in support of a
decision are relevant given the legal context, presenting an alternate set of reasons and
outcome cannot show the decision maker has failed to discharge that burden. It follows
that the only strategy with any chance of prompting a reviewing court to interfere on the
basis of unreasonableness will be one that is exclusively concerned to establish that the
reasons supporting the decision fail to satisfy the requirements set out by the three
criteria.
A third recommendation follows from the second; the bulk of a court’s review for
reasonableness will be dedicated to establishing that the reasons presented are relevant
given the legal context. Practitioners who succeed in showing judicial interference is
18

It is important to note that the chances of successfully challenging the decision of an
administrative body were already low. See, for example, G. Van Harten, G. Heckman, and D. J.
Mullan, Administrative Law: cases, texts, and materials 6th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications Ltd, 2010) at 21: “[P]ublic law litigation is generally a remedy of last resort; the cost
of taking the administration to court is high; the prospect of success in court is limited; and even
when a favourable judicial decision is obtained, the possibility remains that, having corrected the
legal error, the administration may not change the substance of the decision that generated the
complaint.”
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necessary will therefore be those who prepare a case focused on articulating the way in
which the impugned outcome is not supported by reasons that are relevant in that context.
My last recommendation is specifically directed to those seeking to challenge a
municipal policy decision. Owing to the status of municipal bodies as democratic
institutions, the Court in Catalyst imposed an exceedingly high burden on complainants
seeking judicial relief (irrespective of whether that burden assumes the form of a review
for correctness or reasonableness). Municipalities need not support their decisions with
reasons, and there exists a presumption in favour of the assertions of municipal powers
every bylaw implies. A challenge to a municipal policy decision therefore cannot succeed
on the ground that the bylaw fails to satisfy the three criteria. Instead, the only chance of
success lies in showing that the decision does not fall within the scope of the powers
contemplated by provincial legislators. It follows that an inability to show the impugned
action is clearly ultra vires means practitioners should not expect to successfully
challenge a municipal decision. There is no meaningful sense in which a complainant can
expect to succeed when challenging the reasonableness of a municipal policy decision.

4. Final Thoughts – Causes for Concern and Optimism
There is, I believe, one genuine cause for concern that emerges from my analyses
of the post-Dunsmuir case law. More specifically, there is one way in which the reforms
to the single reasonableness standard introduce the possibility that the need for reasons,
and the role of reviewing courts in assessing those reasons, might become significantly
confused. My concern arises from the Court’s treatment of implicit reasons as set out in
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ATA19 and Maclean.20 More specifically, I am concerned by these repeated attempts to
prioritize the justifiability of an administrative decision over its actually being justified.
According to those two rulings, the mere absence of a justification is not an independent
basis for interference. As I argued in Chapter 3, this approach is entirely consistent with
my account of reasonableness as an attempt to prevent arbitrary decisions; if reasons that
satisfy the three criteria are available in the sense that they are obvious to a reviewing
court, the rule of law is upheld because the decision is justifiable, meaning interference is
prohibited.21 The problem is the possibility for abuse this priority introduces.
If courts are obligated to seek out implicit reasons, it is at least possible that
administrative decision makers could cease to present reasons; the justifiability of their
decisions will be, if and when necessary, determined by the courts. Since the statistical
likelihood that reviewing courts will not interfere owing to unreasonableness is high,
most complainants would be unlikely to pursue judicial review merely to ensure the
decision to which they object was indeed justifiable. If decisions that are not
accompanied by reasons are not challenged, the chances those decisions will in some
cases not be justifiable and so arbitrary increases, undermining the rule of law. So the
willingness of the Court to seek out and accept implicit reasons needs to be clearly
constrained, and no obvious basis for constraint presents itself.22

19

A.T.A. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner) 2011 SCC 61.
Maclean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission) 2013 SCC 67.
21
Supra at 66 – 74.
22
I am not the first to raise a version of this concern. See, for example, Van Harten et al supra
note 18 at 437: “[I]f a tribunal gives reasons that do not reveal some legal error in its approach to
the legislation but are unduly vague or ambiguous, can a court nonetheless… allow the appeal or
set the decision aside as being wrong in law, even though in a substantive sense the decision was
one that the tribunal could properly reach?”
20
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I end by articulating the sense in which my claim that there are no longer any
circumstances under which a reviewing court will declare an objectively less desirable
but justified decision unreasonable is a cause for optimism. During the evolution of
judicial review over the course of the twentieth century, “there were aspects of the courts’
practice… that were the equivalent of a war between the courts and the legislature.”23 In
other words, courts struggled to strike the appropriate balance between the role of the
court upholding the rule of law and the powers of democratically elected representatives
to confer delegated authority. What my analyses throughout this project suggest is that, at
least in respect of reasonableness, that struggle has come to an end. It has ended because
the reasonableness standard clearly identifies an appropriately narrow set of
circumstances in which interference owing to unreasonableness is necessary to preserve
the rule of law. Specifically, interference is necessary only when a delegated decision
maker decides arbitrarily as defined by the three criteria. When, by contrast, the reasons
in support of a decision satisfy the criteria, irrespective of the relative shortcomings of the
outcome, courts will refrain from intervention out of respect for the foundational
democratic principle.

23

Ibid at 674.
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